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‘I have struggled with weakness of the will all my life. So many opportunities 
passed me by simply because I was unable to keep my eyes on the prize. The lure 
of the tiniest joy is sufficient to make me avert my eyes from aspirations that I am 
genuinely committed to. You do not want to hear my diatribe: my love life, my 
health, my career … all ruined by weakness of the will’
Luc Bovens (1999, 230)
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1.1 Reintroducing a character approach to akrasia
For several years now, I have been convinced that it is best to limit my shower 
time to conserve water. Nevertheless, I continue to find it difficult to resist 
taking long showers. The temptation of the pleasant and relaxing feeling 
of hot running water often prevails over my judgment that it is best not to 
use up water unnecessarily, given environmental considerations. One could 
say that I have a tendency to violate my better judgment in this respect, an 
‘akratic’ tendency, which is persistent and disconcerting to me.
 In philosophy, akrasia1 raises two problems. Contemporary 
philosophers often  approach it as a logical puzzle. They consider akrasia in the 
form of a single and isolated episode of acting against one’s better judgment.2 
Their challenge is to explain how an akratic action is possible in its most 
paradoxical form: how can someone perform an action while at the same 
time judging it best to act otherwise? Ancient and medieval philosophers, 
on the other hand, view akrasia primarily as a moral problem. They regard 
it as a character trait that stands in the way of a moral ideal, such as virtue 
1  This Greek term is often translated in English as ‘weakness of  will’ or sometimes 
as ‘incontinence’, following the Latin incontinentia. I choose to use the Greek term to avoid 
presupposing an account of  the will and to avoid unwanted bodily connotations. Throughout 
the dissertation, I transliterate the Greek.
2  This is not to say that these authors necessarily believe that akrasia is uncommon. 
However, even the contemporary authors who hold that akratic action is not just an 
exception are puzzled by the question of  how a single akratic action is possible.
1.  INTRODUCTION
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or leading a life without sin. This dissertation is deliberately not meant as a 
contribution to solving the logical puzzle; rather, it aims to reintroduce a 
‘character approach’ to akrasia into the philosophical debate.
 The contemporary literature on akrasia preoccupies itself almost 
exclusively with the possibility of single and isolated akratic action. Though 
this is an interesting philosophical problem, it fails to address a very significant 
issue: people can, and typically do, act against their better judgment repeatedly. 
Akrasia especially poses a problem in everyday life when it is recurrent, as 
in the shower example. Amélie Rorty also states that ‘Akrasia is typically not 
episodic. Of course it can in principle occur as a single momentary event, 
a kind of motivational or epistemic sneeze, a single absent-minded light-
fingered questionable bond sale or an isolated flare of rage. But it rarely does’ 
(1997, 649).3 Despite judging it best to do otherwise, many people fail to 
stick to a healthy diet, often give in to the temptation for another drink, fail 
to exercise regularly, do not manage to quit smoking for long, continue to 
miss deadlines, and so on. These examples immediately show that akrasia as 
a character trait can take different shapes. However, it seems that many of us 
persistently fall short in exercising self-control in some sphere of our lives, or 
know someone else who does.
 The aspect of repetition is not a theme in common discussions on 
akrasia, but it is worthy of analysis of its own. First of all, an episodic view 
– that is, a view that focuses on akrasia as a single and isolated event – can 
cloud the true state of a person’s level of self-control. For example, someone 
who is typically akratic when it comes to bodily exercise may manage to 
go to the gym for a period of time. At that moment, the person seems to 
be in control, whereas on the whole he4 is not. Returning to the shower 
example above, I experienced that I find it easier to refrain from taking long 
3  Rorty does not further develop a characterological conception of  akrasia, however. 
Instead, she discusses the social and political sources of  akrasia. I return to this in Chapter 
Six.
4  In this dissertation, I generally use ‘he’ and ‘him’ to refer to people in general. 
I do this with some reluctance, but alternating between ‘he’ and ‘she’ in my eyes risks 
suggesting that there is a significant difference between men and women in this context. 
Moreover, switching between the two would not do justice to people who picture themselves 
somewhere else along the gender spectrum.
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showers on the whole if I indulge myself now and then, for example after 
a particularly hard day of work. Seen in isolation, these lapses look akratic, 
but – assuming that it is not just a matter of rationalization – they may 
actually enable me to exercise greater self-control in the long run. Secondly, 
akrasia can have particularly devastating consequences when it is recurrent. 
Just think of examples about smoking and drinking alcohol. Thirdly, akrasia 
especially raises criticism when it forms a pattern. It is not a problem when, 
for example, someone who thinks it best to stick to a healthy diet indulges 
himself on rare occasions. However, we do not think highly of ourselves (or 
of others, for that matter) when we continually show little control in relation 
to what we judge it best to pursue.
 What is more, in a recurring form, akrasia raises different and 
important questions. It is not uncommon to attribute moral significance 
to character traits, for example. Hence, if recurring akrasia is regarded as a 
character trait, it is of philosophical interest mainly as a moral problem and 
not just as an action theoretical one (cf. Thomas Hill 1986 and Jörn Müller 
2009).5 In ancient and medieval literature, in any case, akrasia is considered 
a kind of vice or character defect which seriously threatens moral ideals. It 
hinders moral development and our capacity to reach goals is at stake, notably 
moral goals. This raises several questions, some of which are conceptual. How 
can akrasia be a stable condition, given that by definition it is characterized 
by internal conflict? How can we understand the failure of an akratic person, 
that is, an akratēs, to improve despite the fact that by his own standards he 
should exercise more self-control? The fact that an akratēs may be aware of 
his own akratic character adds something to akrasia on a reflective level: how 
does someone relate to himself when he knows that he has a tendency to 
violate his better judgment? Other questions are more distinctively moral. 
For what reasons should we try to avoid or overcome the character trait 
of akrasia? What factors play a role when we blame someone for being 
disposed to violate his better judgment? Should we hold people morally 
5  Hill and Müller both draw attention to akrasia as a character trait, and I am inspired 
by their work. Hill’s article on the topic remains introductory, however. Müller’s work is 
much more extensive, but, in contrast to my project, it primarily focuses on action theory 
and on historical studies on akrasia.
 Chapter One - Introduction
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responsible for their akratic character? And, as Hill asks himself (but does not 
answer), ‘how can we regard weakness of will as a moral vice if so many of 
its manifestations are not themselves morally wrong?’ (1986, 93). The moral 
problem of akrasia as a character trait was central to the ancient and medieval 
philosophical literature on the topic. This approach is strikingly absent in 
the contemporary literature. As long as people are actually troubled by their 
akratic character, however, the issue will continue to be of interest. 
 In this dissertation, I therefore set out to recover this older focus on 
akrasia as a character trait. What can a fruitful character account of akrasia 
look like? What are the advantages and the challenges of such an account? In 
developing a character account of akrasia, I specifically rely on Aristotle.6 His 
view on akrasia has been widely discussed in the contemporary literature, 
but mainly in the context of the logical puzzle of how a single and isolated 
akratic action is possible. As it turns out, he has much to say specifically about 
akrasia as a character trait, and this has not received much attention in the 
contemporary literature. Building on the work of Aristotle, I contend that a 
character account provides a fruitful and interesting way to approach akrasia.
1.2  The main features of akratic action and 
 important aspects of a character account
In his well-known definition of akratic action, Donald Davidson highlights 
the most distinctive features: ‘In doing x an agent acts incontinently if and 
only if: (a) the agent does x intentionally; (b) the agent believes there is an 
alternative action y open to him; and (c) the agent judges that, all things 
considered, it would be better to do y than to do x’ (1969, 94). Most authors 
who are concerned with the topic of akrasia, including myself, concur with 
6  In her book Addiction and Weakness of  Will (2013), Lubomira Radoilska also seems 
at times to imply an Aristotelian-inspired character concept of  akrasia of  some description. 
However, it is difficult to say whether this is indeed the case. If  it is, the characterological 
account remains implicit, and she does not specify further details. Radoilska is mainly 
interested in moral responsibility, and she uses the distinction between akrasia and addiction 
to this purpose.
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Davidson that akratic action involves 1) a conflict between what a person 
judges it is best to do and the action he actually performs, 2) intentional 
behavior, and 3) a basis for the attribution of moral responsibility. I briefly 
take a closer look at these features and then discuss the important ways 
in which the character account I have in mind differs from the common 
contemporary account of akratic action.
 The most essential of the above-mentioned features of akratic action 
is the conflict between a person’s better judgment and his actual behavior.7 The 
term ‘better judgment’ is an abbreviation of some sort. It denotes a person’s 
own judgment about what it is best to do in a certain situation, all things 
considered. The better judgment might not be based on a consideration of 
all possible relevant reasons, however, but might instead be based on the 
reasons a person has access to or takes into account at the time. Also, it may be 
explicit or remain implicit. In any case, what matters is that a person judges 
it best to perform a certain action and yet, due to a competing motivation, 
ends up acting in a different and incompatible way. As a result of this failure 
to abide by his better judgment, he disapproves of his own behavior. And, 
although it is usually not included in definitions of akrasia, this is often said 
to be accompanied by a negative feeling such as regret or shame.8 With 
‘akrasia’, I thus refer to a failure to abide by one’s judgment about what it is 
best to do.
 Note that I thereby do not adopt Richard Holton’s notion of 
‘weakness of will’ in terms of intention-violation (2009). Roughly, Holton 
understands ‘akrasia’ as judgment-violation and ‘weakness of will’ as 
intention-violation, where the latter need not involve a better judgment. 
Usually, though, and I follow the contemporary literature in this, the terms 
‘akrasia’ and ‘weakness of will’ are used interchangeably and to indicate a 
7  I am interested in akratic behavior, but the concept of  akrasia has also been 
extended in the literature to beliefs (see, for example, Amélie Rorty 1983 and Alfred Mele 
1987, Chapter Eight) and to feelings (Mele 1989).
8  Mathieu Doucet argues that regret is not a reliable indicator of  akrasia. I am 
hesitant to accept his argument, for one thing because he seems to equate disapproving of  
one’s own behavior with the feeling of  regret. However, I do agree with his remark that 
‘weak-willed actions that we perform repeatedly might be more likely to lead to accurate 
self-assessment than one-off  failures’ (2016, 459).
 Chapter One - Introduction
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type of judgment-violation. This is not to say that akrasia cannot involve 
intention-violation. As Amélie Rorty explains (1980b), the ‘akratic break’ 
can take place at different stages, for example in between better judgment and 
intention or in between intention and action. Let me emphasize, however, 
that I am only interested in a gap between intention and action insofar as the 
intention represents a person’s better judgment.
 Furthermore, the characteristic conflict that is ascribed to akratic 
action in the contemporary literature differs in a notable way from how 
ancient philosophers usually describe akratic conflict. In the older literature, 
philosophers are primarily interested in cases in which someone fails 
to abide by objectively true knowledge or reason’s correct prescription, 
rather than by a subjective better judgment. A subjective criterion is still 
considered crucial for akrasia. Aristotle, in any case, remarks that it makes no 
difference for discussions of akrasia whether a person possesses knowledge 
or a firm conviction (Nicomachean Ethics (NE) VII.3.1146b24-b31; see also 
9.1151a29-1151b5). In the contemporary literature, the subjective aspect of 
akrasia is more paramount, however. What is central is that a person fails to 
abide by a better judgment that he himself sincerely endorses. I follow the 
contemporary literature in this.
 In addition to involving conflict between better judgment and 
behavior, akratic action is intentional. I do not want to get into the difficult 
task of defining precisely what ‘intentional’ means in this context. I use the 
term mainly to point out that the way in which an akratēs typically acts is 
not just a coincidence or merely a mindless automaticity.
 Thirdly, akratic action involves a basis for the attribution of moral 
responsibility. This feature sets akratic action apart from a condition like 
compulsion. There is no physical or psychological obstacle that prevents 
someone who acts akratically from abiding by his better judgment. In the 
contemporary literature, this moral responsibility element is often captured 
by defining akratic action as ‘free’, and in Davidson’s definition it is implied 
by the phrase ‘the agent believes there is an alternative action y open to 
him’. In the case of akrasia as a character trait, there might be a different 
kind of basis for the attribution of moral responsibility. Regardless of the 
precise element that grounds moral responsibility, however, it is essential to 
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akrasia that it is something in relation to which a person can be held morally 
responsible.
 These three key characteristics are widely agreed upon. However, 
there are a cluster of important differences between how ‘akrasia’ is used 
on a character account and how contemporary philosophers commonly 
use it. In contemporary discussions, what is central is ‘strict’ akratic action: 
acting against one’s better judgment while simultaneously judging that it 
is best to do otherwise. On a character account, akrasia is considered not 
as a single and isolated episode but rather as a tendency or inclination to 
violate one’s better judgment. This description of akrasia is broader than the 
common contemporary account of strict akratic action and can in principle 
encompass it. Strict akratic action can be seen as one way in which the 
character trait of akrasia might manifest itself. However, as I argue in Chapter 
Three, a character account can include another type of manifestations as well: 
violating one’s better judgment while temporarily not having one’s better 
judgment in mind. This means that on my character account I let go of the 
demand for strictness in identifying akrasia. The character account of akrasia 
I have in mind thus differs from the contemporary account of strict akratic 
action in that 1) it refers not to a single and isolated episode but to a tendency 
of judgment-violation, and 2) I not only allow for strict manifestations but 
include all sorts of failures to abide by one’s better judgment.
 By ‘character trait’ I refer to a stable and intelligent (or reasons-
responsive) state characterized by distinctive patterns of feeling, thinking 
and acting that are morally relevant, such as a person’s core commitments, 
aspirations and ideals.9 Based on this definition, I want to point out two 
further aspects of the character account of akrasia that I have in mind.
 First, I am interested in akrasia as a stable condition with positive 
ontological features of its own that can influence how a person typically 
thinks, feels and acts. I refrain from further discussion of the metaphysical 
status of character traits, but I do want to mention that a pattern of akratic 
9  This definition is inspired by John Doris’ definition of  a perfect character trait 
(that is, of  virtue; 2002, 17) and Kristján Kristjánsson’s definitions of  a character trait and 
of  the moral self  (2010, 27 and 232). According to Doris, character traits defined in this way 
do not exist. I do not agree with him on this, as I explain in Chapter Three.
 Chapter One - Introduction
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action can alternatively be defined in a negative way, for example as a 
complete lack of the capacities or qualities required to exercise control 
in certain situations. Some sort of lack of quality or capacity may surely 
(sometimes) play a role in recurring akratic action.10 Nevertheless, a pattern 
of akratic action can be sufficiently consistent to allow us plausibly to assume 
that it can have a positive ontological core. The akratēs’ better judgment and 
contrary inclination to act in a certain way do not form loose strands, but are 
strongly connected through their conflicting relation. When the akratēs fails 
to follow his better judgment, he disapproves of this behavior and of the fact 
that a judgment-contrary motivation leads to action. If, however, he were 
to be motivated to act in line with his better judgment and to succeed, he 
would presumably no longer disapprove but rather approve of his behavior. 
Hence, though the akratēs’ thoughts, feelings, motivations, and actions are 
typically not aligned, these elements show consistency in the attitude he has 
towards them.
 Secondly, my focus on akrasia as a character trait adds a moral 
dimension to akrasia that is usually deliberately absent in contemporary 
definitions of strict akratic action. A character trait captures both overt 
behavior and someone’s inner condition. On my definition, it also has a 
built-in moral dimension. As noted above, it is not uncommon to attribute 
moral significance to character traits. Joel Kupperman, for example, observes 
that ‘the word character has moral overtones the word personality lacks’ (1991, 
5) and Kristján Kristjánsson states that character traits have to do with ‘a 
person’s moral worth’ (2010, 27). This moral aspect distinguishes character 
traits from personality traits.11 Character traits include traits such as virtues 
and vices – prudence, justice, cowardice, self-indulgence, and so on – as well as 
self-control and akrasia. Personality traits such as extraversion, creativity, and 
spontaneity are excluded. The former are relevant to the moral evaluation of 
10  Müller, for example, discusses how akrasia may be due to a lastingly defective 
working memory which makes it hard for people to keep their attention on their goals (see 
Wilhelm Hofmann et al. 2011 and Müller 2016).
11  Kristjánsson points out that character traits can also be distinguished from 
personality traits because they are ‘potentially reason-responsive’ (2010, 27). I return to this 
in Chapter Seven.
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a person, the latter are morally neutral. When we apply akrasia to a person 
it has moral import. To say that someone is akratic is not only to describe 
him as typically violating his better judgment but also to say something 
evaluatively negative about the kind of person he is and about the way in 
which he is inclined to feel and act.
 Let me stress, however, that my character account of akrasia is not 
based on any specific ethical approach. I admit that my account has a virtue 
ethical flavor to it. This is hard to avoid, given the central role of character 
in virtue ethics. Moreover, I build on Aristotle, who is presumably the 
most influential virtue ethicist ever, and I engage with the work of several 
neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists. These make for interesting conversational 
partners, not only because of their intriguing ideas on character and 
character development but also because little has been written on character 
in the contemporary literature on akrasia. Furthermore, an ethical theory 
can only appropriately deal with the character account I develop if it can 
shed light on the evaluative side of akrasia as a character trait. Perhaps virtue 
ethics, as an agent-based ethics, is best equipped for this job. Nevertheless, 
my arguments in favor of a character approach to akrasia do not depend on 
or imply a virtue ethical viewpoint. Hence, the character account I present 
is of interest to anyone who is concerned with akrasia, regardless of their 
ethical orientation.
1.3  Sphere and degree of akrasia as 
 a character trait
Throughout the dissertation, I mostly talk about akrasia as a character trait 
in a general way. However, the character trait may actually differ from person 
to person. Just like most character traits, akrasia can come in degrees and 
can pertain to different spheres (or domains). Unlike virtue, though, it is 
inconceivable that akrasia to the fullest degree can cover all spheres of a 
person’s life.
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Consider what akrasia would look like if it were to display the same kind 
of unity that virtue is often supposed to have.12 In the most extreme form, 
someone would be prone to violating any of his better judgments, regardless 
of what the judgment is about. Firstly, a person with this trait would get 
nothing done that he set out to do. It is hard to imagine someone who does 
not manage to realize any of his goals ever, even when the goal is only as 
small and short-lived as making a meal or putting on clothes.13 Amélie Rorty 
also stresses that ‘unless he [someone characterized by akrasia] conforms to 
his preferred judgment in some crucial areas, he’d hardly survive’ (1980a, 
205).14 
 Secondly, if someone’s tendency to violate his better judgment were 
all-encompassing, the question is whether he would be rational enough 
to even be considered a person. In ‘Incoherence and Irrationality’ (1985a), 
Donald Davidson argues that irrationality – and this includes akrasia – is only 
possible against the background of rationality. If someone lacks sufficient 
consistency in thought and action, there is no criterion to identify deviating 
behavior.15 Davidson’s standard of what counts as ‘sufficient consistency’ for 
rationality is quite high. He says: ‘An agent cannot fail to comport most of 
the time with the basic norms of rationality, and it is this fact that makes 
irrationality possible’ (1985a, 352).16 
12  Among virtue ethicists, the so-called ‘unity of  virtue’ or ‘the reciprocity of  the 
virtues’ thesis is quite popular. The idea is, roughly, that a person who has one virtue has 
all the virtues. Someone cannot be truly moderate without also being practically wise, just, 
courageous, and so on.
13  Provided, of  course, this person sets himself  goals that he can be realistically 
thought to achieve.
14  In the context of  this quote, Rorty also says that akrasia is ‘often temporary’ 
(1980a, 205). She does not explain what she means by this, but the remark seems strange 
since she talks of  akrasia as something that is characteristic of  a person here. Perhaps she has 
in mind the possibility that people often eventually overcome their akrasia. In Chapter Six, 
with the help of  another article by Rorty, I explain that there is reason to believe that akrasia 
as a character trait is often highly persistent.
15  Assuming that the better judgment itself  is sound.
16  On the basis of  this criterion, in ‘Incoherence and Irrationality’ Davidson also 
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I think the bar for what counts as sufficient consistency for rationality 
can be set lower. A person whose thought and action are not consistent 
most of the time17 can nonetheless act in accordance with his judgment a 
considerable amount of the time. And, on the occasions that he does not, 
his inward condition could still render him sufficiently rational. He may 
clearly grasp the norms of rationality and acknowledge that his thought and 
action ought to be consistent. This is precisely the case with akrasia: a person 
recognizes that he violates his better judgment and disapproves of this. A 
person’s attitude towards his own behavior can be consistent, even though 
his thought and action are often not.18 However, I grant Davidson that if 
someone’s thoughts and actions are rarely consistent, it is highly unlikely 
that this person is capable of acting on reasons at all. Based on conceptual 
considerations, then, akrasia cannot plausibly be construed as an entirely 
broad character trait.
 An akratic condition can nevertheless be sufficiently broad or 
regular to serve as a basis for the moral evaluation of a person. Someone who 
possesses akrasia as a character trait would be no different than someone who 
is not fully virtuous or vicious but who possesses only some specific virtues 
or vices, or only to a certain degree.19 However, whereas specific virtues and 
seems to rule out habitual akrasia (1985a, 352). The Davidsonian philosopher Xavier 
Vanmechelen in any case draws the conclusion that akrasia cannot be a character trait and 
must instead be an action that is atypical of  a person (2000, 131). I do not believe that this 
conclusion follows. For one thing, a person with the character trait of  akrasia may still abide 
by his better judgment most of  the time. He may, for example, not always experience (much) 
judgment-contrary motivation, or he may compensate for his akrasia in one sphere with self-
control in another.
17  Note that a virtuous person may not display virtuous behavior most of  the time 
either, if  only because he needs to sleep regularly. What is key, however, is that, theoretically, 
a virtuous person might display virtue in any situation in which virtue can possibly be 
displayed, whereas for conceptual reasons it is doubtful that a person with an akratic 
character can act akratically in all possible situations in which there is something over which 
he could in principle lack control.
18  In Chapter Seven, I address in more detail the question whether a person with 
akrasia as a character trait can be sufficiently rational to be held morally responsible.
19  This certainly seems possible when it comes to vice. As to virtue, a person could 
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vices often have names of their own – such as moderation or cowardice – 
there is hardly any specified terminology to indicate that akrasia pertains to 
a particular sphere. To make clear the extent to which the moral evaluation 
of a specific person with akrasia stretches, it can therefore be helpful to 
add a qualification of the following sort (inspired by one of the ways in 
which Aristotle talks about akrasia): a person may be akratic with regard to 
helpfulness or with regard to bodily appetite.
 There is no conceptual ground to assign any specific sphere or 
degree to akrasia, though.20 As far as the sphere is concerned, there are the 
usual suspects, such as food, alcoholic drinks and marital (dis)loyalty. And, 
there might be reasons to be especially interested in a certain sphere, such 
as its bearing on moral evaluation, how central it is to a person’s life, or the 
expected negative consequences. Furthermore, it would not be surprising 
if a shortage of self-control in one sphere were to flow into another sphere, 
especially where the kinds of temptations or aversions at stake are similar. 
However, it is an empirical matter which sphere(s) akrasia most commonly 
relates to in real life, and whether there are certain spheres that usually go 
together.21 What is clear is that, unlike virtue, akrasia cannot pertain to the 
fullest degree to all spheres of a person’s life. With this established, I now 
move on to explore the dimensions of akrasia as a character trait.
be said to only possess certain specific virtues if  he is not yet fully virtuous but is already 
more advanced in certain respects than in others. Another option would be to let go of  the 
thesis of  the unity of  virtue altogether.
20  Aristotle limits akrasia as such to the sphere of  food, drink and sex. However, as I 
argue in Chapter Five, this restriction does not reflect an empirical claim. Aristotle applies it 
for reasons of  moral evaluation. He acknowledges that people can lack control with regard 
to other spheres as well.
21  The psychologists Angela Lee Duckworth and Eli Tsukayama, for example, refer 
to empirical evidence of  self-control and its contrary regarding a wide range of  spheres. 
They mention work, interpersonal relationships, drugs, food, exercise, and finances (2015, 
399). They also note that ‘impulsive behavior [that is, a lack of  self-control] in the food 
domain correlates strongly with impulsive behavior in the alcohol domain’ (2015, 394).
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1.4  Outline
In Chapter Two, I address the main positions in the contemporary discussion 
on akrasia as a logical puzzle. There are basically three types of solutions to 
the question of how strict akratic action is possible. I discuss each of these 
in turn, focusing on the well-known accounts of strict akratic action by 
Richard Hare, Donald Davidson and Alfred Mele. I show that each type of 
solution to the logical puzzle has a disadvantage that appears impossible to 
overcome.
In Chapter Three, I present several advantages of regarding akrasia as a character 
trait rather than a single and isolated type of action. I argue that a character 
approach can do justice to akrasia as it is of most concern in everyday life 
because it focuses on akrasia in a recurrent form and can also take all of the 
factors that are relevant to its moral evaluation into account. In addition, 
I show that because it is necessarily stretched out over time, the notion of 
akrasia as a character trait can include not only strict but also non-strict 
manifestations. This fact also enables a character approach to pay attention to 
issues other than the logical puzzle. On a character approach, it is possible to 
remain agnostic about the possibility of strict akratic action because akrasia 
as a character trait can manifest in non-strict ways as well. Furthermore, I 
show that the so-called situationism challenge to global character traits does 
not render the existence of akrasia as a character trait suspicious. This paves 
the way for a discussion of the repetitive nature of akrasia as a character trait 
and of its moral status.
To explore the details of what a fruitful character approach to akrasia may 
look like, I turn to Aristotle’s rich account of akrasia as a character trait. 
According to him, a character trait is 1) stable and long-lasting and 2) a 
moral notion. In Chapter Four, I discuss Aristotle’s view on akrasia as a stable 
and long-lasting character trait. I argue that although akrasia is stable and 
long-lasting on his view, the disharmony between reason and affect that is 
so characteristic of akrasia is only present with the manifestations of the 
character trait, which occur only temporarily and occasionally. Furthermore, 
I argue that in his famous passage on akratic action in Book VII.3 of the 
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Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle is addressing not what he considers akrasia as 
such but rather the form that the symptom(s) of this character trait can take.
In Chapter Five, I address Aristotle’s ideas on akrasia as a moral notion. In the 
largest part of Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics, he compares akrasia to 
other character traits, such as virtue and vice, but also enkrateia (self-control), 
softness, and beastliness. A closer look at this discussion brings to light where 
he situates akrasia in a moral hierarchy of character traits. Moreover, it reveals 
the features he deems relevant for morally evaluating the akratēs, for example 
the kind of objects an akratēs is likely to be tempted by.
In the final two chapters, I follow the division between the stability of akrasia 
as a character trait and its moral dimension, and I explore further challenges. 
In Chapter Six, I address how we can understand, on conceptual grounds, 
how akrasia can remain a stable state. How is it possible for akrasia not to 
develop into self-control or, alternatively, degrade into vice? I engage with 
the work of contemporary character educationists who present akrasia as a 
stage of character development. Their work suggests that there is reason to 
believe that akrasia is likely to change. With the help of Aristotle’s account 
of akrasia as a character trait and Amélie Rorty’s views on the social and 
political sources of akrasia, I discuss how we might understand a person’s 
failure to change his akratic character.
Finally, in Chapter Seven, I consider the basis on which akrasia can be thought 
of as a moral notion. The main worry is that repetitive akratic behavior turns 
out to be (just) a mindless habit. This would imply a) that we cannot ascribe 
moral responsibility to the akratēs, and b) that it is doubtful whether akrasia 
can qualify as a character trait given that it is common to define a character 
trait as an intelligent or reasons-responsive condition. I do not develop a full 
theory of the moral responsibility of the akratēs, but I discuss the aspects of 
the akratēs’ condition that are likely to play a role in considerations about 
moral responsibility. I argue that John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza’s 
account of moral responsibility provides promising leads for understanding 
akrasia as an intelligent or reasons-responsive condition in relation to which 
a person can be held morally responsible.
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2.1  The focus of contemporary discussions 
 on akrasia
In the contemporary philosophical literature, akrasia is mostly discussed 
within the context of action theory. These discussions revolve around one 
central question: how is it possible for a person to freely and intentionally 
act against his better judgment?1 This question arises because ostensibly 
plausible theories concerning action have a hard time accounting for the 
possibility of akratic action. This includes theories that primarily try to grasp 
the nature of human action, but also theories that are otherwise concerned 
with action, such as theories of action explanation (what explains an 
action?), intentionality (what makes an action intentional?), free will (when 
is an action performed freely?), moral responsibility (on what terms is a 
person responsible for his actions?), and moral language (how does language 
concerned with action function?).2 As a result of this action theoretical 
context, the object of contemporary discussions is akratic action. Authors 
zoom in on what happens during a single and isolated episode in which a 
person acts against his better judgment.3
1  Note that this question is distinct from the more empirical question of  what 
actually causes akratic action.
2  See Richard Hofmann (2015) for a discussion of  the different fields in which 
akratic action poses a philosophical problem from the perspective of  action theory.
3  A good illustration of  the ongoing contemporary preoccupation with akratic 
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More precisely, contemporary authors primarily ask about the possibility of 
akratic action in its ‘strictest’ form: acting in one way while simultaneously 
judging it best to act otherwise. In the remainder of this chapter, when I talk 
of ‘akratic action’ I mean this strict form (unless otherwise indicated). By 
asking about the strict form, contemporary authors carry the philosophical 
problem of akratic action to the extreme and pose the problem in the most 
puzzling way possible. Strict akratic action constitutes a logical puzzle because 
it seems plausible that there is a tight connection between better judgment 
and action, but this connection is inconsistent with the experience of strict 
akratic action in which a person acts in one way while at the very same time 
judging it best to act differently.
 In this chapter, I first present the logical puzzle of akratic action (2.2).4 
I turn to Donald Davidson’s classic diagnosis of the problem of akratic action 
to introduce the puzzle. Even though not everyone phrases it in the same way 
he does, Davidson’s formulation of the logical puzzle offers a fruitful way to 
compare the different kinds of solutions that have been offered in answer to 
the question of how akratic action is possible. Secondly, I discuss the main 
positions in the contemporary literature on the logical puzzle. Basically, there 
are three types of strategies for solving it. I discuss each of these with the help 
of what are probably the most well-known and influential representatives of 
these strategies in contemporary literature: the accounts of akratic action by 
Richard Hare (2.2.1), Donald Davidson (2.2.2), and Alfred Mele (2.2.3). I 
also show that each of the three strategies faces a problem that is inherent to 
the strategy itself and that therefore appears impossible to overcome.
action is Sarah Stroud’s entry on weakness of  will in the Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy 
(2014).
4  For a more extensive discussion of  the logical puzzle, see Xavier Vanmechelen 
(2000).
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2.2 The logical puzzle
The possibility of akratic action is puzzling because it seems irreconcilable 
with the intuition that there is a tight connection between evaluation and 
motivation. On the one hand, it seems probable that actions are explained in 
terms of what a person sees as the strongest reason for action. On the other 
hand, the alleged occurrence of akratic action seems to show that this cannot 
always be the case.
 In ‘How is Weakness of the Will Possible?’, Davidson describes the 
logical puzzle of akratic (or incontinent) action in terms of three inconsistent 
principles (the first two of which exclude the third), each of which seems 
intuitively plausible on its own.5 As Davidson remarks: ‘the problem posed 
by the apparent contradiction is acute enough to be called a paradox’ (1969, 
95).6 He describes the principles as follows (1969, 95)7:
P1. If an agent wants to do x more than he wants to do y and he believes himself 
free to do either x or y, then he will intentionally do x if he does either x or y 
intentionally.
P2. If an agent judges that it would be better to do x than to do y, then he wants to 
do x more than he wants to do y.
P3. There are incontinent actions.
Recall that Davidson defines akratic action as follows: ‘In doing x an agent 
acts incontinently if and only if: (a) the agent does x intentionally; (b) the 
agent believes there is an alternative action y open to him; and (c) the agent 
judges that, all things considered, it would be better to do y than to do x’ 
(1969, 94).
 
5  I discuss Davidson’s own suggestion for a solution to the logical puzzle further on.
6  Geoffrey Mortimore (1971) also talks about a paradox in this context.
7  Davidson does not insist that the principles have to be formulated in this precise 
way. He maintains, however, ‘that no amount of  tinkering with P1-P3 will eliminate the 
underlying problem’ (1969, 96).
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The first of Davidson’s principles links motivation to action. It states that of 
the options that a person considers open to him, he will carry out the one 
that he is most strongly motivated (wants the most) to perform. Motivation 
is often understood in a broad sense and is consequently often identified 
as that which determines action. A statement like P1 can therefore be 
considered a tautology. Nevertheless, authors have pointed out that the 
idea expressed in P1 is not necessarily redundant. Xavier Vanmechelen, for 
example, believes it may refer to a person’s experience of the intensity of 
his aspirations in relation to his better judgments (2000, 147). Mele, on the 
other hand, stresses that the strongest motivation need not always be the 
most affectionately intense (1987, 162, n.11). He holds that the added value 
of P1 is that it provides a point of departure for seeking an explanation of 
a person’s akratic action (1987, 14-15). In any case, because a principle like 
P1 can essentially be considered a tautology, it is hardly ever questioned in 
the literature.8
 The second of Davidson’s principles links evaluation to motivation. 
It captures the intuition that what a person judges to be the best option 
for action corresponds with what he is most strongly motivated to do. P1 
and P2 together thus entail that a person’s better judgment, via motivation, 
leads to action. The idea that underlies P2 is that the higher a person values 
performing a certain action, the stronger he is motivated to do it, and 
conversely for negative evaluation and motivation. This assumption is often 
called motivational internalism: judgments about action correspond directly 
with motivation, without the interference of any other factor. Motivational 
externalism, on the other hand, consists of the idea that judgments about action 
do not come with motivation. Note that on such a motivational externalistic 
view, akratic action is of no special interest, because it is taken for granted 
that better judgment and motivation come apart. The possibility of akratic 
action only challenges theories that assume some form of motivational 
internalism.9
8  Randolph Clarke (1994) is an exception. He appeals to non-mental neurological 
conditions to question P1.
9  See, for example, G.F. Schueller (2010) for an overview of  different forms of  
motivational internalism.
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The third of Davidson’s principles simply states that akratic actions occur. 
When Davidson formulated this principle, it was not yet common to add a 
term such as ‘strict’ to the description of akratic action. However, it is clear 
that strict akratic action is what he has in mind. In the article in which 
Davidson formulates the puzzle, he gives an example of akratic action and 
describes someone who is explicitly deliberating and thereby seems to be 
very much aware of what is going on at the moment of action (1969, 101-
102). Also, in a later article he says that ‘the defining cases of akrasia’ are 
those in which someone ‘acts intentionally while aware that everything 
considered a better course of action is open to him’ (1982, 295). Moreover, 
only strict akratic action undeniably raises the logical puzzle, for by definition 
it entails that there is a direct clash between what a person judges it would 
be best to do and what he actually does. To come back to P3: this principle 
expresses the occurrence of akratic actions – by which is meant strict akratic 
actions – and it is therefore inconsistent with the first two principles. P3 
shows that evaluation does not always result in action (P1 and P2 combined) 
and thus that a person’s better judgment does not necessarily determine 
what he is most strongly motivated to do (P2).
 In sum, the logical puzzle is constituted by the fact that intuitively 
there seems to be a strong link between evaluation and action (via motivation), 
yet the experience of akratic action – in which better judgment and action 
clearly come apart – seems real enough as well.
There are roughly three possible strategies for solving the logical puzzle: 1) 
deny the actual occurrence of akratic action by claiming that this type of 
action is altogether impossible (drop P3), 2) redescribe the principles in such 
a way that they are no longer inconsistent (maintain P1-P3 in an alternative 
form), and 3) deny that there is a tight connection between evaluation and 
motivation (drop or alter P2). Note, again, that a strategy that consists of 
dropping P1 is not really an option because this principle is mostly considered 
a tautology. Below, I describe each of the three above-mentioned strategies 
in turn and illustrate how they can be applied by presenting representative 
accounts that are classics in the contemporary literature on akratic action.
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 2.2.1  First strategy: denying the possibility of 
  akratic action
A first strategy for trying to tackle the logical puzzle is to outright deny that 
it is possible for akratic action to occur. Or, in Davidson’s terminology, to 
drop P3. Akrasia skeptics – as we may call authors who apply this strategy – 
maintain that the experience of akratic action is misleading. They typically 
provide an alternative description of what happens when someone appears 
to act against his better judgment. The difficulty for this strategy is, however, 
to argue convincingly that the offered alternative description applies to all 
experiences of akratic action.
 Roughly, there are two ways to deny the possibility of akratic action.10 
The first option is to argue that a person who fails to abide by his better 
judgment cannot truly and sincerely endorse this judgment, at least not at 
the moment of action. This undermines criterion (c) of Davidson’s definition 
of akratic action. A person may, for example, merely pay lip service to the 
better judgment, perhaps because it is a social convention. Or, he may at the 
moment of action temporarily change his better judgment or set it aside. 
The second option is to reject the idea that a person can freely act against his 
better judgment. This thwarts criterion (b) of Davidson’s definition. Acting 
against one’s better judgment then comes down to a form of addiction or 
compulsion. Hence, akrasia skeptics can deny the possibility of akratic action 
in two ways: by claiming that at the moment of action the better judgment 
that a person violates cannot be sincere or by claiming that acting against 
one’s better judgment cannot be free.
 Richard Hare appeals to both options in denying the possibility 
of akratic action. I discuss his account in some detail as an illustration of 
the ‘skeptical’ strategy of dealing with the logical puzzle.11 He gives up on 
10  Theoretically, there is a third option. One could dispute whether akratic action can 
be intentional. In this case, criterion (a) of  Davidson’s definition of  akratic action would not 
be met. Nobody in the literature defends this option, however.
11  Gary Watson’s skepticism about akratic action is another well-known and influential 
representative of  this strategy (1977). His argument hinges on the idea of  irresistible desires. 
For others who apply the skeptical strategy, see the references in my discussion in Chapter 
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the possibility of akratic action because it is incompatible with a theory 
concerning action of which he is very much convinced, that is, his theory 
of prescriptivism.
 Hare develops his theory of prescriptivism in The Language of Morals 
(1952) and Freedom and Reason (1963).12 He sets out to investigate the 
way in which moral language functions. In particular, he asks about the 
meaning and function of value-words that appear in moral judgments, such 
as ‘good’, ‘right’ and ‘ought’. Hare’s central claim is that moral judgments are 
prescriptive and universalizable. By ‘universalizable’ Hare simply means that 
a moral judgment applies in situations that are either exactly or relevantly 
similar (1963, 33). For example, all other things being equal, if I think Jane 
should go to prison because she owes me a large amount of money, it 
would be inconsistent of me not to subscribe to the judgment that I should 
go to prison for owing Oscar a large amount of money. It is due to the 
other aspect – that of prescriptivism – that the alleged occurrence of akratic 
action poses a challenge to Hare’s theory of moral language.
 According to Hare, moral judgments are prescriptive because the 
primary meaning of value-words in moral judgments is prescriptive. He does 
not deny that value-words also have a descriptive aspect to their meaning. 
A tennis racket or a person is called good because of certain factual features. 
Furthermore, value-words can be used in a descriptive way, for example, 
in quoting other people’s judgments or referring to conventional standards. 
Hare emphasizes, however, that the primary meaning of value-words is 
prescriptive. Consider the following example: ‘If we came to disapprove of 
industry, we should not stop calling the industrious man industrious; but, if 
we had previously called him a good man because, among other virtues, he 
was industrious, we should, if we came to disapprove of his industry very 
much, stop calling him good’ (1963, 24-25). If the facts remain the same, but 
Three of  non-strict forms of  akratic action (descriptions of  akratic action in terms of  
temporary judgment shifts, self-deception and rationalization).
12  Hare further expands his theory of  prescriptivism and his thoughts on akratic 
action in his later work, Moral Thinking (1981). However, Hare still does not make room for 
the possibility of  freely acting against a better judgment about what it is best to do in a specific 
situation.
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normative standards alter, value-words come to apply to different facts. It is 
the primary function of value-words ‘to commend or in some other way to 
guide choices or actions’ (1952, 171); what is commended is secondary.
 Hare’s claim goes further than this, however. He maintains not only 
that moral judgments are meant to guide action but also that they do guide 
action when a person sincerely assents to them: ‘It is a tautology to say that 
we cannot sincerely assent to a […] command addressed to ourselves, and at 
the same time not perform it, if now is the occasion for performing it and it is 
in our (physical and psychological) power to do so’ (1952, 20; cf. 1963, 79). I 
will come back to the qualification between the brackets, but here I want to 
point out that, according to Hare, to grasp the meaning of a moral judgment 
is to understand that it bears on action (1952, 168-169; cf. 1963, 79). This 
view resembles the idea that is expressed by the combination of the first two 
of Davidson’s principles (only Hare talks of moral judgments rather than 
judgments in general about what it would be best to do). In other words, 
Hare endorses a strong form of motivational internalism and holds that there 
is an immediate link between moral judgment and action (presumably via 
motivation).
 The possibility of akratic action therefore challenges Hare’s theory 
of prescriptivism. As Hare phrases it: ‘The problem is posed by the fact that 
moral judgements, in their central use, have it as their function to guide 
conduct. If this is their function, how can we think, for example, that we 
ought not to be doing a certain thing […] and then not be guided by it?’ 
(1963, 70). Hare mainly talks of akratic action in terms of ‘backsliding’ and 
‘moral weakness’. Especially the latter term indicates that he has in mind 
acting against a moral judgment only. That is, he only addresses instances 
of akratic action in which a moral judgment is violated (be it based on 
weighed preferences, on principles, on ideals or on a conception of human 
excellence). This fits his aim of clarifying moral language. It is moral weakness 
that challenges the view that moral language is prescriptive. Nonetheless, 
what Hare says on moral weakness could also easily apply to prudential 
cases of akratic action, for he holds that the properties of value-words 




Hare addresses the problem of akratic action in Chapter Five of Freedom and 
Reason. He discusses the issue on a linguistic and on a psychological level, 
reflecting the two different options for denying the possibility of akratic 
action described above. First, Hare considers the possibility of akratic action 
on a linguistic level and concludes that the respective moral judgment in 
such cases is insincere, that is, it is not used prescriptively. He maintains 
that value-words such as ‘ought’ imply ‘can’ when used in their proper 
prescriptive sense. However, when value-words are only used to describe, 
they do not imply ‘can’. The prescriptive aspect of the meaning of a value-
word can be neglected in order to emphasize its descriptive aspect, for 
example, when it is used to describe a general view (1963, 75). This is what 
happens, according to Hare, when we ‘backslide’. The moral judgment is 
downgraded. A person may recite the general slogan that one ought to eat 
two pieces of fruit a day, without presuming that he himself ought to eat two 
pieces of fruit a day. Either the universalizability is neglected and he does 
not apply the prescription to his own situation, or the prescriptive element 
is neglected altogether and the moral judgment is used to describe, for 
example, a social convention or another person’s conviction (1963, 75-77). 
In either case, the person does not sincerely assent to the moral judgment 
himself. On Hare’s view, what appears to be akratic action is actually a case 
in which a moral judgment is not used in its primary prescriptive meaning.
 Secondly, Hare addresses the issue on a psychological level and states 
that in apparent cases of akratic action the action is unfree, that is, it involves 
a psychological inability. This explains why Hare includes the bracketed 
qualification that I pointed out earlier. He claims that if someone does not 
do what a moral judgment prescribes, he is not capable of doing it. Hare’s 
argumentation for this claim is very thin, though. He is of the opinion that 
the terminology of ‘weakness’ – recall that he mainly talks about akratic 
action in terms of moral weakness – reveals that we are dealing with an 
inability (1963, 77). He cites two literary passages: one spoken by Ovid’s 
Medea, who claims that she cannot resist and is compelled when she kills 
her children to take revenge on her husband Jason, and one depicting the 
biblical Saint Paul, who says that he is a slave and prisoner of sin. Hare states 
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that both of these often-discussed examples of akrasia13 involve an appeal to 
helplessness (1963, 78-79). Hare does not explain what he takes the inability 
to consist in, nor does he discuss whether it is the kind of inability that 
excludes moral responsibility. Moreover, he does not provide an argument 
for why we should interpret the two examples in terms of inability, or, if we 
do, why we should assume that these are typical cases of akratic action. It is 
clear, though, that according to him alleged akratic action is at least usually 
a psychological inability.14
 Interestingly, Hare maintains that the downgrading of a moral 
judgment and the psychological inability to do what this moral judgment 
prescribes typically go together (1963, 75). For the sake of the argument, 
he grants that it might perhaps be possible after all to act against a moral 
judgment that is used in its prescriptive sense, but he emphasizes that the 
action would then still not be akratic because of a psychological inability 
to perform the prescribed action. Hare thus holds that if someone does 
not put a moral judgment into practice, he does not sincerely endorse that 
moral judgment, or else he was unable to do so, and that in most cases of 
apparent backsliding both of these possibilities obtain. On Hare’s view, then, 
it is impossible to freely act against one’s moral judgment while sincerely 
assenting to it at the moment of action.15
 There are several problems with Hare’s account of akratic action, 
though. Some of these are particular to his view. For example, Hare does not 
explain why a strong form of motivational internalism would hold and, as I 
already mentioned, his argument that akratic action reflects a psychological 
inability is very thin.16 
13  It appears to me that a passage from Euripides’ Medea is actually cited more often 
as an example of  akratic action than the passage Hare quotes from Ovid’s version.
14  Hare does not take seriously the option that compelled instances of  acting 
against one’s better judgment could be the result of  a physical inability. Given our current 
understanding of, for example, neuroscience and addiction it nonetheless seems plausible 
that physical obstacles may sometimes be involved.
15  In other terms, Hare’s view entails that akratic action is a form of  compulsion and 
therefore a type of  behavior for which people are not commonly held morally responsible.
16  For more extensive discussions and criticism of  Hare’s position on akratic action, 
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Other problems pertain more generally to the ‘skeptical’ strategy for dealing 
with the logical puzzle. As with any attempt to deny the possibility of akratic 
action, the problem remains that the experience of akratic action is highly 
compelling. Why not take this experience more seriously? Hare’s alternative 
description of the experience of akratic action in terms of the downgrading 
of a moral judgment or a psychological inability may very well sometimes 
be accurate, as may be alternative descriptions presented by other authors. 
However, Hare’s view and the skeptical strategy more generally do not 
succeed in solving the logical puzzle, because it is impossible to prove that 
alternative descriptions of akratic action apply to all experiences of akratic 
action.17
 However, how can one persuade someone who is not already 
convinced of the possibility of akratic action to adapt his theory of action so 
as to accommodate it? This is a difficult matter, but one option would be to 
show that the possibility of akratic action is compatible with a strong form 
of motivational internalism after all. This is precisely what authors who apply 
the second strategy of dealing with the logical puzzle aim to do.
 2.2.2 Second strategy: distinguishing between 
  different kinds of judgments
A second strategy for dealing with the logical puzzle is to argue that 
the possibility of akratic action can be combined with a strong form of 
motivational internalism. In Davidson’s terminology, this means showing 
see, for example, Charles Taylor (1980), William Frankena (1988), and Thomas Spitzley 
(1992, 125-164).
17  In Chapter Three, I argue that on a character account of  akrasia some of  these 
alternative descriptions can in fact qualify as genuine instances of  akratic action. I especially 
have in mind so-called ‘non-strict’ descriptions of  failing to abide by one’s better judgment 
– that is, instances in which a person does not have the relevant better judgment in mind at 
the moment of  action. In contemporary discussions on the logical puzzle, however, authors 
tend to dismiss such non-strict descriptions as examples of  akratic action or see them as 
derivative at most (see, for example, Davidson 1969, 97-98 and Mele 1987, 19).
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that P3 is consistent with P1 and P2. All three principles are maintained, but 
they are reinterpreted in such a way that they do not contradict one another.
 This strategy requires some form of what we may call, following 
Michael Bratman (1979), a non-homogeneous account of practical 
reasoning. For if one wishes to maintain both that there is a tight link 
between a person’s judgment and action (P1 and P2) and that it is possible 
to act contrary to what one judges it would be best to do (P3), then there 
must be something about the judgment that warrants action that sets it apart 
from the judgment that is violated in akratic action. Otherwise, it cannot be 
the case that all three principles are correct. And that is what constituted the 
logical puzzle in the first place. There might be, for example, different types 
of judgment involved or different kinds of processes of practical deliberation. 
As I will show, however, this strategy cannot fend off the question of why 
akratic action would not also be possible in relation to the judgment that is 
the subject of a principle like P2.
 Davidson applies this strategy himself in answer to the logical puzzle.18 
To illustrate how the second strategy might take shape, I look further into his 
account of akratic action as presented in his article ‘How is Weakness of the 
Will Possible?’ (1969).19 Like Hare, Davidson becomes interested in akratic 
action because it poses a challenge to his theory of action.
 In ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’ (1963), Davidson defends a theory 
of action that implies a strong form of motivational internalism. He holds 
that reasons rationalize an action (make intelligible why someone performs 
this particular action) and at the same time cause that action (1963, 685). A 
reason for action, Davidson takes it, consists of a pro-attitude20 and a belief. 
18  Michael Bratman (1979) also applies a form of  the second strategy in his account 
of  akratic action.
19  For extensive discussions of  Davidson’s work on akratic action, see for example 
Charles Taylor (1980), Paul Grice and Judith Baker (1985), Thomas Spitzley (1992, 165-223), 
and Jeanne Peijnenburg (1996, Chapter Six).
20  Pro-attitudes can be desires, but according to Davidson they can also be ‘wantings, 
urges, promptings, and a great variety of  moral views, aesthetic principles, economic 
prejudices, social conventions, and public and private goals and values in so far as these can 
be interpreted as attitudes of  an agent directed toward actions of  a certain kind’ (1963, 686).
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This pro-attitude/belief-pair can be represented in a practical syllogism, 
that is, a set of premises on the basis of which a conclusion about action 
can be drawn. According to Davidson, the conclusions of different practical 
syllogisms provide different reasons for action. He points out that in practical 
reasoning we weigh multiple reasons, that is, compare the conclusions of 
several practical syllogisms to establish what it is best to do (1963, 697). 
Importantly, this means that according to Davidson, the conclusion of just 
any a practical syllogism does not necessarily explain and determine action. 
Nevertheless, he holds that an action corresponds with the conclusion of a 
practical syllogism (1963, 697). Davidson does not make it entirely explicit, 
but the way I understand his 1963 view is that the reason that corresponds 
with (explains and determines) action is the reason that emerges after 
weighing all of the relevant available alternatives, which he later calls an ‘all 
things considered judgment’.
 In ‘How is Weakness of the Will Possible?’ (1969), Davidson 
recognizes that his 1963 view is challenged by the possibility of akratic 
action. It challenges both his claim that reasons rationalize actions and his 
claim that reasons cause actions. As Jeanne Peijnenburg remarks: ‘If reasons 
and actions are conceptually connected, then akrasia constitutes a crack 
in the conceptual chain. […] If reasons cause actions in conformity with 
obdurate causal laws, how could a person ever act against his reasons?’ (1996, 
178). Both in the case that reasons explain actions and in the case that reasons 
cause actions, one would expect actions to match the strongest reasons. With 
akratic action, this is clearly not the case.
 Davidson nevertheless tries to make room for akratic action within 
his theory of action. He draws a distinction between two different kinds 
of judgments in order to do so: conditional and unconditional judgments. 
Basically, the difference is that conditional judgments are based on premises, 
whereas unconditional judgments are detached from premises.21
 First, consider conditional judgments (or prima facie judgments, or 
relational judgments). This kind of judgment is the conclusion of a practical 
21  Conditional judgments take a form such as ‘pf(a is better than b, r)’, where r refers 
to a reason or set of  reasons, whereas unconditional judgments look like ‘a is better than b’ 
(Davidson 1969, 109-110).
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syllogism. Since, according to Davidson, practical syllogisms only represent a 
reason for action, conditional judgments can conflict. For example, in view 
of the fact that this piece of food is sweet and I like sweet food, I judge that it 
is better to eat it than not to eat it. In view of the fact that this piece of food 
is poisonous, however, and insofar as I do not want to be poisoned, I judge 
that it is better not to eat it. Logically, these two judgments do not conflict, 
for they rest on different premises. However, they do give conflicting advice 
about which action to pursue (1969, 104-106). To resolve this issue, a person 
must form an argument in which the relevant available reasons are weighed 
and compared (1969, 107). According to Davidson, the new argument that 
arises is strictly speaking not a practical syllogism itself. He nevertheless 
maintains that the judgment that is formed is still conditional because it is 
based on and cannot be detached from the reasons (and the premises that 
they are based on) that have been taken into consideration. For example, 
taking the two above-mentioned practical syllogisms together, I judge that 
it is better not to eat this piece of food than to eat it, for I prefer not being 
poisoned over eating sweet food. Davidson calls such a judgment, which takes 
into consideration all the available relevant reasons, an ‘all things considered 
judgment’. An all things considered judgment is conditional because it is a 
judgment about what it is best to do given the reasons that have been taken 
into account (1969, 107). A conditional judgment, and therefore also an 
all things considered judgment, cannot be detached from the premises and 
reasons on which it is based.
 Unconditional judgments (or sans phrase judgments, or all-out 
judgments), on the other hand, are detached from premises. They simply 
state that it is better to do one thing rather than another, without referring 
to any further practical deliberation. An unconditional judgment is neither 
the conclusion of a practical syllogism nor the conclusion of a subsequent 
argument based on the comparison between different practical syllogisms. 
Davidson’s notion of an unconditional judgment remains quite vague. On 
what ground can it be considered a type of judgment? How are unconditional 
judgments formed? Also, Davidson holds that an unconditional judgment 
always reflects one or another conditional judgment, for, as far as he is 
concerned, it is always possible to point out a reason for a person’s action, 
even for an akratic action. However, he does not explain precisely how 
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unconditional judgments relate to conditional judgments. His main point 
is that since unconditional judgments are not based on premises and reasons, 
they do not necessarily reflect the conditional judgment that is a person’s all 
things considered judgment (although this is the default mode, according to 
Davidson). He concludes that an unconditional judgment therefore does not 
necessarily match a person’s all things considered judgment or best reason for 
action (1969, 110).
 The crux of Davidson’s account of akratic action is that actions 
are geared to unconditional judgments and not to conditional judgments. 
On his view, ‘[i]ntentional action […] is geared directly to unconditional 
judgments like ‘It would be better to do a than to do b.’ Reasoning that 
stops at conditional judgments […] is practical only in its subject, not in 
its issue’ (1969, 110). The practical reasoning that leads to a conditional 
judgment is practical in the sense that it is about practical matters. Davidson 
maintains that this does not go beyond theorizing, however. Unconditional 
judgments, on the other hand, have concrete actions as their object. He does 
not clarify the ways in which unconditional judgments are similar to and 
different from actions. Davidson simply points out that it is unconditional 
judgments, and not conditional judgments, that motivate a person to act.
 In the case of akratic action, a person judges all things considered 
– that is, conditionally – that it is better to do a than to do b, but judges 
unconditionally that it is better to do b than to do a (1969, 110). His 
unconditional judgment moves him to do b, while his all things considered 
judgment advises him to do a. This is possible because there is no necessary 
or logical relation between conditional and unconditional judgments.22 
This means that on Davidson’s view the three principles that constitute the 
logical puzzle do not really logically contradict one another.23 The kind of 
22  Akratic action is nonetheless irrational. Davidson maintains that this is because 
akratic action violates what he dubs the ‘principle of  continence’, which advises every 
rational being qua being rational to ‘perform the action judged best on the basis of  all 
available relevant reasons’ (1969, 112). Of  course, one could also just consider akratic action 
irrational because a person does not do as he himself  judges what all things considered it 
would be best to do (Spitzley 1992, 206).
23  Note that here Davidson only addresses the logical possibility of  akratic action. In 
his later article, ‘Paradoxes of  Irrationality’ (1982), he also discusses how irrational action 
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judgment that is the subject of P2 is an unconditional judgment, whereas 
the kind of judgment that is the subject of P3 is a conditional judgment – 
more specifically, an all things considered judgment.
 Davidson’s distinction between two different kinds of judgments 
seems ingenious, but his account of akratic action nevertheless faces 
important difficulties. For starters, one may wonder whether unconditional 
judgments could truly be considered judgments, given that they are not 
based on premises, reasons or anything of the sort. In fact, in his 1978 
article ‘Intending’, Davidson equates unconditional judgments with 
intentions (1978, 56; cf. 1985b, 197). He does not explain how this bears on 
his account of akratic action. It seems relevant, though, since the intuition 
that a principle like P2 tries to capture is about a strong relation between 
evaluation and motivation, not about intention and motivation. In any case, 
even if unconditional judgments could truly be considered judgments, 
Davidson’s account of akratic action still faces a further problem.
 Davidson allows for acting against a conditional judgment, but 
why is it not possible to act against an unconditional judgment (or, if 
you will, an intention)24 as well?25 Davidson manages to make room in 
his theory for a certain kind of strict akratic action: acting in one way 
while simultaneously conditionally judging that it is best to act otherwise. 
However, his way of approaching the logical puzzle comes at the cost of 
ruling out another imaginable form of strict akratic action: acting against 
one’s unconditional judgment or intention. Davidson’s solution therefore 
– which includes akratic action – is factually possible. He develops a Freudian divided mind 
theory to this purpose. For a further discussion of  this part of  Davidson’s work in relation 
to akratic action, see for example Peijnenburg 1996, 211-217.
24  In Davidson’s 1978 article ‘Intending’, the text is inconclusive about whether he 
sticks to his view that an unconditional judgment/intention corresponds with action or 
whether he now believes that a breach between an unconditional judgment/intention and 
action is possible. The latter option would imply a change to his view on the logical puzzle, 
for it would mean that he no longer holds that there is a type of  judgment that warrants 
action, and thus that he has abandoned P2.
25  Relatedly, we may wonder whether the intuition that P2 tries to capture is not 
actually about conditional and thus about all things considered judgments (cf. Taylor 1980, 
500).
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seems to shift the challenge about the possibility of akratic action rather 
than solving it: he accounts for one form that akratic action might take 
(acting against a conditional or an all things considered judgment), but he 
leaves us wondering why another form of akratic action is not also possible 
(acting against an unconditional judgment or an intention).
 This difficulty with Davidson’s account applies more generally to 
the second strategy for solving the logical puzzle. If someone argues that 
the kind of judgment that warrants action (as in P2) differs from the kind 
of judgment (or the underlying process of practical reasoning) involved in 
akratic action (as in P3), then what automatically arises is the question of 
whether akratic action is not also possible in relation to the first kind of 
judgment. Another option is to try to make room in one’s theory for the 
possibility of the latter form of akratic action as well, in Davidson’s case to 
allow for acting against an unconditional judgment or intention. However, 
this would require one to let go of the idea that there is a tight connection 
between better judgment, motivation, and action. This is what the third and 
final strategy for dealing with the logical puzzle suggests.
 2.2.3 Third strategy: denying a necessary link 
  between better judgment and action
A third strategy in response to the logical puzzle is to give up on a strong 
form of motivational internalism. On Davidson’s sketch of the puzzle, 
this means dropping P2, for, as noted above, P1 is typically considered a 
tautology. In other words, it comes down to denying that there is a tight link 
between better judgment and motivation. The idea is that a better judgment 
does not necessarily correspond with the strongest motivation and thereby 
does not automatically lead to action.
 The third strategy does not entail adopting a form of motivational 
externalism, however. As I explained above, akratic action poses no challenge 
to motivational externalism, because this position does not assume that there 
is any connection between better judgment and motivation, other than 
perhaps coincidentally. In the context of motivational externalism there is 
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no logical puzzle, for it does not involve a principle like Davidson’s P2. The 
possibility of akratic action only poses a challenge to theories that in some 
way or another assume a form of motivational internalism.
 In trying to make room for the possibility of akratic action, the third 
strategy instead entails weakening motivational internalism (cf. Vanmechelen 
2002, 681). A weak form of motivational internalism assumes that there 
is some relation between better judgment and motivation. It can still be 
considered the default mode that a better judgment, via motivation, leads 
to action. However, better judgment and motivation can occasionally come 
apart, as in the case of akratic action. Despite judging it best to act in a certain 
way, a person can sometimes be most strongly motivated to act otherwise. 
The ultimate problem for this kind of strategy is not making room for the 
possibility of strict akratic action but explaining why better judgments 
sometimes do and sometimes do not lead to action.
 I discuss Alfred Mele’s influential account of akratic action26 as a 
representative of the third strategy.27 Mele has written several books and many 
articles about akratic action. He has not altered his general view on akratic 
action, however. I base my discussion mainly on his book Irrationality (1987), 
where Mele discusses akratic action most extensively and systematically. 
Unlike Hare and Davidson, Mele’s reason for discussing akratic action is not 
that it poses a challenge to his theory of action. Rather, he sets out to develop 
a theory of action – more specifically, a causal theory of action (1987, 11) – 
that takes the possibility of akratic action seriously from the start (1987, viii).
 Mele believes that akratic action simply shows that better judgments 
do not always result in the strongest motivation, and thus that a principle like 
Davidson’s P2 is false (1987, 49). He stresses that it is crucial to distinguish 
26  Mele recognizes that the Greek term ‘akrasia’ originally indicates a character trait, 
and he says that akratic action may sometimes be the result of  a character trait (see, for 
example, 1987, 3). However, in line with contemporary literature, he chooses to focus on 
the conceptual possibility and causal explanation of  single and isolated strict akratic actions 
(1987, 4 and 7).
27  For other prominent accounts of  akratic action which make use of  the third 
strategy, see, for example, Robert Audi (1979), Michael Stocker (1979), David Pears (1982), 
Robert Dunn (1987), and Jeanette Kennett and Michael Smith (1994).
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between the evaluative and the motivational force of a better judgment.28 
He holds that practical reasoning does not ensure the strongest motivation 
to act because motivation is not what practical reasoning is about; it is about 
evaluating or ranking options for action. Nevertheless, Mele thinks that 
reasons (which are constituted by beliefs and desires) play an important role 
in action explanation.29 He just maintains that they are often not sufficient 
to explain action (1987, 40-41). Mele thus supports a weak form of 
motivational internalism. According to him, reasons can motivate a person, 
but the motivational force of a person’s best reason is not always sufficiently 
strong to result in action.
 Mele emphasizes that, in addition to beliefs and desires, a model of 
action therefore needs further elements that can help to explain how akratic 
action is possible. He holds that intentions do not suffice for this purpose, 
for he wishes to allow not only for a form of akratic action in which there is 
a breach between better judgment and intention but also for the possibility 
of an executive form of akratic action in which there is a breach between 
intention and action (1987, 35). That is, he also wants to make room for the 
form of akratic action that Davidson’s account seems to rule out. On Mele’s 
view, neither better judgments nor intentions warrant action. He concludes 
that a sound model of action should be expanded especially by including an 
executive element, and he names this executive element ‘self-control’ (1987, 
51).
 The concept of self-control thus plays a central role in Mele’s account 
of akratic action.30 He uses the term ‘self-control’ in several different ways, 
most prominently to refer to an ability and to a type of action. He says 
28  Mele borrows this distinction from Gary Watson, who in ‘Free Agency’ (1975) 
introduces two senses of  the term ‘wanting’: an evaluative and a motivational sense.
29  In later work, Mele makes explicit that according to him it is still the default mode 
that actions are caused by the best reasons and thus by better judgments (see 1991, 44-45 and 
2012, 64).
30  He also addresses paradoxes raised by self-control on its own, such as how a 
person can exercise self-control in support of  a certain action if  he is more motivated to 
perform an alternative. I will not go into this since I am mainly interested how he deals with 
the logical puzzle, but see Irrationality, Chapter Five, or for more recent discussions Mele 
(1997) and (2014).
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that to act in a self-controlled way is to stick to one’s intention to act in 
a certain way here and now31 in the face of competing motivation (1987, 
52). He holds that through the ability of self-control we can exercise some 
amount of influence over motivation. He points out that besides reasons 
(beliefs and desires) and intentions, several other factors can influence a 
person’s motivation to act, including the proximity of the desired object, a 
person’s motivational base (roughly, the combination of his motivation to 
perform a certain action and his motivation to perform alternatives; 1987, 
69), a person’s attentional condition, and whether (and if so, how) a person 
makes an attempt to act in a self-controlled way. Each of these factors can 
contribute to what Mele calls a person’s motivational balance (1987, 44-
45). However, he claims that only through the ability of self-control can a 
person, in the face of competing motivation (and right up to the very last 
moment), turn the motivational balance around (1987, 44-45 and 53).
 I like to think of Mele’s idea of a person’s motivational balance in 
terms of the metaphor of a seesaw. Imagine that each motivational factor 
adds weight to either the left side of the seesaw (say, the option selected by 
one’s better judgment) or the right side (say, the akratic alternative), and that 
the seesaw touches the ground (results in action) on the side which is the 
heaviest at the moment of action (assuming that there is sufficient weight 
on one or the other side to begin with). Self-control can influence the 
motivational weight of either side of the seesaw and can bring it about that 
the seesaw touches the ground at the ‘better judgment side’ even when, close 
to the moment of action, it leans towards the side of the akratic alternative.32
31  This intention typically represents a better judgment (1987, 54-55), but Mele allows 
for ‘unorthodox’ cases of  self-control as well. In such cases, the exercise of  self-control is 
in the service of  an intention that does not represent a better judgment. He mentions the 
example of  Freddy, who exercises self-control to keep his fears of  breaking into a house in 
check even though he judges it best not to break in (1987, 54; cf. 1990).
32  Of  course, the seesaw metaphor oversimplifies matters. For starters, there might 
be more than two options competing for the strongest motivation. Secondly, as Mele stresses, 
many factors do not have a fixed motivational weight (1987, 44). The seesaw metaphor 
might give the impression that each motivational factor contributes a specific amount of  
weight to the motivational balance. Self-control might, however, also shift the balance by 
increasing or diminishing the weight of  other motivational factors, or by functioning as a 
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According to Mele, there are many different ways in which a person can 
exercise self-control and thereby many ways in which someone can use his 
ability of self-control to change the motivational balance. Mele distinguishes 
between two kinds of self-control, which he calls ‘brute resistance’ and ‘skilled 
resistance’. He defines brute resistance as ‘resisting temptation by sheer effort 
of will’ (1987, 26). He tries to make this notion less mysterious by describing 
it in terms of intentions. He holds that brute resistance may consist in a 
further intention that is aimed at retaining another intention, typically the 
intention that represents one’s better judgment (1987, 26).33
 Skilled resistance, as the term suggests, instead relies on techniques. 
The list of techniques is potentially endless. Inspired by both theory and the 
results of empirical research, Mele mentions examples such as manipulating 
one’s environment (1987, 26; think of someone who throws away his supply 
of cigarettes at a moment at which he has no desire to smoke; 1987, 63-64), 
promising yourself a reward, refusing to have second thoughts, and focusing 
your attention on certain aspects of the available alternatives (1987, 23-
24, see also 52-53). With regard to the latter technique, for example, Mele 
discusses that a person can influence the impact of the proximity of a desired 
object through controlling his attentional condition. Psychological research 
on delayed gratification indicates that the motivational weight that stems 
from the proximity of an akratic alternative can be diminished by focusing 
one’s attention on something other than the ‘arousing’ aspects of the desired 
object, such as its ‘informational’ aspects (1987, 88-90). A person is likely to be 
less motivated to eat a marshmallow if he focuses his attention on something 
other than how nice it would taste. Hence, according to Mele, there are 
several self-control techniques that a person can use to try to influence his 
motivational balance in view of his better judgment.
 
center of  rotation that influences how much weight is required to shift the balance.
33  Mele does not explain what such an intention would look like. I picture a person 
who says to himself  things such as ‘let’s do this’ and ‘stick to the plan’. Perhaps the intention 
could also take the form of  what Holton calls ‘contrary inclination defeating intentions’, or 
‘resolutions’ (2009, 77). These are intentions that are designed to prevent one from giving in 
to temptation, such as an intention not to reconsider one’s judgment.
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Mele does not claim, however, that people always exercises self-control 
when they can, or that every attempt at self-control will be successful. He 
says, for example: ‘I do not suggest that this picturing technique [that is, 
focusing one’s attention on certain aspects of the available options rather 
than others], nor any of the techniques mentioned here, will always be 
efficacious’ (1987, 162, n.6). On Mele’s account, then, what makes akratic 
action possible is that people can fail to exercise their ability of self-control in 
relevant situations, and that their attempts at self-control can be ineffective.
 This raises the question, however, of why people do not always 
attempt to exercise self-control when they can and why certain attempts at 
self-control are successful while others are not. Mele holds that this depends 
on the details of the situation. He illustrates this with the help of the example 
of Susan (1987, 93-95). Susan goes out for a stroll on campus, despite judging 
it best not to because she needs to work and also because there have been 
robberies on campus lately. Mele supposes that Susan makes no attempt 
at self-control whereas sticking to her intention to stay home and work 
depends on it. He says: ‘…in the present case we may seek an explanation 
in Susan’s attentional condition. Perhaps the focus of Susan’s attention at a 
crucial juncture was on the pleasure of the solitary stroll and the dreariness 
of her present surroundings rather than on her reasons for staying in’ (1987, 
94). Mele may be perfectly right that a person’s attentional condition can 
play such a role in examples like Susan’s. However, this provides no further 
explanation as to why a person’s attentional condition is not directed at the 
self-controlled alternative at the relevant moment, and, importantly, what 
explains that a person’s attempt at self-control is successful when it is.
 In the end, Mele’s account does not clarify what is decisive when it 
comes to whether a person makes an attempt at self-control and, if he does, 
what makes such an attempt a fruitful one.34 Mele relies on the concept of 
self-control to try to make sense of the observation that, while our strongest 
motivation is often grounded in a better judgment, it is sometimes grounded 
in a different factor. However, this merely seems to shift the problem: what 
remains unclear is what explains that a person is successful in using his ability 
34  For similar critiques of  Mele’s account of  akratic action, see for example Marcia 
Homiak (1991, 123), Sarah Buss (1997, 41, n.35), and Sergio Tenenbaum (1999, 887-888).
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of self-control to influence his motivational balance in favor of his better 
judgment.
 This kind of problem troubles the third strategy for dealing with the 
logical puzzle more generally. Denying a principle like Davidson’s P2 makes 
conceptual room for akratic action by stating that better judgment and 
motivation can come apart. However, if there is no necessary link between 
better judgment and motivation but it is nevertheless sometimes (or even 
usually) a better judgment that corresponds with action, then the question 
comes up of how better judgment and motivation are related. Moreover, a 
similar question arises with regard to every factor that is substituted for a 
better judgment as the final link in the chain that leads to action (regardless 
of whether this is, for example, a conceptual or a causal chain), which on 
Mele’s account is the ability of self-control. It seems that ultimately it is 
impossible to fully understand where motivation comes from. As Sarah 
Buss puts it: ‘These accounts [which I have dubbed ‘the third strategy’ – PS] 
describe agents who simply find themselves moved to act in a manner that 
is incompatible with their own practical conclusions’ (1997, 28). Like the 
former two strategies, then, the third strategy for solving the logical puzzle 
also faces a problem that seems to be inherent to the strategy itself.
2.3 Conclusion
The possibility of akratic action – more specifically, of strict akratic action 
– raises a logical puzzle because it is inconsistent with the intuition that a 
person’s better judgment, via motivation, corresponds with action. I have 
presented the accounts of akratic action offered by Hare, Davidson and 
Mele to illustrate the three different strategies one can pursue in trying to 
deal with the logical puzzle: (1) denying the possibility of akratic action, 
(2) distinguishing between (processes leading to) a judgment that warrants 
action and (processes leading to) a judgment that a person violates in acting 
akratically, and (3) denying that there is a necessary connection between 
better judgment, motivation, and action.
 Each of these strategies faces a difficulty, however, which is inherent 
to the strategy itself. The first strategy does not take the experience of akratic 
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action truly seriously. With regard to the second strategy, the question arises 
whether it is really impossible to act against the kind of judgment that 
supposedly warrants action. And the third strategy, although it can make 
room for the possibility of akratic action, renders the precise relation between 
better judgment, motivation, and action unintelligible. Theories concerning 
action, then, either have a hard time accounting for (all forms of) akratic 
action or have trouble specifying the precise nature of the relation between 
better judgment, motivation, and action. All three strategies for dealing 
with the logical puzzle therefore face a problem that seems impossible to 
overcome entirely.
 Despite the many rich solutions that have been offered in answer 
to the question of how akratic action is possible, the logical puzzle appears 
insoluble. Davidson was perhaps more correct than he himself knew in 
calling the triad of principles that constitute the logical puzzle a paradox. 
Xavier Vanmechelen observes that the literature on akratic action has not 
really come much closer to finding a solution to the puzzle (2002, 669), and 
Jörn Müller even concludes that discussions on the possibility of akratic 
action have reached an impasse (2009, 755).
 This leaves us with the following issue, though: even if we can never 
theoretically account for the possibility of strict akratic action in a satisfactory 
way, and it looks like we cannot, the compelling experience of failing to 
abide by one’s better judgment remains. If we are to say anything more about 
akrasia as it poses a problem in everyday life, we need an alternative way to 
conceive of it – a way that enables us to talk about it productively without 
first having to face the logical puzzle.
 It is my contention that a character approach to akrasia provides a 
fruitful alternative. In the next chapter, I show that there are several advantages 
of regarding akrasia primarily as a character trait instead of primarily as a 
type of single and isolated action. One of these advantages, so I argue, is that 
a character account of akrasia can refrain from taking a stance on the logical 
puzzle of how strict akratic action is possible.
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3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I present several advantages of regarding akrasia as a character 
trait as opposed to regarding it merely as a type of single and isolated action. 
Recall that by ‘character trait’ I refer to a stable and intelligent (or reasons-
responsive) state characterized by distinctive patterns of feeling, thinking 
and acting that are morally relevant, such as a person’s core commitments, 
aspirations and ideals. In fact, I want to make the stronger claim that a 
character approach to akrasia is to be preferred over an ‘action approach’. 
 In contrast to ‘character approach’, I use the term ‘action approach’ 
to refer to the dominant contemporary approach to akrasia, presented in 
the previous chapter, which focuses on the logical puzzle of how single and 
isolated strict akratic action is possible. The two approaches are not rivals in 
the sense that they can exist alongside one another. However, a character 
approach has the advantage that it can address the same philosophical worries 
as the action approach and on top of this can attend to other issues that akrasia 
raises as well. This is not to say that akratic action is always expressive of a 
character trait. It may very well sometimes occur in isolation. However, even 
though a single akratic action can be troublesome enough as it is, akrasia as 
a stable and morally objectionable tendency is of even greater concern in 
everyday life.
 I start by explaining that there are three reasons why an action 
approach cannot do justice to akrasia as it is of most concern in everyday 
life (3.2). I then go on to show that a character approach does not face the 
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same obstacles. A character approach has four clear advantages over an action 
approach. The first three together entail that a character approach better 
captures what akrasia is about in a person’s life (3.3). The fourth reason 
is that it can refrain from taking a stance on the logical puzzle (3.4). This 
observation is not meant as a contribution to solving the logical puzzle but 
rather points out that a character approach can remain agnostic about it. 
Lastly, I address the situationism challenge to character (3.5). Situationists 
claim that it is unlikely that character traits exist. If they are right about 
this, my project is bound to fail from the start. I argue, however, that the 
empirical research on which situationists base their claim does not actually 
support their conclusion about character. The arguments that I present in this 
chapter show that it is highly fruitful for philosophers to approach akrasia as 
a character trait.
3.2 Limits of an action approach
Luc Bovens points out that the contemporary philosophical literature on 
akrasia does not offer any help to people with an akratic character: ‘When 
it comes to therapy, philosophy has been somewhat of a disappointment’ 
(1999, 230). Perhaps Bovens is looking in the wrong place. It seems that if 
one is searching for specific self-control techniques, psychology is a better 
fit. Empirical research sometimes comes up with good suggestions for how 
to exercise self-control. Peter Gollwitzer (1999), for example, has found that 
the formation of implementation intentions – specifying the where, when 
and how of implementing an intended goal – helps a person to complete 
tasks; Walter Mischel and Bert Moore (1973) have revealed that focusing on 
the informative rather than the arousing properties of an object – say abstract 
qualities instead of tastiness – helps a person to delay gratification.1 There 
might, however, be another reason why contemporary literature on the 
topic has thus far not been much help to people with an akratic character: 
it does not deal with what makes akrasia so troublesome in daily life. It does 
1  For the status quaestionis of  the psychological literature on self-control, see the 
handbook on self-regulation by Kathleen Vohs and Roy Baumeister (2011).
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not concern itself with questions of therapy and the good life.2 What is most 
troublesome is akrasia as a recurring phenomenon, but philosophy has been 
overly preoccupied with the theoretical challenge of the logical puzzle.
 An action approach cannot do justice to the problem that akrasia 
poses in everyday life for three reasons. First of all, its focus on the logical 
puzzle prevents it from seeing that the actual predicament of akrasia lies in its 
recurrent form. Furthermore, due to its exclusive focus on the possibility of 
strict cases, an action approach overlooks the importance of the differences 
between the kinds of objects over which people lack control. Thirdly, an 
action approach tends to rule out diachronic cases of akratic action (that is, 
cases that are necessarily stretched out over time, most of which are ‘non-
strict’), disregarding the fact that these can actually greatly disturb a person’s 
life.
 To start with the first reason: an action approach takes single and 
isolated strict akratic action as a point of departure. In this form, akratic action 
poses the largest puzzle to action theory. However, as long as no satisfactory 
answer to the question of how such action is possible is to be found – and, as 
I have shown, the prospects look grim – an action approach will continue to 
go around in circles trying to account for strict akratic action.
 An action approach can certainly allow for the possibility of a person’s 
acting against his better judgment many times. However, the logical puzzle 
does not go away if strict akratic actions form a chain. Each particular case 
still raises the same question. Hence, as a means of solving the logical puzzle, 
an action approach has nothing to gain by shifting its focus to a pattern of 
strict akratic actions.
 Secondly, all examples with the structure of a strict akratic action 
are equally interesting to an action approach. It is indifferent to whether 
the example is about watching a television show, or painting the shed, or 
struggling with being overweight, or adultery. The logical puzzle is about 
the formal structure underlying these different actions. The moral status of 
an akratic action is considered irrelevant and sometimes even distracting.
 Most telling in this context is Donald Davidson’s attempt to deprive 
the notion of akrasia of any specific moral meaning. For this purpose, 
2  I say more on therapy, character development and stagnation in Chapter Six.
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Davidson sketches the situation of a person who is in bed at night and 
suddenly remembers that he has forgotten to brush his teeth. The person 
does not want to disturb a good night’s sleep but is also concerned about 
his dental health. He weighs his reasons and judges that in this instance it 
is best to stay in bed. Nonetheless, he gets up and brushes his teeth (1969, 
101). Davidson may be right that conceptually, this example is as puzzling as 
any other: someone freely and knowingly acts against his better judgment. 
Morally, however, the toothbrusher example is not very serious. It is not 
usually a big deal if someone gets a bit less sleep now and then. (This might 
change if it happens regularly.)3 Of course, Davidson would not maintain 
that the toothbrusher example is on the same moral level as an example 
about adultery. He only wants to show that akratic action need not be moral 
at all. I do not deny this. I want to emphasize, however, that instances of 
akrasia can have the same structure while nevertheless taking up different 
places in a moral hierarchy.
 The moral status of a certain case (ranging from the non-moral to 
the morally very serious) is relevant to an account of akrasia because it is 
part of what determines how strongly we criticize someone for his lack 
of control. For the most part, philosophers hold that all akratic actions are 
criticizable due to their irrational structure. Justin Gosling, for example, 
tries to capture the nature of this irrationality and concludes that it lies ‘in 
not acting on reasons that you take seriously’ (1990, 198). Sometimes, an 
example of akrasia may only be criticizable because someone’s behavior 
has not come about in the way that one would expect of a rational being. 
However, alongside considerations of irrationality and other factors, it can 
matter for the purposes of evaluating a person whether he is akratic with 
regard to doing the dishes, or paying bills, or extramarital sex, etcetera. A 
character trait, on my understanding, describes how well or poorly someone 
does with regard to distinctive patterns of feeling, thinking, and acting that 
are morally relevant. A person’s akratic character might be morally worse 
3  I would not like to encourage the person in the example, however, to stick to 
his better judgment but never to brush his teeth in the evening again. Self-control requires 
of  this person not only that he resist getting out of  bed but also that he finds a way to 
remember to brush his teeth before going to bed.
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than someone else’s in virtue of being directed at certain objects rather than 
others.
 Thirdly, an action approach unduly restricts the notion of akrasia. It 
basically identifies akrasia with strict akratic action. There is, however, a wider 
variety of actions that can be described as ‘failing to abide by one’s better 
judgment’.
 A prominent example in this respect is procrastination. Sarah Stroud 
(2010) argues that procrastination is not a form of akrasia. Her argument is 
based on the observation that synchronicity is a pivotal part of what she calls 
the ‘classic’ definition of akratic action.4 Akrasia on this classic definition is 
the same as what I have been calling ‘strict akratic action’. Synchronicity 
entails the simultaneity that is essential to a strict definition: a person acts 
in one way while at the very same time judging it best to act in a different 
way. Stroud points out that procrastination, on the other hand, is a diachronic 
phenomenon. It is necessarily stretched out over time. She concludes that 
a classic definition of akratic action cannot include procrastination. Being 
stretched out over time is essential to the latter, whereas ‘considerations of 
time are inessential to the possibility of akrasia’ (2010, 59).5
 However, procrastination is often one of the first things that people 
mention as an example of ‘failing to abide by one’s better judgment’. 
Indeed, in The Thief of Time (Chrisoula Andreou and Mark White 2010a) 
– a volume dedicated entirely to procrastination – several authors intimate 
that procrastination is a form of akrasia (it is noteworthy in this context 
that in The Thief of Time the primary concern is irrational delay and not 
4  Stroud calls this definition ‘classic’ to distinguish it from Richard Holton’s 
alternative definition of  weakness of  will. Holton defines it as a form of  intention violation. 
Stroud denies that procrastination is a form of  weakness of  will on Holton’s definition as 
well.
5  Note that synchronic akratic action can also be stretched out over time. Being 
aware of  the fact that you judge it best not to have another beer might last as long as it takes 
to drink the beer. It is not clear whether Stroud agrees. Be that as it may, Stroud’s point is 
not that synchronic akratic action cannot be stretched out over time, but just that time is an 
irrelevant feature here. She says that ‘[a]n “instantaneous” agent – an agent who was destined 
to exist for only one moment, and knew this – could, in that one moment, be akratic’ (2010, 
59).
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strict akratic action). Duncan MacIntosch writes: ‘It is natural to class 
procrastination in with weakness of will’ (2010, 69). Similarly, Mark White 
suggests that ‘[p]rocrastination may be the most common and widespread 
instance of weakness of will’ (2010, 216).6 One is bound to conclude that a 
definition of akrasia that rules out a case that so naturally belongs to its realm 
is unsatisfactory, to say the least.
3.3  Advantages of a character approach
As will be clear, a character approach to akrasia does not face the problems 
outlined in the previous section. A character approach has four advantages 
over an action approach, the first three of which are the converse of the limits 
to an action approach discussed above. In addition, a character approach has 
the theoretical advantage that it does not necessarily have to address the 
logical puzzle.
 3.3.1  Repetition and moral evaluation
A character approach is directed towards akrasia as a stable and morally 
objectionable tendency to fail to abide by one’s better judgment. It therefore 
comes with an interest in recurring akrasia (first advantage) and its morally 
relevant aspects (second advantage). These advantages are intertwined 
because a character trait has both a descriptive and an evaluative side. A 
character trait not only describes how a person is prone to feel, think, and act 
but also determines how a person – at least in this respect – is to be morally 
evaluated.
 Readers may have reservations about whether the fact that a character 
approach is directed towards morally relevant aspects of akrasia is indeed an 
advantage. Davidson warns against a specific focus on moral weakness – that 
6  In the same volume, this is also implied by Don Ross (2010, 44), Christine Tappolet 
(2010, 120), and Jennifer Baker (2010, 174). Olav Gjelsvik sides with Stroud, but he too 
seems to rely on a strict definition of  akratic action (2010, 114).
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is, on acting against a moral judgment (1969, 101). John Austin also complains 
about ‘the grotesque confusion of moral weakness with weakness of will’ 
(1956, 24, n.13). Let me start by showing that a character approach does not 
restrict akrasia to a tendency to act against certain kinds of judgments alone.
 3.3.1.1  An unfounded worry about the moral 
  orientation of a character approach
The concern might be that because of its focus on akrasia as a moral problem, 
a character approach dismisses both common examples of judgment-
violation that only seem to involve a prudential failure and unconventional 
examples in which the outcome is generally considered to be good moral 
conduct. The worry that a character approach excludes certain instances of 
akrasia is unfounded, however.
 First of all, a character approach can include inclinations to act against 
any kind of judgment. The content of the better judgment is not the only 
thing that is of relevance to the moral evaluation of akrasia. As I will show in 
a moment, repetition is a morally relevant factor too. An instance of akrasia 
that is innocent and morally irrelevant in isolation can still render a person’s 
character morally objectionable when it is repetitive.
 Furthermore, I allow for a broad meaning of ‘moral’ that covers both 
the interpersonal domain as well as matters that are related to a person’s 
flourishing. Actions that harm others are the first to spring to mind when 
we think about examples of immoral action. It is obvious that akratic 
actions that result in lying and cheating are instances of moral weakness. 
However, the moral domain is broader than interpersonal matters. Virtue 
ethical theories emphasize this most strongly. Daniel Russell summarizes 
that these theories aim to ‘grasp which character traits are the virtues by 
understanding which traits practical reasoning recommends as essential 
to living a fulfilling human life’ (2013, 7-8). In the Aristotelian tradition, 
this includes other-directed virtues but also a virtue such as moderation, 
which is the cultivation of one’s own bodily appetites for food, drink and 
sex (see for example Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III.10-12). Virtue ethics is 
therefore concerned both with being considerate to others and with taking 
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good care of oneself. Kant likewise does not restrict his ethical theory to 
interpersonal matters to the extent that he distinguishes duties to others 
from duties to oneself (Metaphysik der Sitten (MS) 6: 421-447). The duty 
not to commit suicide is well known (MS 6: 422-424), but he also talks of 
the duty to be moderate with regard to stimulants and food (MS 6: 427-
428) and the duty to develop one’s natural talents (MS 6: 444-446). Hence, 
matters of personal flourishing can be considered morally relevant. Being 
prone to give in to bodily appetites (such as chocolate cravings or the desire 
to have another beer) or being prone to laziness violates the moral ideal of 
the virtuous person and the duties one has to oneself. Thus the character 
approach’s moral orientation does not prevent it from addressing any of the 
common examples of akrasia.
 Can a character approach also acknowledge, however, instances of 
judgment-violation that result in action that we generally find (morally) 
desirable? I shall stick mostly to conventional examples of akrasia because 
I suspect that people can easily relate to them and that these are the kinds 
of cases that we worry about most in everyday life. However, as Jonathan 
Bennett remarks, ‘…rotten principles may be as difficult to keep as decent 
ones’ (1974, 124). Consider the following case, described by Eric Snider: 
A judge reckons it wrong to give blacks fair trials, and so decides to deny fair trials 
to blacks. He also desires to advance his position as a judge by moving to a higher 
court. But, in order to advance his position, he must, though he reckons it wrong, 
give blacks fair trials. So whenever a black comes to trial, due to his desire to 
advance his position, he treats the person fairly. (1986, 267)
Clearly, the judge’s judgment about black people and fair trials is incorrect 
and immoral. However, it seems that, on the one hand, in going against his 
judgment due to his desire to secure a better position (provided he does not 
see this as an overriding reason for action), the judge’s action is nonetheless 
akratic. On the other hand, his action is usually considered a desirable outcome. 
This might give the impression that the judge knows what the right thing to 
do is after all and acts on this knowledge.
 It has been asked, especially in the literature on ‘inverse akrasia’, 
whether such unconventional examples of failing to abide by one’s better 
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judgment are in fact to be regarded as instances of akrasia.7 The idea is that 
it can sometimes be rational to violate one’s better judgment (or in any 
case more rational than acting in accordance). In particular, authors have 
suggested that such a violation of one’s better judgment is rational and 
hence not akratic if a person’s action is more coherent with his overall set 
of beliefs and desires than his better judgment is (Arpaly 2000), or if a desire 
does a better job at ‘tracking’ the right reasons for action than deliberation 
does (Jones 2003). The most commonly cited example of inverse akrasia is 
Mark Twain’s Huckleberry Finn. Huck judges that he should turn in the 
runaway slave Jim. Due to his sympathy for Jim, he fails to do so when the 
opportunity comes along. The inverse akrasia interpretation maintains that 
Huck’s sympathy represents what he truly holds as best, even though he 
does not recognize it himself at that moment. Examples like Huck’s would 
then be construed as cases in which someone acts on a better reason for 
action than the one on which his better judgment is based.
 I am not persuaded that akratic action can sometimes be rational. As 
Sabine Döring points out, ‘…in order to be rational, an agent must satisfy 
the condition that he would so authorize the action, were he asked to do 
so’ (2010, 295).8 If asked, Huck would say that he should turn Jim in. In 
Twain’s novel, he acknowledges years later that he did the right thing in 
helping Jim out.9 In the relevant behavioral context, however, Huck could 
7  This term was coined by Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder (1999). Arpaly 
(2000) in particular has stimulated discussion on inverse akrasia. There are, however, others 
who express similar views. See, for example, Robert Audi (1990), Alison McIntyre (1990), 
Karen Jones (2003), Christine Tappolet (2003), and John Brunero (2013).
8  James Montmarquet (2012) makes a similar point about Huck Finn.
9  Döring observes that even though akratic action is always irrational, akratic conflict 
can sometimes lead to new and improved insights. She holds that this is what happens 
with Huckleberry Finn: ‘in the end, Huck comes out of  it [the conflict between his better 
judgment that he should turn Jim in and his feelings of  sympathy for Jim] with new and 
better reasons, by which he may then guide his actions’ (2010, 297). Annemarie Kalis also 
remarks that ‘failures of  agency might be seen as signals that tell us that we might want to 
rethink our evaluative assessments’ (2011, 164). Xavier Vanmechelen (2000, 302-308) and 
Martin Seel (2001, 618) discuss similar ideas. I agree that akrasia can trigger reflection on 
one’s better judgment and that this can occasionally be productive.
 Chapter Three - Towards a character approach to akrasia
60
not have realized this given the better judgment he had at the time. We may 
disapprove of Huck’s standpoint, but this does not make it rational for him 
to go against it.
 It is not a problem for a character approach, however, to accept 
that certain actions and stable inclinations are akratic – and, on a character 
approach, thus in some sense morally criticizable – despite a desirable 
behavioral result. Morally speaking, we may be even more concerned about 
such unconventional instances of akrasia than about common examples, for it 
seems that people in examples like that of the judge and Huck Finn go wrong 
in two ways: not only do they fail to follow their better judgment, they also 
do not recognize what a fair and sound judgment looks like (cf. Snider 1986, 
274). The fact that the outcome is desirable does not compensate for this. It 
is not my aim to pinpoint what exactly constitutes a sound and morally good 
judgment. However, I insist that certain instances of akrasia involve a double 
failure. Moral improvement requires of people like the judge and Huck 
Finn not only that they gain greater self-control but also that they come to 
see that their better judgment or general standard for action is flawed. After 
all, even though a high level of self-control is an important achievement in 
moral development, by itself it does not make a person good. Consider the 
image of a Nazi who is very self-controlled in carrying out his cruel aims (cf. 
Thomas Hill 1986, 93). Some people with an akratic character may have to 
both overcome their lack of control and change their standard for action in 
order to become the kind of person we can rightfully admire.
 A character account thus recognizes that for akrasia it matters most 
that a person fails to abide by a better judgment of which he is himself strongly 
convinced, regardless of the content of the better judgment. This subjective 
criterion is all-important. However, for the moral evaluation of akrasia we 
can subsequently turn to more objective criteria. Is the better judgment that 
a person endorses plausibly correct or clearly misguided? Is the behavior 
relatively innocent or quite serious given how it affects other people or a 
person’s own flourishing? To conclude, it is the irrational structure of failing 
to abide by one’s better judgment that qualifies an action as akratic, even on a 
character account. The content of a specific case, together with other factors 
such as repetition, influences how serious we consider the akrasia to be.
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 3.3.1.2 Character traits and repetitive behavior
One advantage of a character approach to akrasia is that it is naturally directed 
towards the aspect of repetition. As I mentioned in the introduction to this 
dissertation, I think of the character trait of akrasia as a stable condition with 
positive ontological features of its own that can influence how a person 
typically thinks, feels and acts.
 It must be said, however, that even though there is a natural 
connection between character traits and repetitive behavior, this connection 
is not a necessary one. A character trait need not manifest very often. First 
of all, trait-relevant situations might be rare. Trait-based behavior is triggered 
by certain conditions, such as the strength of competing motivation and the 
presence of an object of desire or aversion. As Christian Miller and Angela 
Knobel phrase it: ‘It is a feature of dispositions in general [of which they 
consider character traits a subclass] that they are sensitive to certain stimulus 
events or stimulus conditions specific to the given disposition’ (2015, 22).10 The 
relevant conditions may not obtain very often. As a consequence, someone’s 
character might never or only rarely reveal itself. Consider, for example, 
a person with an akratic character who is in prison and is deprived of all 
resources over which he could lack control. The prisoner has an akratic 
character, but based on how he currently acts we would never know this. 
 Furthermore, even when the relevant conditions obtain, a character 
trait does not always lead to a corresponding action. As became apparent in 
the discussion of Alfred Mele’s theory of action in Chapter Two, factors other 
than character can influence action, such as a person’s attentional condition 
at the moment of action. For this reason, Mele says that ‘characterological 
explanations of actions are at best promissory notes of a sort’ (1987, 58; cf. 
107). A character trait may have a strong influence on behavior, but it does 
not necessarily determine how someone acts.
 Conversely, the fact that someone exhibits repeated akratic behavior 
is not a conclusive sign of an akratic character. Theoretically, it is possible that 
10  Miller and Knobel point out that certain background conditions can also play an 
important role. A mental illness such as depression can interfere with a character trait, for 
example (2015, 22).
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a self-controlled person could keep finding himself in situations where he 
does not know how to exercise self-control. Perhaps he often finds himself 
in new and surprising circumstances. Repetitive action is not ultimate proof 
of a character trait.
 Having said that, one can expect that a character trait usually leads 
to corresponding behavior in trait-relevant situations. As Miller and Knobel 
write: ‘…the causal activities of trait dispositions [that is, character traits] can 
create expectations about the person’s future behavior in both himself and 
others’ (2015, 23). More importantly, I am mostly interested in akrasia as a 
character trait insofar as it actually manifests itself with regularity, because 
even though single akratic actions can be troublesome enough as it is, akratic 
behavior poses an even larger problem in everyday life when it is repetitive.
 3.3.1.3 Repetitiveness as a morally relevant aspect
A character approach to akrasia focuses on repetition for another reason as 
well. A character trait not only describes how a person is prone to act but is 
also a basis for the moral evaluation of who a person is. Among other things, 
it is relevant for moral evaluation whether a person fails to abide by his better 
judgment incidentally or repeatedly.
 Akrasia especially raises moral criticism when it forms a pattern. 
When we praise or blame someone for what he does, it is moral practice to 
take into consideration whether he acted in or out of character. A punctual 
person who is late for an appointment is more easily excused than someone 
who always makes others wait. A murderer who is generally very peaceful 
is judged less harshly than a murderer who is the violent type (this often 
also influences legal punishment). Similarly, a person who fails to put his 
judgment into practice only once is blamed less harshly than someone who 
violates his better judgment on a regular basis.
 Taken as isolated cases, most of the regular examples of akratic action 
in the literature are not worth worrying about. Think of all those examples 
that have to do with eating, drinking alcohol, smoking, exercising, social 
activity, laziness, and so on. The temptation to eat a piece of chocolate cake, 
have another beer, go to a party, or watch television prevails over the ‘better’ 
63
alternative of sticking to a healthy diet, keeping a clear head, studying for 
an exam, or doing physical exercise. In daily life, the impact of these cases 
as single actions is negligible. The point of sticking to a healthy diet, for 
example, is to be healthy, and this is not threatened by succumbing to the 
occasional chocolate bar. Furthermore, morally speaking, one-time akratic 
actions of the kind under consideration here are irrelevant. As single actions, 
they neither bear on the life of other people nor influence a person’s own 
development. An incidental lapse with regard to things such as eating, 
drinking, and exercising is therefore usually not of much concern.11
 This is not to say that I encourage such incidental lapses. For 
one thing, you never know whether a single action will be the first in a 
pattern.12 George Ainslie, for example, describes how people can make 
use of a mechanism to bundle choices into categories (2001, 78-85). This 
mechanism can help with the exercise of self-control: someone chooses an 
action as if it is the first one of a series of similar actions, and this makes 
him follow through with it. However, the same mechanism makes people 
vulnerable. If you regard an action as a precedent for how you will act in 
the future, this can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. In the case of akrasia, 
this can have disastrous consequences, as Ainslie points out: ‘A lapse that you 
see as a precedent reduces your hope for self-control in similar situations in 
the future, a reduction that recursively reduces your power of self-control 
in those situations’ (2001, 160). Self-control should not amount to overly 
rigid behavior either, however (see also Christine Swanton 1997, 89 and Joel 
Kupperman 1991, 140). It is sometimes good to make an exception. After 
having worked hard and finishing his final exam, a student may justifiably 
judge it best to let himself go and party all night. However, an ideally self-
controlled person makes an exception not only because desire pulls him in 
that direction but because he recognizes when it is called for.
 By contrast, the examples of akratic action of the kind described 
above are of much greater concern when the behavior is repetitive. First 
11  Given, of  course, that there are no other factors in play, such as a promise to 
accompany a friend to the gym.
12  Jeanne Peijnenburg (2007) argues that an action may even become part of  a 
specific pattern only in retrospect.
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of all, in repetitive form, there can be serious negative consequences. For 
example, someone who is consistently lazy may fail to obtain the academic 
degree he is striving for. Secondly, and this is the main thing I want to point 
out, if akratic actions of the kind under consideration form a pattern, this 
bears on how the person is to be morally evaluated. Akrasia as a character 
trait testifies to the fact that someone is the kind of person who – in certain 
sphere(s) of life – fails to follow his better judgment. In general, we do not 
admire people who show little self-control. More particularly, examples 
of akrasia that are innocent in isolation might hinder moral development 
and virtuous behavior when they become part of a pattern. A person who 
is akratic with regard to eating, drinking, studying or household tasks falls 
short, for example, of possible moral ideals such as moderation and industry.13 
Such a person can be said to have a morally objectionable character trait.
 There are also akratic actions that already constitute a problem 
when they occur only once. Think of examples that have very pronounced 
moral significance, such as those that involve adultery, fraud, or endangering 
others. These actions are morally reproachable, whether they happen once 
or often. Furthermore, they can have devastating consequences as single 
actions. A one-time failure to resist a drink when one needs to drive can 
result in a person’s killing someone in a car crash. Hence, certain instances 
of akrasia can have a big impact and are also morally objectionable as single 
actions.
 Even with these examples of akrasia, however, it can make a difference 
for moral evaluation whether they happen incidentally or repeatedly. Persistent 
unfaithfulness is usually considered worse than cheating only once. And, 
someone who commits fraud on one occasion is likely to be punished less 
harshly than someone who commits such a crime systematically. Incidental 
13  People who fall short in these ways are sometimes still admired. Many famous 
actors and musicians, for example, make the news with stories of  alcohol and drugs abuse 
but nonetheless continue to enjoy a large fan base. This does not automatically mean that 
the fans do not value a virtue such as moderation. In their eyes, perhaps, the talent and sheer 
fame of  the celebrity compensates for the shortcomings. Fans also tend to idealize their 
idols. This may lead them to ignore the faults of  the celebrity. Or perhaps they embrace the 
faults of  the celebrity because it shows that he or she is less than perfect and very much 
human.
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cases, no matter how serious, can still be seen as a mistake that someone can 
learn from, or as an excess that he will try to avoid in the future. Frequent 
behavior is a sign of an underlying stable condition. It reveals that someone 
is the kind of person who is bound to act like that again. Hence, even though 
there are akratic actions that are morally objectionable as one-off events, 
here too the moral blame increases when the behavior forms a pattern.
 In sum, certain akratic actions only become a problem in everyday 
life through repetition, but repetition is always an aggravating factor for 
moral evaluation. Akrasia as a character trait can have serious negative 
consequences. More importantly, a person with an akratic character has a 
stable inclination that is morally objectionable.
 3.3.1.4 About further morally relevant aspects
The focus of a character approach on moral evaluation applies to all morally 
relevant aspects of akrasia as a character trait, not only to the aspect of 
repetition. As I have already mentioned, an important factor is the kind of 
object that is involved. I pointed out that it can matter a great deal for moral 
evaluation what kind of object a person is prone to lack control over. 
 For the moment, I will not discuss any further factors that are 
relevant to the moral evaluation of akrasia. I come back to this when I discuss 
Aristotle’s account of akrasia as a character trait. In the Nicomachean Ethics 
Book VII, he indicates several possible factors. For now, it suffices to have 
shown that contrary to an action approach, a character approach can address 
the fact that different kinds of akrasia constitute a moral hierarchy.
 3.3.2 A wide variety of manifestations
A third advantage of a character approach is that it acknowledges that akrasia 
as a character trait can have a wide variety of manifestations. The character 
trait can be expressed not only through strict akratic action but through all 
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sorts of actions that are naturally described as ‘failing to abide by one’s better 
judgment’.
 Thomas Hill makes a similar claim. He states that a focus on akrasia 
and character directs us towards ‘a somewhat different range of cases than 
those that have so puzzled action theorists’ (1986, 93). The cases that Hill 
has in mind, however, do not necessarily involve a failure to abide by one’s 
better judgment. Most examples that he mentions rather come down to a 
failure to properly form or maintain a judgment in the first place, or to a 
failure in the manner of execution. He holds that apart from ‘acting with 
full awareness contrary to what one judges best’, weakness can reveal itself 
in several other ways. He mentions ‘half-hearted efforts’ (acting but not 
trying very hard), ‘weak resolves’ (forming vague resolutions), ‘surrendering 
after a struggle’ (changing one’s mind while giving in to temptation), ‘fading 
will’ (a disappearing judgment) and ‘unstable will’ (continually changing 
one’s judgment) (1986, 95-98). 
 Here, I restrict myself to actions that involve a complete failure to 
abide by one’s better judgment, for these cases qualify most naturally as 
akrasia. I discuss three so-called ‘diachronic’ alternatives to strict akratic 
action that fit the bill: procrastination, temporary judgment-shift and akrasia 
through self-deception or rationalization.
 3.3.2.1 Procrastination and considerations of time
Procrastination is essentially diachronic. It is necessarily stretched out over 
time. For this reason – as I mentioned above – Sarah Stroud denies that it is 
a form of ‘classic’ (read: strict) akratic action, which is essentially synchronic. 
However, it is natural to consider procrastination a form of akrasia, at least 
when it involves violating a better judgment.14 
 
14  Procrastination may still not entirely overlap with akrasia, for there could be 
instances of  irrational delay that do not involve the violation of  a better judgment, for 
example instances in which someone postpones making a decision or forming a better 
judgment to begin with.
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A character approach has no trouble with the diachronic features of 
procrastination. Akrasia as a character trait is itself diachronic, since it is a 
stable condition. This implies that it covers a long period of time, potentially 
as long as a person’s lifespan (at least counting from the age of which a 
person has a fully formed character). There is therefore no reason to 
exclude as manifestations actions that are by themselves extended over time, 
including procrastination. Procrastination can cover a shorter or a longer 
period of time. Examples range from an employee who postpones handing 
in his letter of resignation until tomorrow despite the fact that he holds that 
it is best to do so today, to a writer who keeps postponing the completion 
of his book for years. In both cases, the procrastination can be occasional 
or repetitive. Even when procrastination covers a longer period of time, it 
may only be peculiar to a specific project. However, my point is that when 
procrastination forms a pattern, it can be considered a manifestation of the 
character trait of akrasia.15
 When a better judgment is in play, procrastination can be described 
as a diachronic form of ‘failing to abide by one’s better judgment’. It is some 
form of irrational delay, although it is difficult to specify the exact conditions 
under which putting things off is irrational. We cannot do everything at once. 
Sometimes we need to postpone certain things, and it is not always bad to 
leave something to the last minute. So when, exactly, does something count 
as procrastination? One indication that the delay is irrational is whether 
someone acts later than he thinks he should.16 As Chrisoula Andreou states, 
procrastination ‘involves leaving too late or putting off indefinitely what one 
should, relative to one’s goals and information, have done sooner’ (2010, 
206-207). A procrastinator’s better judgment involves a time specification as 
one of its main elements. The better judgment specifies not only that it is 
15  It is striking that a considerable number of  the authors of  The Thief  of  Time hold 
that procrastination is often persistent, or at least that in its recurrent form it is of  the 
greatest concern. See Christoula Andreou and Mark White (2010b, 3), George Ainslie (2010, 
13), Don Ross (2010, 44), Christine Tappolet (2010, 122), Sergio Tenenbaum (2010, 130), 
Mark White (2010, 216), and Manuel Utset (2010).
16  It gets more complicated when the judgment about the need to act at a certain time 
is itself  not formed in a proper way (see Andreou and White 2010b, 4), but let us assume for 
the moment that it is.
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best to do something but also that it is best to do so before or at a certain 
point in time, or within a certain timespan.
 Its diachronic nature does not prohibit procrastination from taking 
a strict form, though. A person who postpones something despite judging 
it best to do it earlier may be very much aware of this.17 Unlike what is 
often implied, synchronicity and diachronicity do not exclude one another. 
Features of actions that are stretched out over time (diachronic) can nonetheless 
be present at the same time (synchronic). This does not mean that with strict 
procrastination someone has to have his better judgment in mind all the 
time. It suffices, I would say, if he is aware of it at the relevant moments. 
For example, someone who puts off starting work on a paper that is due 
in two weeks may think of this on every occasion that he could be writing 
but instead turns on the television, organizes his cupboard, etcetera. What 
matters is that the different elements of a conflict can be simultaneously 
present in someone’s mind for a period of time. Procrastination can hence 
be a diachronic form of strict akratic action.
 But if diachronicity does not exclude synchronicity, why then are 
authors with an action approach at such great pains to keep considerations 
of time out of the ‘classic’ definition of strict akratic action? The crux is 
that diachronicity opens up the possibility of non-simultaneity. Diachronic 
akrasia can be synchronic, but it does not need to be. If akrasia takes place 
over time, it is possible that the one element of the conflict will be present 
only after the other. A person in that case does not act in one way while at 
the very same time judging it best to act otherwise. The conflict between 
better judgment and competing motivation can in some evaluative sense 
be called simultaneous because a person’s previously formed or implicit 
better judgment pertains to the moment of action. Psychologically speaking, 
however, the conflict is not simultaneous in the sense that the person is 
unaware of his better judgment at the relevant moment. Diachronicity does 
not rule out simultaneity, but for an action approach the problem is that it 
does not guarantee the strictness that authors seek in a definition of akrasia.
 A character approach, on the other hand, can take both strict and 
non-strict akratic actions on board. An action that is characteristic of a person 
17  Tappolet also notes this and talks of  ‘clear-eyed procrastination’ (2010, 121).
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who is disposed to fail to put his better judgment into action qualifies as a 
manifestation of an akratic character in strict and non-strict cases alike. A 
character approach can hence incorporate both strict and non-strict akratic 
actions because they are equally expressive of a stable condition of akrasia.
 Procrastination can take both a strict and a non-strict form. Other 
diachronic manifestations are necessarily non-strict. I have in mind, first 
of all, actions in which a person temporarily replaces his better judgment 
with another. In a second type of case, a person does not replace his better 
judgment but temporarily sets it aside or does not think about it.
 3.3.2.2 Temporary judgment shift
In the case of a temporary judgment shift, someone temporarily replaces 
his better judgment with another. At the moment of action, he changes his 
mind about what it is best to do in this situation. However, the change of 
mind is not permanent. After the action, the initial judgment is restored, and 
the person regrets his action and disapproves of it.
 A well-known description of temporary judgment shift is George 
Ainslie’s theory of ‘hyperbolic discounting’.18 The theory describes how a 
preference for a certain object of desire is temporarily replaced by another. 
The starting point is the observation that people often choose smaller, more 
proximate rewards over larger later ones. Ainslie agrees with economic 
models of action that desire for an object increases with proximity. However, 
he rejects the idea that the desire increases exponentially. The basic idea of 
hyperbolic discounting is that when an object of desire draws nearer in time, 
the desire for it not only strengthens but increases dramatically (it makes 
a steep curve). As a result, Ainslie says that ‘you’ll tend to prefer smaller, 
earlier rewards to larger, later ones temporarily, during the time that they’re 
imminent’ (2001, 38).
18  Some authors who write on akrasia build on or have a similar theory to Ainslie’s. 
See, for example, David Pugmire in Pears and Pugmire (1982), Frank Jackson (1984), and Jon 
Elster (1985). Pugmire and Jackson are ‘akrasia-skeptics’: their descriptions of  temporary 
judgment shifts are meant as substitutes for strict akratic action.
 Chapter Three - Towards a character approach to akrasia
70
Ainslie holds that his theory of hyperbolic discounting describes what 
happens in cases of akrasia (2001, 39).19 Someone has a judgment that it 
is best to pursue a larger later reward. When a smaller object of desire is 
imminent, he temporarily replaces this judgment with the judgment that 
it is best to pursue the object that is closer to him in time. He ends up 
violating the former judgment and following the latter. If Ainslie is correct 
that this is akrasia, then it is a non-strict form: the judgment that a person 
fails to abide by is only in place before and after the action, not during.
 There is a challenge if we want to consider temporary judgment 
shifts as instances of akrasia, however. On what grounds can we assume 
that by a person’s own standards his prior judgment has a higher authority 
than his current one? In order for akrasia to occur, there must be reason 
to believe that the prior judgment represents a person’s take on the matter 
better than the judgment at the moment of action.
 The fact that the ‘new’ better judgment is only temporary raises 
suspicion. It is often rational to change one’s mind, for example because of 
new information or further deliberation. However, the temporary judgment 
that is formed in the case of hyperbolic discounting is directly based on 
desire. Furthermore, if the new reasons are convincing and the change of 
mind expresses a person’s new viewpoint, one would expect the judgment 
to last. Instead, a person quickly reinstalls his prior judgment after the action 
and regrets his action.
 Even though a temporary judgment is suspicious, it may nonetheless 
be reliable. As Barbara Guckes points out, there are two options. People 
can overestimate their desires in the heat of the moment, but they can also 
underestimate their preferences for certain options when they are not in 
the concrete situation (2005, 186-187). Consider a woman who changes 
her view on the use of anesthesia during childbirth while in active labor. 
Beforehand, she holds that it is best not to use anesthesia. She is of the 
opinion that childbirth without anesthesia is more natural and that its use 
19  Ainslie states that hyperbolic discounting is the basic impulse for action (2001, 38). 
However, he does not claim that there is no way to counteract this impulse. A large part of  
his book Breakdown of  Will is dedicated to the mechanism of  willpower and the downsides 
that, according to him, come with this mechanism.
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jeopardizes the bond between mother and child. This is her view before 
the moment of action, and she reverts to it at some point after the child is 
born. During childbirth, however, she changes her mind based on the pain 
she experiences. It is not too farfetched to think that her judgment at the 
moment of action is more reliable than her prior judgment. It is based on 
the intensification of a desire to relieve pain, but in the case at hand this 
seems like a good reason to change one’s mind. Before labor, the woman 
probably underestimates the pain, and afterwards the memory of it fades 
away. Only at the moment of childbirth itself can she take the real amount 
of pain into consideration. Her prior judgment does not seem very fit for a 
situation she has never or only seldom experienced before. Then again, she 
might have given her prior judgment much thought, which surely counts 
for something. So which judgment expresses her actual standpoint?
 There is no simple answer to this. One might argue that when a 
prior judgment represents a person’s firm, long-term commitment, it has 
the highest authority. This sounds especially convincing in the case of a 
commitment to avoid the kind of situation in which you expect that the 
temporary judgment shift will arise.20 For example, someone may judge it 
best not to have chocolate in the house to avoid being tempted to eat it. For 
this argument to work, however, we would need a theory of why agency is 
to be identified with a person’s long-term commitment rather than his state 
of mind at the moment of action.21 I will not try to develop such a theory 
here. Moreover, I am not convinced that a long-term commitment is always 
most representative. A theory on the status of agency would need to account 
for exceptions like possibly the childbirth example outlined above. It would 
need to explain when a prior judgment has the highest authority and when 
20  A better judgment in that case has a similar purpose as that which Richard Holton 
ascribes to resolutions. He says: ‘Resolutions serve to overcome the desires or beliefs that 
the agent fears they will form by the time they come to act, desires or beliefs that will inhibit 
them from acting as they now plan’ (2009, 77). Unlike Holton, I am mainly interested in 
resolutions and other intentions insofar as they represent a better judgment.
21  I thank Michael Bratman for pointing this out to me. Bratman’s own work on 
planning agency would be a promising starting point for such a theory (see, for example, 
Intentions, Plans and Practical Reason (1987)).
 Chapter Three - Towards a character approach to akrasia
72
a temporary judgment is more reliable.22
 In the context of a character account of akrasia, this difficulty is not 
all too worrisome, however. An akratic condition is likely to manifest itself in 
a pattern of behavior. If it expresses itself through temporary judgment shifts, 
the person who suffers from this condition has faced a temporary change of 
mind in similar situations quite often. Each time, he has a better judgment 
that in this kind of situation it is best to behave in a certain way; when the 
moment arrives, however, his preference changes. Afterwards, he reverts to 
his earlier judgment. He sticks with his better judgment despite the fact 
that it has been put to the test repeatedly. This makes it highly likely that 
for him, the judgment prior to action has the highest authority. The regret 
he feels over his actions strengthens this even more. If we rely on a person’s 
own attitude towards his behavior, it seems fair to say that if he hangs on to 
a better judgment or standard for action that he has had ample opportunity 
to abandon, then it truly represents where he stands.
 Hence, on a character approach a temporary judgment shift can be 
considered a non-strict form of akratic action. If a temporary judgment 
shift is recurrent, it is plausible that the prior and intermittent judgment 
accurately represents a person’s view.
 3.3.2.3 Akrasia through self-deception or 
  rationalization
In a second form of non-strict akratic action, a person does not replace his 
better judgment with another but temporarily sets it aside or does not think 
about it. The chocolate cake looks so tasty that a person becomes convinced 
that he has good reason to make an exception to his diet in the current 
situation. Or, all of his attention is drawn to how good a piece of the cake 
will taste, and he gives the diet no further thought at the moment. Under the 
22  Let me stress that I do not wish to identify a person solely with his better judgment. 
Desires, actions, akratic behavior, and so on, can be very much a person’s own. In this 
context, I am just most concerned with taking seriously a person’s own perspective on his 
behavior.
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influence of competing motivation, at the moment of action a person can 
fail to apply a general standard to the relevant situation or can push his better 
judgment to the back of his mind. One way to describe these instances of 
akrasia is in terms of self-deception.
 One might wonder whether it is fruitful to turn to self-deception, 
though, for it has raised something of a logical puzzle of its own. Xavier 
Vanmechelen, for example, describes it as the ‘cognitive’ counterpart of (the 
strict form of) akrasia (2000, 209). If self-deception is impossible, then so is 
akrasia through self-deception. A character approach does not have much 
to gain by incorporating another manifestation the possibility of which is 
widely questioned.
 Indeed, self-deception can be a puzzling phenomenon. The two 
most common ways of understanding self-deception are paradoxical (see, 
for example, Vanmechelen 2000, 229-241). First of all, self-deception is often 
described as a situation in which someone believes p and not-p at the same 
time. Secondly, it is common to try to understand self-deception on the basis 
of a model of interpersonal deception. Interpersonal deception is intentional. 
Someone who deceives himself would then intentionally deceive himself 
and be deceived. Moreover, as the deceiver he knows that which he deceives 
himself about, but as the deceived he does not know it. This seems impossible. 
On these conceptions, then, it is hard to make sense of self-deception.
 This difficulty can be avoided by selecting a notion of self-deception 
that is not paradoxical. Julius Schälike (2004) suggests that in order to account 
for akrasia in terms of self-deception, it is most fruitful to draw on a notion 
that defines self-deception not on the basis of a model of interpersonal 
deception but rather as the result of a motivated misinterpretation of facts 
(2004, 373). Self-deception in that case does not amount to knowing and 
not knowing something at the same time or to holding two contradictory 
beliefs; instead, it involves forming a false belief under the influence of 
motivation. Motivated by his craving, someone comes to believe that it 
is okay to eat this particular piece of chocolate cake. This notion of self-
deception does not require that a person be aware at the moment of action 
of the belief of which he is deceived.
 Schälike points out that Alfred Mele is one of the authors who has 
developed such an alternative notion of self-deception. In a more recent 
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article, Mele summarizes the core of his view as follows: ‘self-deceivers have 
motivationally biased beliefs’ (2009, 261). The idea is that motivation can 
influence one’s belief-formation, for example through misinterpretation 
(positive or negative), selective focusing, and selective evidence gathering 
(2009, 261-262). He illustrates how this might work: ‘…desire can enhance 
the vividness or salience of data. […] Similarly, desires can influence which 
hypotheses occur to one and affect the salience of available hypotheses’ 
(2009, 263-264). Mele’s view does not come down to believing something 
merely by willing to believe it. He stresses that his view does not entail 
anything like intentionally deceiving oneself. For this reason, he calls his 
view ‘deflationary’. The self-deception lies in the fact that a person believes 
something because he is biased by his motivation.
 One may perhaps hesitate to call this non-intentional motivated 
belief-formation a form of self-deception, for deception seems to imply the 
intention to deceive. Mele expresses this worry himself: ‘…someone might 
claim that if I have unmasked something, it is not self-deception’ (2009, 
275). He responds that even though his critics do not agree with all of the 
details of his account, most accept that what he describes is a form of self-
deception. For those who are nevertheless not persuaded, however, I propose 
that we use a different term instead – for example, ‘rationalization’. This term 
is related to self-deception but does not have the associations of intentional 
deceit and holding contradictory beliefs. Rationalization can refer to cases 
such as coming up with an excuse to make an exception to a general standard 
for action23 or focusing only on the reasons that justify a certain action.
 Julius Schälike uses such a notion of non-intentional self-deception 
to describe the experience of akratic action, but he does not provide the 
kind of account I am looking for. His article for the most part follows Ursula 
Wolf ’s analysis of akratic action in terms of self-deception (1985). She is 
skeptical about strict akratic action but tries to understand how people can 
nonetheless think they experience it. According to her, and Schälike follows 
her in this, self-deception enters the scene twice. First of all, someone comes 
23  A person with an akratic character might make so many exceptions to a general 
standard for action that his behavior no longer qualifies as exceptional. Nonetheless, he may 
still rationalize his action by perceiving it as an exception.
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to have a long-standing false belief about what he values most. For example, 
a person is mistaken about the hierarchy of his standards for action. This 
long-standing false belief is motivated by a desire to be the kind of person 
who subscribes to certain standards for action (1985, 30). Secondly, to justify 
opting for immediate pleasure in a particular situation, a person becomes 
convinced, for example, that the current situation is an exception to his 
standard for action, about which he was self-deceived in the first place (1985, 
31). After the action, he realizes that he has rationalized his behavior, but at 
this point he can declare without cost – that is, without having to confirm 
it in action – that he sees his standard for action as binding (1985, 32). The 
crux, according to Wolf and Schälike, is that a person does not grant the 
standard for action that he violates the status that he says he does. They use 
the notion of self-deception to describe a case that looks like (but is not) a 
case of failing to abide by one’s better judgment.
 However, non-intentional self-deception or rationalization can also 
help to describe real instances of non-strict akratic action, which involve failing 
to abide by a better judgment that one sincerely endorses. It can account for 
cases in which someone at the relevant moment discards or does not think 
about the better judgment. Under the influence of competing motivation, a 
person temporarily focuses on reasons to make an exception or to justify a 
certain course of action. As a result, for the time being he fails to see that his 
standard for action commits him to acting in this situation or he does not 
give his better judgment any thought. Akrasia as a character trait can hence 
manifest itself in a non-strict way through self-deception (more specifically, 
through non-intentional self-deception or rationalization).
 A character approach thus has a broad scope. It can include as 
manifestations not only ‘classic’ strict akratic actions but strict and non-
strict diachronic forms as well. The fact that akrasia as a character trait has a 
wide variety of manifestations also plays a crucial role in the fourth and last 
advantage of a character approach that I want to point out.
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3.4  An agnostic stance on the possibility of 
 strict akratic action
The fourth advantage of a character approach is that it can refrain from taking 
a stance on the possibility of strict akratic action. As a consequence, it can 
basically accept all solutions to the logical puzzle. (I address one important 
exception further on.) This is an advantage, first of all, because it means that 
discussions on akrasia as a character trait need not lead to the impasse that 
it seems discussions on the logical puzzle unavoidably face. And secondly, as 
intriguing as the logical puzzle is, it clouds other issues concerning akrasia 
that are also worth our attention.
 In the previous chapter, I explained that an action approach almost 
exclusively focuses on the logical puzzle24 of how strict akratic action is 
possible. In this form, akratic action is the most puzzling and raises the largest 
challenge for action theory. I also explained that the three possible strategies 
for dealing with the logical puzzle each face a difficulty that appears to be 
insoluble because it is inherent to the strategy itself. Either akrasia has to 
be given up – at least in its strictest form – or the relation between better 
judgment and motivation remains unintelligible. This suggests that an action 
approach cannot move beyond the logical puzzle.
 A character approach does not make the logical puzzle go away; nor 
does it provide a new strategy for tackling it. A character approach can still 
be confronted with the logical puzzle. In this sense, a character approach 
encompasses an action approach: it can address the same philosophical 
challenge. Strict akratic action is one of the ways in which the stable 
condition of akrasia could manifest itself. The challenge of explaining the 
possibility of strict cases stays very much the same. A character approach 
cannot say anything more about this than an action approach can.
 The medieval scholastic literature illustrates this. Jörn Müller observes 
that in ancient and medieval literature, akrasia was regarded as a character trait 
24  Recall that the logical puzzle is constituted by the fact that the possibility of  acting 
against one’s better judgment is in tension with the action theoretical assumption that if  one 
sincerely judges that it is best to perform a certain action and is free to perform it, then one 
will also be most strongly motivated to do so and will automatically act in that way.
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(2009, 28-29). This observation lies at the heart of this dissertation. He also 
argues, however, that the medieval scholastic debate on akrasia reached an 
impasse that, according to him, was similar to that faced by the contemporary 
debate (2009, 755).25 Ancient and medieval discussions about the forms 
that the manifestations of akrasia as a character trait can take went through 
motions that were similar to those in contemporary discussions on the 
logical puzzle about strict akratic action,26 and this reached its height in the 
scholastic debate (2009, 740). Voluntarists who believed in the autonomous 
status of the will pointed to strict akratic action in order to argue against the 
plausibility of intellectualistic positions which ascribed more influence to 
reason.27 The fact that akrasia was regarded as a character trait did not prevent 
the older literature from getting stuck in a discussion about the possibility of 
strict akratic action.
 Nevertheless, a character approach enables us to focus on something 
other than the logical puzzle, because it can take an agnostic stance towards 
strict akratic action. Note that such an agonistic stance, if only for the time 
being, is required to avoid the logical puzzle because granting the possibility 
of strict cases is what I have dubbed the third strategy of dealing with the 
puzzle (denying a tight link between better judgment and motivation), and 
denying its possibility comes down to the first or second strategy (denying 
all or some forms of strict akratic action).
 On a character approach there is, first of all, the alternative of 
focusing on the stable condition of akrasia as such. One may ask, for example, 
how this condition can be stable and how it is to be morally evaluated. 
This by itself is not enough to avoid the logical puzzle, for a character 
trait reveals itself through manifestations. However, in the previous section I 
showed that a character approach can incorporate both strict and non-strict 
manifestations. All manifestations are equally expressive of the overarching 
25  Some prominent figures in this scholastic debate are Thomas Aquinas, Henry of  
Ghent and John Duns Scotus.
26  A. Hügli makes a similar observation (2004, 805 and 807).
27  At the end of  the scholastic debate, the interest in akrasia disappeared because, 
as with the contemporary view of  motivational externalism, on the extreme voluntaristic 
positions that emerged every decision and action was rendered equally mysterious.
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character trait of akrasia. As long as the character trait can manifest itself in 
some way, the precise way in which it manifests itself does not matter. The 
character trait can include strict akratic action if it is possible. If strict akratic 
action is impossible, however, the stable condition could still express itself 
through non-strict akratic action. A character approach is not dependent on 
whether strict akratic action is possible. A person can be a procrastinator, for 
example, even if he is never aware that he procrastinates at the very moment 
at which he does. Secondly, then, a character approach can remain agnostic 
about the possibility of strict akratic action because it has the option of 
focusing on non-strict manifestations.
 There is of course one possible solution to the logical puzzle that a 
character approach cannot accept: denying strict akratic action by denying 
any form of akratic action whatsoever, including all imaginable non-strict 
forms.28 It might therefore seem that a character approach cannot avoid the 
logical puzzle after all because it is not entirely indifferent to the solution. 
This conclusion does not follow, however. The target of the logical puzzle is 
strict akratic action. The incompatible assumptions that constitute the logical 
puzzle do not render non-strict cases suspicious. Not-strict akratic action 
does not form much of a puzzle, or at least not the same puzzle as strict cases 
do. If one wants to defend the position that non-strict akratic action cannot 
occur, one therefore needs to enter a different discussion than the one about 
the logical puzzle. Non-strict manifestations certainly raise challenges of 
their own. When is a temporary judgment shift irrational? Which notion 
of self-deception should we use, or should we rather talk of rationalization? 
And why might someone not clearly have the relevant better judgment 
in mind at the moment of action? From an action theoretical perspective, 
28  I know of  no one who explicitly takes this rigid view. Some authors seem to imply 
that no form of  akratic action is possible because they state that akrasia is impossible in 
general. However, I suspect that in those cases the real target is again strict akratic action. 
In Plato’s Protagoras, for example, Socrates denies akrasia altogether, but he provides an 
alternative description in terms of  overvaluing an object due to its proximity in time. This 
resembles Ainslie’s description of  a temporary judgment shift. Both Wolf  and Schälike 
also seem to deny akrasia in general. Their description of  how someone can have a false 
impression of  acting against his better judgment can easily exist alongside non-strict forms 
of  akratic action, though.
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however, a person’s failure to abide by a better judgment of which he is at 
the moment of action not aware that he endorses it is not all that perplexing. 
The better judgment fails to be productive because it is not consciously 
present (in the right way) at the relevant moment. On a character approach, 
one can therefore refrain from taking a stance on the logical puzzle without 
necessarily having to give up on non-strict forms of akratic action.
 Note that this way of responding to the logical puzzle is not open 
to an action approach. As I pointed out in Chapter Two, an action approach 
has the tendency to either dismiss non-strict descriptions or see them as 
derivative at most (see for example Davidson 1969, 97-98 and Mele 1987, 
19). Non-strict descriptions are for the most part presented as substitutes 
for strict akratic action by authors who apply a skeptical strategy in dealing 
with the logical puzzle. So non-strict cases play a role in an action approach 
mainly as artillery to deny the possibility of strict akratic action. This keeps 
the discussion on the logical puzzle very much at the center of attention, 
though.
 Hence, a character approach can but need not address the logical 
puzzle. The greatest advantage is that this makes it possible for a character 
approach to also address the questions and worries that akrasia raises as an 
everyday problem.
3.5 The situationism challenge
I have discussed several advantages of a character approach to akrasia over an 
action approach. None of these advantages really matter, however, if it turns 
out that it is unlikely that character traits exist. Philosophical situationism 
claims that this is indeed unlikely. Let me therefore consider the ‘situationism 
challenge’.
 Building on empirical research, philosophical situationism challenges 
the existence of broad character traits such as courage and honesty and 
thereby also seems to pose a challenge to my project on akrasia as a character 
trait.29 Much has already been written on situationism, and I do not intend 
29  I do not address psychological situationism. For a discussion of  the person-
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to rehash the entire debate. I shall briefly summarize the situationists’ main 
claims, and then refute the challenge by relying on two counterarguments 
offered by Tom Bates and Pauline Kleingeld. Not only are their arguments 
particularly persuasive, but out of all the counterarguments in the debate 
theirs are also the most significant to my project. I show that their arguments 
apply to akrasia as a character trait as well. I conclude that the empirical 
evidence relied on by the situationists does not rule out the existence of a 
character trait such as akrasia.
3.5.1 Situationism
Situationists – such as John Doris, Gilbert Harman, Peter Vranas and Maria 
Merritt – consider it unlikely that character and character traits exist, 
at least in the way these notions are usually understood in ethical theory 
(virtue ethics in particular) and everyday language. Their view is based on 
psychological research. According to situationists, empirical evidence shows 
that situational factors typically better explain human behavior than a 
person’s alleged character does.30 As Merritt, Doris and Harman put it, ‘[s]
ocial psychologists have repeatedly found that the difference between good 
conduct and bad appears to reside in the situation more than in the person’ 
(2010, 357). For example, one psychological experiment suggests that 
whether a person helps someone to pick up a dropped pile of papers is better 
explained by factors that influence mood – such as finding a dime in a phone 
booth shortly beforehand – than by whether the person possesses a trait 
such as helpfulness.31 And there are many more psychological experiments 
that the situationists cite, the most familiar of which are probably Stanley 
situation debate in psychology, see for example William Fleeson et al. (2015).
30  There are many varieties and arguments within the debate on situationism that I do 
not discuss. For excellent overviews of  the debate, see Kristján Kristjánsson (2010, Chapter 
Six) and, especially, Tom Bates (2016).
31  It is no coincidence that most of  the examples that I mention in relation to 
situationism are about helping behavior, for many of  the relevant psychological experiments 
are about helping others.
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Milgram’s obedience experiments and a series of experiments on the so-
called ‘bystander effect’. The striking aspect of situationism is not the idea 
that situational factors influence behavior as such. Character traits can be 
expected to be highly sensitive to specific circumstances. For example, 
helpfulness requires that a person takes into account factors such as whether 
someone needs help, who needs help the most, and what kind of help is 
required. The issue is that according to situationists the situational factors 
that influence behavior are typically factors that are morally insignificant and 
irrelevant (such as finding a dime) and are often not recognized by people 
themselves as influencing the way they act.
 Situationists primarily argue against the notion of a ‘global’ or ‘robust’ 
character trait. They deny that people’s behavior is typically consistent from 
one trait-relevant situation to another. The claim is based on evidence of 
people’s overt behavior. Situationists do not overlook the fact that a person’s 
inner condition – thoughts and feelings – is a crucial part of a character trait. 
However, they hold that one would nonetheless expect a character trait 
to produce either consistently morally admirable behavior (such as helping 
others) or consistently morally deplorable behavior (such as not helping 
others) in trait-relevant situations. As Doris phrases it: ‘…if a person has 
a robust trait, they can be confidently expected to display trait-relevant 
behavior across a wide variety of trait-relevant situations, even where some 
or all of these situations are not optimally conducive to such behavior’ 
(2002, 18). Empirical evidence shows that people’s observable behavior is 
mostly mixed, however. Take helpfulness again. It turns out that most people 
help in certain kinds of help-relevant situations and fail to help in other 
kinds of help-relevant situations, and situationists maintain that this depends 
on the presence or absence of help-irrelevant situational variables such as 
the weather or the number of other people standing by. They conclude that 
traits such as helpfulness apparently do not exist (or are very rare at most) and 
that there is typically no ‘cross-situational consistency’ in people’s behavior. 
To summarize, situationism is the view that human behavior typically lacks 
cross-situational consistency and that broad character traits do not exist.
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 3.5.2 Two counterarguments to situationism
Many objections have been raised against situationism. I limit myself to a 
brief discussion of two counterarguments by Tom Bates (2016) and Pauline 
Kleingeld (2015). These counterarguments are particularly persuasive 
because they battle situationism on its own ground. Furthermore, they are 
most relevant for my purposes because they focus not on the perfect state of 
virtue but on other global character traits, most prominently on the morally 
imperfect state of vice. For this reason, these two arguments are easily 
transferable to the morally imperfect character trait of akrasia.
 Bates and Kleingeld develop separate but complementary arguments 
against situationism. Both authors choose not to contest the situationists’ 
approach of building on certain empirical evidence,32 but they nonetheless 
question whether the empirical data indeed support the basic assumptions 
of situationism. Furthermore, they both observe that situationists should pay 
more attention to other global character traits than those that have received 
most of their attention thus far.
 Bates grants the situationists that global virtues seem to be rare, but he 
claims that, given the empirical evidence, it is plausible that global vices are 
widespread among the population. He calls this view ‘character pessimism’ 
(2016, Chapter Four). The pessimism refers to the evaluative status of the 
kind of global character traits that are likely to exist. Bates provides alternative 
trait explanations of the empirical data relied on by situationists in terms of 
vices, especially in terms of cowardice (including a fear of embarrassment), 
selfishness, and laziness. If a person is lazy, for example, this can explain why 
he will opt out of helping someone if he can. Bates argues that this could 
account for the fact that in the so-called ‘Good Samaritan Experiment’ most 
subjects did not help a stranger in need when they were in a hurry and did 
help when they were not in a hurry. He observes that ‘those in a high hurry 
condition could avoid helping, as they were late for an appointment’ (2016, 
77). The people who were not in a hurry did not have a similar excuse. On 
32  Although it would definitely benefit the discussion on the empirical plausibility 
of  global character traits if  there were more relevant empirical studies with a longitudinal 
within-subject design.
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top of this, Bates notes that there is no convincing empirical proof against 
the existence of global vices. He points out that there is even some empirical 
evidence in support of it. For example, ‘the moral hypocrisy literature seems 
to offer support for my [Bates’] suggestion that people may have robust self-
interested motivations which they strive to conceal when in the public eye’ 
(2016, 93). If Bates is correct, empirical data do not rule out the existence of 
global vices and even suggest that it is plausible that these global character 
traits are widely possessed.
 Kleingeld provides the complementary argument that situationism 
is based on a fallacy concerning the kind of behavior situationists expect 
as a result of global character traits.33 Recall that situationists base their 
skepticism about global character traits on the claim that if a character trait 
is consistent across situations, one would expect it to result in observable 
patterns of behavior that are either morally admirable or morally deplorable. 
Kleingeld maintains that this expectation does not stretch to all global 
character traits: ‘Situationists overlook a broad range of possible reasons 
and global character traits that would lead agents to act consistently without 
their observable behavior being consistently morally good or bad’ (2015, 347). 
Kleingeld mentions several vices (or possible vices) as an example, such as 
cowardice, indolence, a disposition to shift blame to others, and egoism.34 An 
egoistic person, for example, is unlikely to help in all help-relevant situations, 
but he may nevertheless be inclined to help when he knows that other people 
are watching. Kleingeld concludes that the existence of a global character 
trait such as egoism is compatible with the kind of behavioral evidence that 
situationists refer to.
 
33  Kleingeld also argues that situationism involves a self-contradiction. The 
situationists recommend certain forms of  situation management, but this would precisely 
require ‘a global, robust, and stable disposition to manage one’s situations in the morally 
appropriate way’ (2015, 356). In a similar vein, Wouter Sanderse remarks that ‘situationism 
presupposes the kind of  practical wisdom it rejects’ (2012, 100).
34  Kleingeld notes that not everyone will conceive of  egoism as a vice (2015, 349).
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Hence, even though situationists may be right that global virtues are not 
widespread among the population, this does not mean that people typically 
lack global character traits. The existence of especially global vices is 
compatible with the empirical evidence that the situationists build upon.
 3.5.3 Application to akrasia
Robust akrasia has received little attention in the debate on situationism.35 
The counterarguments to situationism that Bates and Kleingeld base on 
considerations about global vices go for akrasia as a robust character trait as 
well.
 First of all, the expected behavior of a vicious person and a person 
with akrasia can be very much the same. Aristotle, in any case, holds that 
the difference between the two lies solely in a person’s attitude towards 
his own behavior and not in the behavior itself. According to him, the 
difference is that a vicious person does not see that what he is doing is 
wrong, whereas a person with akrasia disapproves of his own behavior. The 
akratēs may not like the way he tends to act, but he can act in the same way 
and on the same motivations as a vicious person. If this is correct, Bates’ 
alternative trait explanations of the experimental data in terms of vices and 
Kleingeld’s remarks on the expected observable behavior of vices such as 
egoism are transferable to related instances of akrasia as a character trait. 
Some people with akrasia may be prone to choose the lazy option if they 
can get away with it or may be prone to consistently act for reasons of self-
interest. Hence, akrasia is equally compatible with the empirical literature 
on which the situationists rely. 
 Akrasia as a character trait might have more explanatory value 
than vice particularly in the case of empirical experiments in which there 
are indicators that test subjects dislike their own behavior. In Milgram’s 
original obedience experiment, for example, under the pressure of an 
35  An article by Dylan Murray (2015) forms a notable exception. However, Murray 
does not consider the option that akrasia is itself  a robust character trait. He instead thinks 
of  akrasia as something that can bypass a person’s character traits.
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authority figure most test subjects administered what they thought were 
dangerous electrical shocks to a third person. While doing so, many of the 
subjects ‘were observed to sweat, tremble, stutter, bite their lips, groan, and 
dig their fingernails into their flesh’ (Milgram 1963, 375). It seems that 
most test subjects disapprove of their own behavior, and, as noted above, on 
an Aristotelian picture this is exactly what distinguishes akrasia from vice. 
Trait explanations in terms of robust akrasia may therefore fit some of the 
empirical data even better than trait explanations in terms of global vice. 
 Furthermore, and as suggested above, as a character trait akrasia is 
likely to vary in degree. This is an additional reason to expect the resulting 
observable behavior to vary.36 The fact that someone has an akratic character 
does not mean he lacks control entirely. As I have argued, shortages of self-
control are likely only to pertain to certain spheres of a person’s life. With 
regard to a specific sphere, however, akrasia as a character trait may vary as 
well, namely in the strength it takes for competing motivation to outbalance 
a better judgment. For example, two people whose akrasia relates to food 
may differ with regard to how strongly they are tempted by or how easily 
they are prone to give in to a desire for a piece of healthy-diet-incompatible 
food. If the two come across a similar range of healthy-diet-incompatible-
food-related circumstances, we can expect the one to violate his better 
judgment about a healthy diet most of the time but the other to do so only 
some of the time. (Or we can expect the one to eat a whole pie, for example, 
and the other to only eat a small part of it.) The akratic character of the latter 
person could still be robust in the sense that it may typically manifest itself 
in a wide range of situation types in which a certain level of temptation is 
reached. Because this person’s akrasia is not too strong, however, as spectators 
36  The character trait I have in mind is notably different from Christian Miller’s mixed 
traits. He understands a mixed trait as a set of  interrelated mental state dispositions that are 
unified only by the sphere to which they pertain and that disposes a person to act morally 
admirably in one sphere-relevant situation and morally deplorably in another. Miller stresses 
that ‘the “mixed” has to do with the moral evaluation of  trait, as it has both morally positive 
and morally negative aspects’ (2015, 169). The way I see it, the moral qualities of  an akratēs 
are consistent in the sense that with regard to a certain sphere the akratēs is steadily and to 
a specific degree morally praise- or blameworthy. For a critical discussion of  Miller’s mixed 
trait model, see Bates (2015).
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we see a person who sometimes gives in to healthy-diet-incompatible food 
and sometimes does not. This kind of behavioral variation is exactly what we 
find in the experiments that the situationists refer to.
 On top of this, there is also empirical evidence that seems compatible 
with the existence of a stable akratic condition. Walter Mischel has done a 
follow-up study on people whom he tested at a young age regarding their 
ability to delay gratification. The study revealed that ‘preschool children 
who delayed gratification longer in the self-imposed delay paradigm [the 
results of which were published in 1972] were described more than 10 years 
later by their parents as adolescents who were significantly more competent. 
Specifically, when these children became adolescents, their parents rated 
them as more academically and socially competent, verbally fluent, rational, 
attentive, planful, and able to deal well with frustration and stress’ (Yuichi 
Shoda, Walter Mischel and Philip Peake 1990, 978). Of course, we need to 
be careful which conclusion we draw. The combination of early self-control 
and later success in life might be due, for example, to beneficial social 
circumstances. However, the findings may also suggest that a person’s level 
of self-control is relatively stable over a long period of time, and that this 
accounts for how well he does in life. Further questions would then include 
the age at which and the ways in which a person can best acquire a self-
controlled character. Secondly, it is common among psychologists to consider 
procrastination as a trait with explanatory power.37 Several experiments 
show that procrastination is significantly correlated with the personality trait 
of low conscientiousness (the facet of self-discipline in particular) and to a 
lesser extent with high neuroticism (see Clarry Lay et al. 1998, Wendelien 
van Eerde 2003, and David Watson 2001). I have argued that procrastination 
can be considered a possible manifestation of akrasia as a character trait. 
If this is correct, evidence of trait procrastination is also evidence of trait 
akrasia. Mischel’s follow-up study and the literature on procrastination thus 
seem compatible with the idea of akrasia as a robust character trait.
37  Psychologists generally have in mind personality traits rather than character traits. 
However, some psychologists acknowledge that procrastination has moral connotations (see 
Van Eerde 2003, 1402). Perhaps on their view character traits could be considered a moral 
subclass of  common personality traits.
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To conclude, like global vices, akrasia as a robust character trait is compatible 
with the kind of empirical evidence that situationists refer to. There is even 
empirical evidence that is consistent with the possibility of people actually 
possessing akrasia as a character trait. Against situationism, then, the empirical 
evidence gives us no reason to believe that robust character traits, including 
akrasia, are unlikely to exist.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have shown that an action approach cannot do justice to 
akrasia as it is of most concern in everyday life, whereas a character approach 
can. Akrasia is of the greatest concern and raises the strongest moral criticism 
when it forms a pattern. A character approach focuses on akrasia in a 
recurrent form and can also take all of the factors that are relevant to its 
moral evaluation into account. Furthermore, it acknowledges a wider scope 
of akrasia than an action approach does. Due to its diachronic nature, akrasia 
as a character trait can include as manifestations not only strict but also 
non-strict akratic actions. This fact also enables a character approach to pay 
attention to issues other than the logical puzzle. On a character approach, 
it is possible to remain agnostic about the possibility of strict akratic action 
because akrasia as a character trait can manifest itself in non-strict ways as 
well.
 Furthermore, I have shown that the empirical evidence to which 
situationism refers does not pose a threat to my project on akrasia as a 
character trait. I will not engage much further with empirical literature. I 
am first and foremost interested in the philosophical questions surrounding 
akrasia as a character trait, and a philosophical analysis of this character trait 
is lacking in the contemporary literature. I especially wish to address the 
repetitive nature of akrasia as a character trait, as well as its moral status.
 In the remainder of this dissertation, these topics will remain central. 
In the next two chapters, I discuss Aristotle’s views on how akrasia as a 
character trait can be stable and long-lasting and where he situates akrasia 
in a moral hierarchy of character traits. In the final chapters, I follow this 
division. I build on Aristotle’s work while addressing further challenges to 
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the conception of akrasia as a stable character trait and discussing akrasia in 
relation to moral responsibility.
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4.1 Introduction
In the next two chapters, I discuss Aristotle’s views on akrasia as a character 
trait (hexis). He offers a fruitful and detailed character account of akrasia. 
Moreover, my discussion of Aristotle’s character account provides a fresh 
perspective on his views on akrasia, for in the literature the focus is usually 
on what he has to say about akratic action. In Book VII.3 of the Nicomachean 
Ethics (NE)1, he considers what happens at the moment when a person acts 
contrary to reason. In all of his work, this passage is most explicitly concerned 
with akratic action, and it has received extensive – almost exclusive – 
attention in discussions of his account of akrasia.2 Some authors who address 
Aristotle’s views on acting akratically even neglect to mention the character 
aspect entirely. Authors who do pay more heed to an element of character 
in this context mostly turn to Aristotle’s ideas on character in general to 
try to understand his viewpoint, again, on how akratic action is possible 
(see for example Amélie Rorty (1970), Myles Burnyeat (1980), and Norman 
Dahl (1984)). I want to emphasize, however, that for Aristotle akrasia is itself 
a character trait – a fact that has not received sufficient attention in the 
literature thus far.
 
1  NE VII is identical to Book VI of  the Eudemian Ethics (EE).
2  The extensive literature on akrasia in Aristotle’s work testifies to this focus. See, for 
example, Gerasimos Santas (1969), Robert Solomon (1971), Alfred Mele (1981), Filip Grgić 
(2002), and the references in the section on the symptoms of  akrasia below.
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As far as I am aware, no in-depth examination of Aristotle’s character account 
of akrasia has been published.3 It is worthwhile to examine it more closely. 
First of all, while a description of akrasia as a character trait is lacking in 
the contemporary literature, Aristotle provides a systematic and rich account 
of this character trait. There is therefore much to learn from examining his 
character account. Secondly, a focus on the aspect of character in Aristotle’s 
discussion of akrasia sheds new light not only on NE VII.3 but on the 
remainder of his discussion of the topic in NE VII.1-10 as well. I argue that 
the fact that Aristotle regards akrasia primarily as a character trait structures 
the whole of his discussion of akrasia in the Nicomachean Ethics.
 I first show that Aristotle indeed primarily considers akrasia to be a 
character trait (4.2), for not everyone in the literature is already convinced 
of this. I go on to explore the specific features he attributes to akrasia as 
a character trait. Aristotle attributes two main features to character traits 
in general. He thinks of a character trait as a state (hexis) of character.4 As 
such, he holds that character traits are stable and long-lasting (Categories 
8.8b29 and NE V.1.1129a13-16) and make someone well- or ill-disposed 
(Metaphysics V.20.1022b10-12 and NE II.5.1105b25-26).5 I then inquire 
how, on Aristotle’s account, these two features apply to the character trait of 
akrasia in particular. In this chapter, I address the first feature (4.3) and argue 
that the actions Aristotle refers to in NE VII.3 are on his view the temporary 
and occasional symptoms of an underlying, stable and long-lasting condition.
3  Jörn Müller (2009) and John Cooper (2009) also point to the significance 
of  Aristotle’s characterological conception of  akrasia, and I have benefited from their 
discussions. However, both of  them fail to take into consideration all features of  Aristotle’s 
character account of  akrasia. I build on their observations, discuss them in more detail, and 
show that the fact that Aristotle regards akrasia as a character trait strongly structures his 
discussion of  the topic.
4  There are, for example, also states of  knowledge (epistēmē; VI.3.1139b31) and 
states of  technical expertise (technē; 1140a10). See also Pierre Rodrigo (2011).
5  For an extensive discussion of  the general features of  character traits in Aristotle’s 
work, see D.S. Hutchinson (1986). I do not address Aristotle’s view on the ontological status 
of  character traits. Carol Gould considers this and concludes that ‘Aristotle views a hexis 
as deeply rooted in the human personality and as having a firm metaphysical reality’ (1994, 
184).
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4.2 Akrasia is primarily a character trait
Aristotle’s description of akratic action in NE VII.3 has received an 
overwhelming amount of attention.6 If one pays attention to this passage 
alone, however, it is easy to get the impression that Aristotle thinks of akrasia 
as a type of action. Donald Davidson, in any case, believes that according 
to Aristotle akratic action cannot be habitual (1969, 96-97). And, Martha 
Nussbaum says in a lexical entry on character that ‘[a]krasia, or weakness, is 
not strictly parallel to the other three conditions [virtue, vice and enkrateia 
(self-control)], since Aristotle defines it not as a condition of the character, 
but as a type of behavior’ (1991, 133). A closer look at the whole of NE 
VII.1-10 shows, however, that this view is mistaken and that Aristotle also 
regards akrasia as a state of character.
 First, although Aristotle at no point defines the term akrasia, he does 
define a type of person that he calls the akratēs. He says that this is someone 
who is:
…inclined to depart from reason, contrary to the correct prescription, because of 
his affective state, who is overcome by that state to the extent of failing to act in 
accordance with the correct prescription but not to the extent of being the sort 
of person to be persuaded that one should straightforwardly pursue such pleasures. 
(VII.8.1151a20-24)7 
The akratēs characteristically succumbs to affect but (explicitly or implicitly) 
thinks he should not.8 His reason and affect are in disharmony, and it is the 
latter that typically ends up determining how he acts. By contrast, Aristotle 
6  Burnyeat (1980) observes, though, that in NE VII.3 Aristotle only describes 
akratic action but offers no explanation as to how such actions are possible.
7  Quotations from the Nicomachean Ethics are from the edition by Sarah Broadie and 
Christopher Rowe (2002). Rowe translates akrasia as ‘lack of  self-control’ or ‘uncontrolledness’ 
and the akratēs as ‘the un-self-controlled’.
8  Aristotle also distinguishes the akratēs from other types of  persons in light of  the 
kind of  desire he succumbs to and the kind of  objects he pursues. I say more about this in 
Chapter Five.
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distinguishes between several other types of people, most notably the virtuous, 
the vicious, and the enkratēs (the self-controlled person). The enkratēs is 
the type of person whose reason and affect are also in disharmony, but in 
whose case reason typically wins out. In the case of the virtuous person and 
the vicious person, reason and affect are in harmony. The vicious person’s 
reason is corrupt, however. Aristotle hence relates akrasia to a specific type 
of person, the akratēs.
 More importantly, Aristotle explicitly identifies akrasia as a character 
trait several times. He starts his discussion of akrasia in NE VII by stating that 
it (together with vice and beastliness9) has to do with character (peri ta ēthē; 
1.1145a15). At other places he literally calls it a character trait (hexis).10 After 
discussing the main features of enkrateia and akrasia, for example, he says: ‘It 
is evident, then, from these considerations that one of these character traits11 
[hexis] is good, the other bad’ (VII.8.1151a28-29). And in the concluding 
remark to his discussion of akrasia, he says: ‘We have said, then, what self-
control is, what un-self-controlledness is, what resistance is, and what 
softness is, and how these character traits [hexeis] stand in relation to each 
other’ (10.1152a34-35).12 He further describes akrasia as a character trait at 
1.1145b1-2, 7.1150a12-16, and 10.1152a26-28.
 At one point Aristotle seems to contradict the notion that akrasia 
is a character trait; there is a passage in which he says that akrasia and vice 
are ‘wholly different in kind [genos]’ (8.1150b35-36), and the kind to which 
vice belongs is that of character traits (II.5.1106a9-12). Elsewhere, however, 
9  I prefer Cooper’s (2009) translation of  thēriotēs as ‘beastliness’ to Rowe’s 
‘brutishness’. It avoids the unwanted sexual connotation of  the alternative ‘bestiality’ but 
maintains the connection to animals that is present in the Greek term.
10  It is clear from the context that Aristotle is talking about hexis ēthikē, as he does in 
relation to virtue (2.1139a34; cf. Cooper 2009, 10-11).
11  I prefer ‘character traits’ to Rowe’s ‘dispositions’. The latter is often used in a wider 
sense than character traits. I have adapted Rowe’s translation on this point throughout.
12  Akrasia and enkrateia on the one hand and resistance (or endurance) and softness 
on the other hand are very similar groups of  character traits. The difference, according to 
Aristotle, is that the first group is related to pleasure, whereas the latter is related to pain 
(7.1150a15).
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he makes the exact opposite remark. He says: ‘we should not regard either 
of these two things [enkrateia and akrasia] as having to do with the same 
character traits [hexeis] as excellence and badness, or as being of a different 
kind [genos]’ (VII.1.1145b1-2). Here Aristotle indicates that akrasia and vice 
are both character traits but stresses that they are different character traits. It is 
plausible that the first passage is meant to make the same point: akrasia and 
vice are both character traits, but they are of a different kind in the sense that 
they are not identical character traits.
 A further factor that might seem to complicate matters is Aristotle’s 
occasional use of the verb akrateuomai (‘to act akratically’13) to address akratic 
action. However, Aristotle only discusses acting akratically as a separate topic 
in NE VII.3, the section in which he speaks about the extent to which a 
person can have knowledge of his reason’s prescription while acting contrary 
to it. What is more, except for one occasion,14 he only uses the verb in the 
context of the ‘puzzle’ (aporia) that is central to NE VII.3 (see 2.1145b21, 
1145b30, 3.1147b18, 1146b25, 1147a24, and 1147b1). For the most part, and 
this includes NE VII.3, Aristotle talks about the akratēs and akrasia (which, 
as I have just shown, he identifies as a character trait). The character notion 
of akrasia is thus predominant in his work. This suggests that he is mainly 
interested in akratic action insofar as it is the type of action that the akratēs 
typically performs.
 Further support for the claim that Aristotle regards akrasia primarily 
as a character trait is the fact that in what is by far the largest part of his 
discussion on the topic in NE, he compares it to all sorts of other character 
traits. He compares akrasia to the general character traits of virtue and vice 
(with regard to their moral status, curability, and the doctrine of the mean), 
to specific virtues and vices (moderation, self-indulgence, practical wisdom, 
13  In their dictionary of  ancient Greek, Liddell and Scott translate the verb as ‘to be 
incontinent’. A translation indicating action seems more correct, however, for Aristotle uses 
the verb in the context of  what happens while the akratēs acts.
14  On the one occasion that Aristotle uses a form of  the verb akrateuomai outside 
of  the context of  the puzzle that is central to NE VII.3, it is in a passage in which he 
distinguishes between impulsiveness and weakness in relation to akrasia (10.1152a28). I 
return to this in the section on the symptoms of  akrasia.
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and justice), and to character traits that resemble it closely but that, according 
to him, are to be distinguished from akrasia as such, for example akrasia with 
regard to thumos, akrasia with regard to things such as honor and money, and 
softness (again with regard to their moral status).
 Hence, there is ample evidence that Aristotle regards akrasia first and 
foremost as a character trait. This is not to deny that the topic in NE VII.3 
is acting akratically. However, his discussion of akrasia as a whole is directed 
towards the character of the akratēs.
4.3 Stable and long-lasting
In the remainder of this chapter, I examine how on Aristotle’s account the 
feature of being stable and long-lasting takes shape in akrasia as a character 
trait. Let me start by designating two aspects of the feature of being stable and 
long-lasting that Aristotle ascribes to character traits in general, and thereby 
by extension to akrasia.
 In the Categories, Aristotle illustrates what it means for a state to be 
stable and long-lasting. He gives the example of paleness (which is a state, but 
not a character trait). He says that we only call someone pale if his paleness is 
a stable and long-lasting condition and not if it is the result of a sudden fright 
(8.9b19-32). Someone can be pale, or someone can turn pale. Similarly, 
in the context of states of character, we only attribute a character trait to 
someone if his condition is stable and long-lasting. With regard to virtue, for 
example, Aristotle says that an action can only be virtuous if its base is ‘firm 
and unchanging’ (NE II.4.1105a33).15 Likewise, then, it seems that according 
to Aristotle an action can only be truly akratic if it is expressive of the stable 
and long-lasting condition of the akratēs. I am not sure whether this means 
that he rules out the possibility of single akratic actions. Alfred Mele points 
out that it is inherent to the way we talk about a character trait that there 
are exceptions. A character trait typically comes in degrees. It follows that 
15  For Aristotle, the possession of  a character trait does not depend on actually 
performing the actions that the character trait disposes one to perform. For example, he 
points out that when someone is asleep his character remains intact (I.5.1096a1).
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we also attribute the character trait of self-control to those who are less 
than perfectly self-controlled (1987, 4). Implicit in Mele’s argument is the 
assumption that someone who is not perfectly self-controlled sometimes 
fails to abide by his better judgment. Since this person is self-controlled, the 
akratic action cannot be the result of a stable akratic condition. So, despite 
the fact that Aristotle regards akrasia as a character trait, he could in principle 
grant that single akratic actions may occur as well. In any case, the fact that as 
a state akrasia is stable and long-lasting implies that the akratic actions of the 
akratēs typically flow from a firm and unchanging base.
 Aristotle furthermore holds that character traits are stable and long-
lasting in a particular way, in the sense that they reliably produce a specific 
kind of action (and not its contrary). When he discusses the character trait of 
justice in NE, he notes that ‘with a capacity [dunamis] or expertise [epistēmē], 
the same one seems to relate to both members of a pair of contraries, whereas 
a character trait [hexis] […] does not relate to contraries in this way; so e.g. 
health does not lead to our doing both healthy and unhealthy things, but only 
healthy ones’ (V.1.1129a13-16). The capacity to be persuasive, for example, 
can be used both to guide others and to mislead them. A hexis such as health, 
however, can only make a person healthy, not unhealthy. Equally, a hexis such 
as a character trait can only result in a specific kind of action. Justice produces 
only just acts, injustice only unjust ones. Each is a character trait on its own. 
This does not mean that character traits always have to manifest themselves 
in the exact same manner16, or that a just person can never do unjust things. 
However, when a person’s character trait of justice determines his action, 
which it likely does with regularity, the action can only be a just one. The fact 
that as a character trait akrasia is stable and long-lasting thus implies that this 
condition only produces akratic actions (and not, for example, sometimes 
also vicious, self-controlled or virtuous actions).
 In addition to these two more general characteristics, Aristotle 
maintains that there is something particular about the stable and long-lasting 
nature of the character trait of akrasia as well, at least in comparison to his 
notion of vice. To my knowledge, John Cooper is the only one to describe 
16  Aristotle says, for example, that what it is virtuous to do can differ according to the 
situation (e.g. II.9.1109a24-31).
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Aristotle’s view on this feature in relation to akrasia (and simultaneously to 
enkrateia). He writes: ‘They [the akratēs and the enkratēs] are people with 
more or less permanently, or at least well-settled, divided minds and feelings 
about the matters that they are self-controlled or uncontrolled about’ (2009, 
13). What needs further explanation is what precisely it is about the character 
trait of akrasia that is ‘well-settled’ or ‘stable and long-lasting’, according to 
Aristotle. Unfortunately, Cooper does not elaborate on this. I believe the key 
to understanding Aristotle’s view on the stable and long-lasting nature of 
akrasia is an analogy that he draws between akrasia and epilepsy.
 4.3.1  Stable and long-lasting in a non-continuous  
  way: the analogy with epilepsy
Aristotle relates akrasia to epilepsy in a passage in which he compares akrasia 
to vice. He states that the bad aspect of vice is constantly present while the 
bad aspect of akrasia is not. On his view, ‘badness of character resembles 
diseases like dropsy [edema] or consumption [tuberculosis], while lack of 
self-control resembles the sort involving seizures [epileptikois]; for the one is 
a continuous, the other a non-continuous way of being as one shouldn’t be’ 
(NE VII.8.1150b33-35). Vice, according to Aristotle, is like a disease such as 
edema or tuberculosis, the symptoms of which are always on show (swelling, 
coughing). The vicious person’s ‘badness’ (that is, his corrupt reason) reveals 
itself constantly. Akrasia is like a disease such as epilepsy, the symptoms of 
which only show now and then (seizures). Of course, other dispositions and 
character traits manifest themselves in symptoms as well, some of which are 
also only temporarily present. However, the epilepsy analogy shows that, in 
contrast to vice, the character trait of akrasia on Aristotle’s view manifests itself 
only occasionally, and, more importantly, that the distinctive characteristic of 
akrasia is therefore not visible all the time. The ‘bad’ nature of the akratēs – 




The analogy with epilepsy is worth developing further.17 An epileptic has a 
medical condition all the time, but it does not show all the time. It becomes 
visible through symptoms, which only occur temporarily and occasionally. 
Furthermore, there is (at least sometimes) a trigger, such as lack of sleep 
or stress. Importantly, the symptomatic seizures are only triggered when a 
person has the epileptic condition. Akrasia is similar. It is a stable and long-
lasting condition which does not reveal itself all the time, but which shows 
itself through symptoms that occur only temporarily and occasionally. 
Furthermore, there is a trigger (according to Aristotle, always).
 This interpretation of the analogy between akrasia and epilepsy fits a 
distinction that Aristotle draws between two different states that the akratēs 
may occupy. While setting up the puzzle about the akratēs’ knowledge, he 
says: ‘it is evident that the person acting uncontrolledly doesn’t think of 
doing it, before he gets into the affective state in question’ (2.1145b30-32). 
Aristotle distinguishes, then, between the affective state of the akratēs and the 
state he is in when he is not affected. Of the affective state Aristotle says that 
this is the state that the akratēs is in when he acts akratically. Furthermore, 
he talks about this state as something that a person ‘gets into’ before once 
again being resolved (3.1147b6-9). The affective state is thus only temporary. 
Concerning the intermittent ‘unaffected state’, Aristotle says that when the 
akratēs is not affected, he does not think of acting ‘uncontrolledly’ – that is, 
he does not consider acting against reason. This does not mean, though, that 
when the akratēs is affected, he approves of acting contrary to reason. The 
point is rather that the akratēs feels pulled to act contrary to reason only at 
those moments when he is in the affective state.
 In analogy with epilepsy, then, the affected state that Aristotle 
mentions can be called the symptom (or manifestation) of akrasia. This state 
can be considered stable insofar as it is reliably produced, but it is certainly 
not long-lasting. Only in this temporary affective state is there an affect 
that opposes reason, and thus a pull to act contrary to reason. This means 
that on Aristotle’s view the characteristic disharmony between reason and 
affect (where affect typically prevails) is only an aspect of the temporary and 
17  Of  course, the analogy has its limitations as well. For one thing, epilepsy does not 
capture the fact that akrasia is intentional.
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occasional symptoms of akrasia as a character trait – that is, of akratic actions.
 Moreover, just like epileptic seizures can be triggered, something 
triggers the symptoms of akrasia.18 Certain objects of desire cause an affect 
and the corresponding disharmony to arise. In general, Aristotle distinguishes 
between three different kinds of desire: rational desire (boulēsis), thumos19, and 
appetite (epithumia) (e.g. III.2.1111b11 and EE II.7.1223a26-27).20 In the 
case of the virtuous person, all three of these are in accordance with reason 
(NE VI.2.1139a22-26, II.9.1109a27-28 and III.12.1119b15-18). In the 
case of akrasia, appetite is typically not. Aristotle says that appetite draws the 
akratēs to act contrary to reason (VII.3.1147b3). To be precise, Aristotle holds 
that objects of bodily appetite do this – that is, objects of food or drink, or 
the opportunity for sex (4.1147b26-28; cf. III.10.1118a24-32). In Chapter 
Five, I discuss why Aristotle restricts the sphere of akrasia to food, drink and 
sex. For now, note that according to him the affected state of the akratēs is 
triggered by objects of bodily appetite.
 Finally, in analogy with epilepsy, there is an underlying condition 
that ensures that the symptoms are reliably triggered, but of which the ‘bad’ 
nature is not constantly on display. The akratēs’ behavioral history may testify 
to his character, but we cannot tell that he is akratic merely on the basis of, 
for example, talking to him about his general views on good moral conduct, 
which are very much like the views of the enkratēs and the virtuous 
person. In between akratic actions, what is on show is the akratēs’ general 
knowledge that pertains to action (in other words, the universal premise that 
he acknowledges), which is in accordance with reason. What is not on display 
at those moments is his inclination to act contrary to reason. Nevertheless, 
18  Julia Annas pointed out to me that in Aristotle’s time, an epileptic attack was often 
thought to strike without warning. Even nowadays, what triggers a specific epileptic attack 
remains a mystery in many cases. It is often not so hard to see, however, what initiated an 
akratic action.
19  The Greek term thumos has been translated into English as, for example, ‘temper’, 
‘spiritedness’, or ‘anger’. I prefer to leave the Greek term untranslated as it has a wider scope 
than the English terms suggest. I say more about thumos in Chapter Five.
20  For excellent discussions of  this distinction, see Klaus Corcilius (2008a) and Giles 
Pearson (2012).
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this person is always disposed to act akratically. Even when the akratēs is not 
affected, he remains the type of person who is disposed to fail to act in line 
with reason’s prescriptions.
 On Aristotle’s view, then, what makes the character trait of akrasia 
stable and long-lasting is an underlying condition that disposes the akratēs 
to think, feel, and act a certain way. According to him, the disharmony or 
conflicted nature that is typical of akrasia is itself not permanent, but is only 
present with the temporary and occasional symptoms (or manifestations) of 
the character trait. Let me take a closer look at what, according to Aristotle, 
the symptoms of akrasia (that is, akratic actions) look like and what is 
distinctive about the underlying condition of akrasia in comparison to that 
of other character traits.
 4.3.2 The symptoms of akrasia: akratic actions
Aristotle’s description of the symptoms of akrasia can be found in the much-
discussed passage on akratic action in NE VII.3 (1146b31-1147b3). In this 
passage, he addresses the question of what form the disharmony between 
reason and affect can take at the moment at which the akratēs fails to abide 
by reason’s prescription. Much has already been written on Aristotle’s view 
on akratic action. Since I am more interested in the character framework of 
which akratic action forms a part than in akratic action as such, it is not my 
aim to argue decisively for a specific interpretation of NE VII.3. I leave many 
of the details and nuances of the different interpretations aside and limit 
myself to an impression of Aristotle’s view on akratic action. I add to the 
literature the observation that Aristotle’s discussion of akratic action in NE 
VII.3 fulfills a specific role within his character account of akrasia, namely 
that of addressing the shape of the symptoms of the character trait.
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There has been wide discussion of how many forms of akratic action 
Aristotle identifies.21 Following Norman Dahl (1984), we may distinguish 
between ‘traditional’ and ‘alternative’ interpretations.22 Roughly, traditional 
interpretations of NE VII.3 hold that Aristotle presents one form of akratic 
action, in which the akratēs’ does not have (full) knowledge of reason’s 
prescription during action23, whereas alternative interpretations hold that 
he discusses a second form of akratic action, in which the akratēs does 
have knowledge of reason’s prescription while acting contrary to it.24 
To connect it to contemporary terminology, the question comes down 
to whether Aristotle allows only for a non-strict form of akratic action 
(traditional interpretations) or whether he makes room for strict akratic 
action as well (alternative interpretations). In applying this contemporary 
terminology here, it is important to bear in mind that Aristotle describes the 
characteristic conflict of akrasia in terms of a disharmony between reason 
and affect, whereas in the contemporary literature it is more commonly 
described as a conflict between a person’s better judgment and competing 
motivation. Having said that, I present both the non-strict and the strict 
form of akratic action that Aristotle arguably presents in NE VII.3.
 The two forms of akratic action that Aristotle arguably identifies 
have sometimes been linked to the distinction between impulsiveness 
(propeteia) and weakness (astheneia) that he introduces in relation to akrasia 
(see for example Norman Dahl (1984, 210), Theodore Scaltsas (1986) and 
21  Perhaps Aristotle’s text is not entirely clear as a result of  the fact that the Nicomachean 
Ethics was written as a series of  lecture notes and not as a book to be read by others. On top 
of  this, there are some translation difficulties which make it hard to come up with a final 
interpretation.
22  See also, for example, Sarah Broadie’s commentary on NE VII.3 in Broadie and 
Rowe’s edition of  the Nicomachean Ethics. She talks about interpretation A and interpretation 
B (2002, 388-394).
23  See, for example, Ronald Milo (1966), Richard Robinson (1977), Terence Irwin 
(1989), Justin Gosling (1993), Jens Timmermann (2000), Martin Pickavé and Jennifer 
Whiting (2008), and Jozef  Müller (2015).
24  See, for example, Norman Dahl (1984), Theodore Scaltsas (1986), Klaus Corcilius 
(2008b), and David Charles (2009).
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David Charles (2009)).25 Interestingly, there is a textual link between the 
passage on akratic action in NE VII.3 and one of the passages in which 
Aristotle mentions this distinction between impulsiveness and weakness. 
Recall my earlier remark that, except for one occasion, Aristotle uses all of 
the forms of the verb akrateuomai in the context of the puzzle that is central 
to NE VII.3. The exception is a passage in which he says that ‘[t]he type of 
uncontrolledness displayed by [akrateuetai] the bilious [or impulsive] sort 
is more easily curable26 than the one belonging to people who deliberate 
but do not stick to it [that is, weakness]’ (10.1152a28-29).27 I am not 
entirely sure whether Aristotle perceives impulsiveness and weakness as two 
(slightly) different character traits, or whether he instead uses these terms to 
denote two possible expressions of the character trait of akrasia. In any case, 
Aristotle presumably talks about acting akratically in this context because 
it is in the heat of action that the difference between impulsiveness and 
weakness is visible. He says that in the case of impulsiveness, the akratēs fails 
to deliberate, whereas in the case of weakness the akratēs deliberates but fails 
to stick to the outcome of deliberation (7.1150b19-28). It therefore appears 
that impulsiveness can be associated with a non-strict form of akratic action, 
and weakness with a strict form.
 At any rate, there is wide agreement in the literature that Aristotle 
describes a non-strict form of akratic action (especially at 3.1147a1-10).28 
25  When commentators working from a traditional interpretation address this 
distinction, they try to integrate it within the frame of  a non-strict form of  akratic action. 
See for example Martin Pickavé and Jennifer Whiting (2008, 359-365) and Jozef  Müller 
(2015, 13).
26  I do not go into the issue of  curability here, but Aristotle certainly does not 
think that it is easy to change one’s character. The fact that the intended audience of  the 
Nicomachean Ethics is people who are already well on their way to virtue goes to show that 
Aristotle believes that it is very hard to become virtuous for those who did not have a good 
upbringing from the start. In the quotation, the aspect of  curability instead seems to indicate 
that impulsiveness is less remote from virtue than weakness. This is relevant to the moral 
evaluation of  akrasia that I discuss in the next chapter.
27  Literally translated, Aristotle says something like ‘the sort of  akrasia which the 
impulsive do akratically’ [tōn akrasiōn, hēn hoi melagcholikoi akrateuontai].
28  Corcilius (2008b) is an exception. He maintains that although Aristotle indeed 
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As noted above, this form of akratic action is sometimes identified with the 
description of impulsiveness, where Aristotle says that the akratēs is typically 
led by affect because he failed to deliberate (7.1150b22). Aristotle presents 
this non-strict form of akratic action in terms of his model of action, which 
is commonly referred to as the practical syllogism. In its simplest form, this 
model consists of a universal premise (e.g. sweet food should not be tasted), 
a particular premise (e.g. this piece of food is sweet), and a conclusion drawn 
on the basis of these premises (e.g. this piece of food should not be tasted). 
The issue at stake is whether a person can act against the conclusion of the 
practical syllogism while having knowledge of it.29 In the case of the non-
strict form of akratic action that Aristotle distinguishes, the akratēs is not 
aware of the conclusion while acting contrary to it. The essence of this form 
of akratic action is that the akratēs ‘has both premisses but is using only the 
universal one, not the particular one; for it is particulars that are acted on’ 
(3.1147a1-2). He adds a couple of lines later: ‘whether this is such-and-such 
– this is what the agent either does not ‘have’, or does not activate’ (1147a7). 
Most commentators conclude that according to Aristotle the akratēs in this 
case fails to reach the conclusion because something has gone amiss with 
the particular premise.30 The akratēs may be aware of the relevant universal 
knowledge. In fact, he might also very well know that ‘this food is sweet’ (cf. 
Paula Gottlieb 2008, 208 and David Charles 2009, 48). He is likely to have 
an appetite for this piece of food because he knows that it is sweet. However, 
he fails to combine the particular premise with the relevant universal one. 
He could have reached the conclusion had he deliberated, as he might 
have done beforehand or on similar occasions. At the moment of action, 
describes this form of  action, he only considers the form of  strict akratic action that he 
describes in the next paragraph as an actual instance of  acting akratically.
29  For an overview of  the different interpretations of  Aristotle’s practical syllogism, 
see Christof  Rapp and Philipp Brüllmann (2008). The main question is whether, according 
to Aristotle, the conclusion of  the practical syllogism is an action (and what this means), or 
whether there can possibly be a gap between conclusion and action. In contemporary terms, 
one could say that the discussion is about whether or not Aristotle endorses a strong form 
of  motivational internalism.
30  Martin Pickavé and Jennifer Whiting (2008) uniquely argue that the problem 
instead lies with the universal premise.
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however, the akratēs has not actually formed the conclusion. In the case of 
this non-strict form of akratic action described by Aristotle, the disharmony 
between reason and appetite therefore takes an indirect form.31
 If Aristotle introduces a second and strict form of akratic action, 
he seems to be doing so especially in NE VII.3.1147a10-24, that is, in the 
lines immediately following the passage that I referred to in the former 
paragraph.32 According to most alternative interpretations, in this passage 
Aristotle discusses a form of akratic action in which the disharmony between 
reason and affect is more direct. As noted above, this form of akratic action 
is sometimes identified with Aristotle’s description of weakness, where he 
says that the akratēs typically fails to stick to the results of the deliberation 
because of his affective condition (7.1150b20-21; cf. 10.1152a27-30). The 
core of this form of akratic action is that the akratēs ‘both has knowledge in 
a way and does not have it’ (3.1147a12). Aristotle indicates what he means 
by this with the help of several analogous examples. He first mentions those 
who are ‘asleep, raving or drunk’ (1147a14). The conditions of the people 
who are in these states are similar to that of the akratēs because they are all 
under the influence of bodily affections. Aristotle goes on to further typify 
these examples and introduces two new ones along the way. He says: ‘those 
in the affected states mentioned, too, can recite demonstrative proofs and 
Empedoclean verses33, and if those who have learned something for the 
first time can string the words together, they don’t yet know what they 
have learned – because they have to assimilate it, and that requires time. 
So we must suppose that those who act uncontrolledly, too, are talking 
like actors on stage’ (1147a20-24). It seems, then, that Aristotle here has a 
form of akratic action in mind in which the akratēs has knowledge (in a 
certain sense) of the relevant conclusion while acting contrary to it, for like 
31  Note that because of  the focus on strict akratic action, in the contemporary 
literature this ‘impulsive’ form would usually not be considered a genuine instance of  akratic 
action (cf. Annemarie Kalis 2011, 22).
32  On traditional interpretations, this passage is considered an addition to Aristotle’s 
former line of  thought.
33  Presumably, this excludes those who are asleep, for they cannot testify to their 
knowledge, unless we count dreaming about it or mumbling in one’s sleep.
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drunks, raving people, actors, and beginning students, the akratēs can ‘recite’ 
the knowledge and can ‘string the words together’. On this basis, authors 
with an alternative interpretation argue that Aristotle identifies a second 
and strict form of akratic action in which the disharmony between reason 
and appetite takes the shape of a direct confrontation.
 Regardless of which interpretation of NE VII.3 is correct, however, 
note that in the passage about actors and beginning students Aristotle 
remarks that even when the akratēs can recite his knowledge of reason’s 
prescription while acting akratically, this knowledge is not assimilated. In 
NE VII.3, Aristotle does not illuminate what he means by this. He only says 
that assimilation requires time. This indicates that the lack of assimilation has 
to do with the underlying, stable and long-lasting condition of akrasia.
 4.3.3 The underlying, stable and 
  long-lasting condition
Aristotle does not discuss the underlying, stable and long-lasting condition 
of akrasia as a separate topic. It is not surprising that the symptoms receive 
special attention because it is through the symptoms that the underlying 
condition shows. Further details about this part of his character account of 
akrasia need to be derived from his general theory of character and virtue, 
in a similar vein to how authors such as Rorty, Burnyeat and Dahl have 
appealed to Aristotle’s general theory of virtue and character development 
to understand how his account can make room for the possibility of akratic 
action.
 Fortunately, Aristotle provides a clue as to what is distinctive about 
the underlying condition of akrasia when he compares the akratēs to the 
person who is practically wise and who hence possesses the virtue of practical 
wisdom, phronēsis.34 He says that ‘one is not wise merely by virtue of having 
knowledge, but also by being the sort of person to act on one’s knowledge’ 
(NE VII.10.1152a8-9). He adds that the knowledge of the wise person differs 
34  Dahl (1984) also stresses that it is fruitful to compare Aristotle’s account of  akrasia 
to his account of  practical wisdom. I have benefited greatly from his discussion.
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from the mere cleverness [deinotēs] that the akratēs might possess ‘in terms of 
the decisions [proairesis] made’ (1152a14; cf. VI.2.1139a22). Some aspect of 
Aristotle’s notion of decision, then, must be what makes the difference on his 
view between the stable and long-lasting conditions of the akratēs and the 
practically wise person.
 In his discussion of practical wisdom, Aristotle specifies what he 
understands by ‘decision’. He says: ‘…decision [proairesis] is a desire informed 
by deliberation [orexis bouleutikē], in consequence what issues from reason 
must be true and the desire must be correct for the decision to be a good 
one, and reason must assert and desire pursue the same things’ (1139a23-
26). Aristotle thus attributes not only an intellectual or ‘reason’ aspect to 
practical wisdom but a motivational or ‘desire’ aspect as well.
 Aristotle holds that for a decision to be a good one, reason’s 
prescriptions must be true. In comparison to practical wisdom, the condition 
of akrasia may therefore be initially characterized by some sort of lasting 
cognitive deficit. As Burnyeat (1980) has shown, the virtuous person has a 
better grasp of what virtue is than the akratēs, in the sense that he not only 
knows which actions are virtuous (‘the that’) but also why (‘the because’). 
More specifically, it has been suggested that the akratēs ‘is deficient in his 
appreciation of the reasons for assenting to the conclusion [of the practical 
syllogism]’ such as ‘considerations of health and happiness’ (Mele 1981, 151-
152), or that the akratēs’ belief about happiness has been partially false all 
along in that he ‘will be wrong about the occasions on which it is rational 
for him to follow his conception of his good’ (Irwin 1989, 71). Despite 
these suggestions, though, I wonder whether the distinctive aspect of the 
underlying, stable and long-lasting condition of akrasia can be captured in 
terms of a permanent cognitive shortcoming (cf. Ty Landrum 2008). For, in 
comparison to the vicious person, Aristotle stresses that the akratēs’ reason 
– more particularly, the fundamental starting point of reason – is healthy 
(NE VII.8.1151a5-16). Perhaps Aristotle merely wants to indicate that the 
akratēs’ reason is in a better state than that of the vicious person (cf. Pavlos 
Kontos 2014, 231). Then again, he also points out that the akratēs knows 
what the virtuous thing to do is and is already persuaded that he should 
do it (see, for example, NE VII.2.1146b2-3 and 8.1150b29-32). Moreover, 
the enkratēs has not yet acquired full knowledge of ‘the because’ of virtue 
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either, and this type of person does manage to abide by reason’s prescriptions 
despite the disharmony between reason and affect. The akratēs’ reason is not 
fully mature, but it is questionable whether this is the main demarcating 
aspect of the underlying condition of akrasia.
 However, Aristotle holds that a good decision not only requires 
that reason’s prescriptions be true, but also that desire be correct – that 
is, that desire pursues the same thing as reason. Another option, then, is 
that the underlying condition of akrasia (also) involves a lasting affective 
or motivational deficit.35 When Aristotle talks about correct desire in the 
context of decision, he is referring to rational desire (orexis bouleutikē, 
or boulēsis). Rational desire is the kind of desire that has the good as its 
object (III.4.1113a15). This includes reason’s prescriptions about what it is 
good to do. Rational desire therefore naturally sides with reason. It is not 
the same kind of desire that draws the akratēs to act contrary to reason. 
That is appetite, which is the kind of desire that has pleasure as its object 
(12.1119b5-7). Hence, it appears that something is at fault with the way in 
which the akratēs’ rational desire has been cultivated. This is not to claim 
that the akratēs lacks rational desire altogether, for Aristotle says that this 
type of person acts contrary to decision (VII.8.1151a5-8) and contrary to 
rational desire (EE II.7.1223b8-9). This is only possible if rational desire is 
present to some extent. Rather, the akratēs’ rational desire is not sufficiently 
strong to outweigh competing appetite when it is present. Aristotle remarks 
that appetite need not be particularly strong for this to happen36 (although 
presumably it sometimes can be strong as well): ‘…the un-self-controlled 
type resembles those who become drunk quickly, after little wine, and 
after less than most people’ (NE VII.8.1151a3-5; cf. 7.1150a10-14). Hence, 
on Aristotle’s account, the underlying, stable and long-lasting condition 
35  For authors who maintain that akrasia mainly involves a motivational error, see 
for example Dahl (1984, Chapter Eleven), Corcilius (2008b, 153-154), and Paula Gottlieb 
(2008, 207). Kontos argues that, according to Aristotle, in non-virtuous states intellectual 
and motivational shortcomings typically go together: ‘…good ethical states go hand in hand 
with good intellectual ones, whereas non-good ethical states go hand in hand with non-good 
intellectual ones’ (2014, 220).
36  I thank Jörn Müller for stressing this point to me.
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of the akratēs can be distinguished from the conditions of other types of 
persons perhaps by some kind of cognitive deficit but in any case also by 
a motivational deficit in the form of a permanently overly weak rational 
desire.37
 4.3.4 Lack of assimilation, and impulsiveness 
  and weakness
I suggested above that Aristotle’s view on the underlying condition of akrasia 
can illuminate what he means by the ‘lack of assimilation’ of the akratēs’ 
knowledge. If this is correct, the lack of assimilation in any case consists of a 
permanently overly weak rational desire. Aristotle only explicitly speaks of 
‘lack of assimilation’ in the context of what I have presented as the second 
and strict form of akratic action – that is, the symptom of akrasia that can be 
associated with weakness. However, his remark on the lack of assimilation 
is also relevant in relation to the non-strict form of akratic action – that is, 
the symptom that can be associated with impulsiveness. The motivational 
shortcoming is a mark of the underlying condition of akrasia in general. 
The lack of assimilation thus bears on all of the symptoms of the character 
trait, be it in the form of a non-strict akratic action or in the form of a strict 
akratic action.
 Aristotle implies that there is a connection between the degree 
of lack of assimilation and the kinds of symptoms that can flow from the 
akratēs’ character. In relation to weakness, Aristotle says that people with 
an akratic character ‘are overcome by a lesser state of affection, and they do 
not act without prior deliberation as the other sort [the ones whose akratic 
character is portrayed by impulsiveness] do’ (NE VII.8.1151a2-3). The 
quotation points out that, in comparison to impulsiveness, with weakness 
it is a less strong appetite that outbalances rational desire. This implies that, 
37  Aristotle holds that desires can be cultivated through practice and habituation 
(II.1.1103a38-b2 and VII.8.1151a18-19). For more on his view on character development, 
see for example Myles Burnyeat (1980), Nancy Sherman (1989), Howard Curzer (2002), 
Kristján Kristjánsson (2007), and Wouter Sanderse (2015).
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according to Aristotle, in the case of weakness the akratēs’ rational desire is 
also less strong than in the case of impulsiveness. 
 More precisely, the relation between the strength of the akratēs’ 
rational desire and the symptoms of akrasia seems to be as follows. If rational 
desire is weak, it only takes very weak appetite to defeat reason. Aristotle 
pairs this up with the (strict) type of acting akratically that involves prior 
deliberation – that is, the symptom that has to do with weakness. If rational 
desire is somewhat stronger, however, it also requires a somewhat stronger 
appetite to defeat reason. Aristotle connects this to the (non-strict) type 
of acting akratically that does not involve prior deliberation, which is the 
symptom that is related to impulsiveness.
 This does not necessarily mean that, according to Aristotle, weakness 
can only manifest itself through the strict type of acting akratically. It is 
typical of weakness that an akratēs gives in to a very weak appetite, even 
when he deliberates and is aware of reason’s prescription at the moment of 
action. If this akratēs’ appetite is somewhat stronger, however, it is plausible 
that he would also not be able to resist the pull of affect. Presumably, then, in 
the case of weakness an akratic character can manifest itself in both the strict 
and the non-strict type of acting akratically that Aristotle distinguishes.
 Aristotle’s account thus postulates a connection between the extent 
to which an akratēs has cultivated rational desire – which is under any 
circumstances typically not very strong – and the kind of symptoms through 
which his character may manifest itself. If the underlying condition of akrasia 
involves a very weak rational desire, it can produce both strict and non-strict 
akratic actions. If the rational desire is somewhat stronger, the character trait 
of akrasia can manifest itself only in non-strict akratic actions.
4.4 Final remarks
Due to the tendency to focus on akratic action and NE VII.3 in Aristotle’s 
work, the fact that Aristotle regards akrasia primarily as a character trait has 
not received sufficient attention. Regarding akrasia as a character trait means, 
first of all, that akrasia has the feature of being stable and long-lasting. The 
analogy with epilepsy reveals how this feature applies to akrasia in particular. 
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It turns out that, according to Aristotle, akrasia is stable and long-lasting in 
a non-continuous way. The disharmony between reason and affect that is so 
characteristic of akrasia is only an aspect of the temporary and occasional 
symptoms (that is, akratic actions) of the character trait. These symptoms are 
distinct from the underlying, stable and long-lasting condition of akrasia.
 I have presented an interpretation of Aristotle’s account in which 
he draws a distinction between two symptoms of akrasia (which can be 
associated with his notions of impulsiveness and weakness), and in which 
it is distinctive of the underlying condition of akrasia that it in any case 
involves a motivational deficit in the form of a permanently overly weak 
rational desire. Furthermore, I argued that Aristotle assumes that there is a 
connection between how strongly (or weakly) the akratēs’ rational desire is 
cultivated and the kind of symptoms that can flow from his character.38
 Aristotle provides a systematic and detailed framework for a 
conception of akrasia as a stable and long-lasting character trait. This 
framework can also be relevant and fruitful for developing a contemporary 
character account of akrasia. In Chapter Six, for example, I argue in 
connection with the contemporary literature on character development that 
the analogy that Aristotle draws between akrasia and epilepsy helps us to 
understand how akrasia can remain a stable and long-lasting character trait, 
despite the fact that the akratēs is displeased with his behavior. In this chapter, 
I have addressed Aristotle’s views on the stable and long-lasting nature of the 
akratēs’ character. In the next chapter, I turn to Aristotle’s views on the moral 
status of akrasia as a character trait.
38  Only empirical research can really establish whether there is such a connection. 
I find intriguing, though, the suggestion that there might be a relation between how 
strongly someone is disposed to fail to abide by his better judgment and the form that the 
manifestations of  his akratic character can take.
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5.1 Making someone well- or ill-disposed
The focus on akratic action and on Nicomachean Ethics (NE) VII.3 in Aristotle’s 
work has obscured not only the fact that Aristotle regards akrasia primarily as 
a character trait (and thus as a stable and long-lasting state) but also the fact 
that consequently, according to Aristotle, akrasia is a moral notion.1 Aristotle 
holds that character traits make someone well- or ill-disposed (Metaphysics 
V.20.1022b10-12 and NE II.5.1105b25-26). Given that a character trait is 
stable and long-lasting in the sense that in trait-relevant circumstances it 
reliably results in a specific kind of action, a character trait makes a person 
either well- or ill-disposed, not well-disposed now and then ill-disposed later.2 
In this chapter, I inquire how the feature of making someone ill-disposed 
(not well-disposed) applies to the character trait of akrasia in particular.
 I argue that Aristotle’s perspective on the moral status of akrasia 
as a character trait can be found in NE VII.4-10. This part of Aristotle’s 
discussion of akrasia has not received as much attention as it deserves. David 
Charles explains why this may be the case: ‘Many believe that Aristotle’s 
subsequent discussion has nothing of philosophical significance to add to 
his brilliant, if elusive, remarks in NE 7.1-3’ (2011, 187). Despite Charles’ 
refreshing commentary on NE VII.4-10, however, he himself examines these 
chapters only insofar as they illuminate some of Aristotle’s remarks on akratic 
1  ‘Moral’ for Aristotle indicates where a person stands on the scale from virtue to 
vice.
2  This is not to deny that character traits can allow for degrees, however.
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action in NE VII.3. To this end, he especially addresses Aristotle’s distinction 
between impulsiveness and weakness. However, I argue that NE VII.4-10 is 
of particular interest to Aristotle’s character approach to akrasia because he 
here establishes just how ill-disposed an akratic character makes a person. 
He discusses several character traits and draws up a moral hierarchy based 
on how well- or ill-disposed these character traits make someone. Vice is the 
worst, followed by akrasia.
 To my knowledge, thus far only Jörn Müller has explicitly 
acknowledged that, according to Aristotle, akrasia is a character trait and 
thereby a moral notion (or, in Müller’s words, a morally qualified disposition; 
2009, 110).3 Unfortunately, he does not consider Aristotle’s grounds for 
evaluating the character trait of akrasia in a particular way, though. I first 
briefly sketch the general criterion on the basis of which Aristotle evaluates 
character traits (5.2). I then discuss the specific factors that he deems relevant 
for evaluating akrasia (5.3). These come to the fore in his discussion of 
various character traits in NE VII.4-10. Since there is no integrated analysis 
of this part of Aristotle’s account of akrasia in the contemporary literature as 
of yet, and certainly not from the perspective of the framework of character, 
I present a quite detailed discussion of Aristotle’s account of the moral status 
of akrasia as a character trait. It will become clear that Aristotle has a nuanced 
and rich perspective on what should be taken into account in morally 
evaluating akrasia as a character trait.
3  Several other authors have commented on parts of  NE VII.4-10 as well or have 
addressed the question why Aristotle limits the sphere of  akrasia to food, drink and sex. See 
especially, although not exclusively, the collection of  close reading articles on NE VII in 
Natali 2009a. However, these authors do not give an account of  akrasia in NE VII.1-10 as a 
whole. One could say that they examine parts of  the picture but do not take the entire image 
into account.
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5.2  Rationality as a general criterion 
 for evaluating character
It requires a more general evaluative criterion to establish just how well- or 
ill-disposed specific character traits make someone. Pierre Rodrigo points 
out that in Aristotle’s work, different criteria apply to different kinds of states 
(2011, 7). States of knowledge, for example, are evaluated in terms of truth 
value; states of character, in terms of how rational they dispose someone to 
be.
 Aristotle emphasizes that it is the possession of reason that sets humans 
apart from other animals. Rational capacity is the exclusive and distinctive 
property of human nature.4 He holds that the moral evaluation of character 
is thus based on how well a person does with regard to this aspect of human 
nature (NE I.7.1098a1-16). This must not be understood in an overly 
intellectualistic way. As already discussed in Chapter Four, on Aristotle’s view 
affect, and especially rational desire, form a crucial part of practical wisdom 
(4.1098b3-6 and III.9.1117a21-23). For a character trait to make someone 
well-disposed, his reason must be healthy, but the non-rational part of his 
soul must also participate in and be obedient to reason (I.13.1102b14-32 
and VI.13.1144b28, cf. Eudemian Ethics (EE) II.1.1219b27-34).
 A character trait only makes a person well-disposed, however, if 
reason’s prescriptions are correct, because if they are not, being disposed to 
obey them will not make a person good. For prescriptions to be correct, 
they must prescribe what it is best for you to do considering that, as a 
human being, you are a rational being (NE II.1.1103a23-26 and 6.1106a21-
24). It is important to note this because most contemporary authors who 
are concerned with akrasia find it most crucial that a person does not do 
what he himself happens to think is best, regardless of the content of the 
judgment. In other words, they are startled by the fact that someone disobeys 
his own reason’s prescriptions, and they want to know how this is possible. 
As I explained above, Aristotle finds this puzzling as well, but he is primarily 
4  Or at least of  the nature of  free men. Aristotle holds that women and natural 
slaves do not fully possess reason. William Fortenbaugh (2006) discusses in detail Aristotle’s 
views on women and natural slaves.
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interested in people who fail to abide by reason’s prescriptions when those 
prescriptions are the correct ones (VII.3.1146b24-31 and 9.1151a29-b5).
 On Aristotle’s view, then, the criterion that forms the basis for the 
evaluation of character is formed by how well a person does considering 
that, as a human being, he is first and foremost a rational being. One character 
trait violates the criterion of rationality more than another and thus makes 
a person more ill-disposed than another, and conversely for character traits 
that follow the criterion of rationality and make a person well-disposed. 
On Aristotle’s account, as a character trait akrasia is hence subject to moral 
evaluation in light of the criterion of rationality.
5.3  Factors relevant to the moral evaluation 
 of akrasia as a character trait
Aristotle holds that akrasia makes a person very ill-disposed (NE 
I.1145a15-17) and that it violates the criterion of rationality in several ways. 
The specific factors that Aristotle considers relevant for evaluating akrasia 
can be derived from his discussion of akrasia in comparison to various other 
character traits in NE VII.4-10.
 Since on Aristotle’s account it is an inherent feature of character 
traits that they are subject to moral evaluation, the factors that demarcate 
one character trait from another are also morally relevant. For example, the 
vicious person and the akratēs both act wrongly. The difference is that the 
first does not disapprove of his actions, whereas the latter does. This factor also 
makes vice worse than akrasia (7.1150a26-31, 8.1150b29-32, and 1151a5-
16). Aristotle does not claim that people’s actual characters necessarily neatly 
follow the distinctions he draws between different character traits. He says in 
relation to akrasia and enkrateia, for example, that ‘the disposition belonging 
to most people is in between these’ (7.1150a16).5 This suggests that a person 
can be akratic with regard to certain spheres and more self-controlled with 
regard to others. He therefore seems to grant that in real life the psychological 
5  For discussions of  what Aristotle means by ‘most people’ or ‘the many’, see Jan 
Garrett (1993) and Jörn Müller (2014).
115
boundaries between character traits might be more blurry. Within Aristotle’s 
survey of character traits, however, demarcating factors and evaluative factors 
coincide.
 In the hierarchy of character traits that Aristotle draws up, akrasia 
comes second. He distinguishes between (starting with the worst): vice, 
akrasia as such (weakness and impulsiveness), softness (that is, failing to 
abide by reason due to a desire to avoid pain), akrasia with regard to things 
such as money and honor, akrasia with regard to thumos, and the positive 
character traits of endurance (that is, abiding by reason despite an inherently 
painful experience or frustration), enkrateia, and virtue (and possibly also 
superhuman excellence). I prefer to leave the Greek term thumos untranslated 
because it has a wider scope than common English translations such as 
‘anger’, ‘temper’, and ‘spiritedness’ suggest. In addition to the character 
traits listed above, Aristotle also identifies the negative character traits of 
beastliness and beastly akrasia, but he does not make clear precisely where 
in the hierarchy they are to be placed. In fact, they may not fall within 
the scope of the hierarchy at all, for it is questionable whether the beastly 
person and the beastly akratēs are sufficiently rational to be susceptible to 
moral evaluation. In this chapter, I mainly focus on the negative character 
traits, since a comparison to these helps to cast light on the moral evaluation 
of the character of the akratēs. The following scheme provides an overview 
of Aristotle’s hierarchy of all of the character traits that make someone ill-
disposed, along with their distinctive features6:
6  Carlo Natali presents a similar scheme in an appendix to his article on akrasia, 
beastliness and akrasia with regard to thumos (2009b, 129). Unfortunately, Natali does not 
expand on all of  the details of  the scheme in his article, nor does he discuss Aristotle’s 
grounds for drawing up the hierarchy as he does.
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Aristotle’s hierarchy of character traits that make someone ill-disposed7
7 I left Aristotle’s notions of  beastliness and beastly akrasia out of  the scheme. 
Aristotle is not clear about the position these states take up in the hierarchy. Due to an 
absence of  reason, they might not fall within the scope of  the moral hierarchy at all. Also, 
the parts of  the scheme about which Aristotle does not make any explicit remarks are left 
blank.
Character trait 
(from least bad 
to worst)
Structure Kind of 
affect
Examples of  
objects
















Akrasia with  
regard to things 




































Vice, in the form 
of self-indulgence
Being disposed to obey one’s  
judgment, but judging incorrectly
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On Aristotle’s view, the specific place of akrasia in this moral hierarchy (that 
is, the moral status of the akratēs) depends on:
1. whether the akratēs is disposed such that he can give in to affect when 
there is a direct confrontation between reason and affect or whether he 
can only do so when there is an indirect confrontation between reason 
and affect: distinction between weakness and impulsiveness (NE VII.7, 
8 and 10);
2. the fact that the akratēs’ reason is healthy (and not corrupt or absent): 
distinction between akrasia, vice and beastliness (NE VII.5, 6 and 7);
3. the nature of the kind of objects the akratēs has an appetite for (food, 
drink and sex are not desirable exclusively for human beings): distinction 
between akrasia, akrasia with regard to things such as money and honor, 
and beastly akrasia (NE VII.4 and 5);
4. the fact that the akratēs desires these objects because of the pleasure 
they promise to bring (in which case reason is defeated more radically 
or actively by affect than when these objects are desired for the sake of 
avoiding pain): distinction between akrasia and softness (NE VII.7);
5. the kind of desire involved (thumos is closer to reason than appetite): 
distinction between akrasia as such and akrasia with regard to thumos 
(NE VII.6).
Together these factors demarcate the character trait of akrasia and show 
why, according to Aristotle, it makes a person very ill-disposed. I address 
each of these factors in more detail below.
 5.3.1 Direct or indirect confrontation between 
  reason and affect
A first factor that Aristotle considers relevant for morally evaluating akrasia 
is centered on whether or not the akratēs is disposed such that he can give 
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in to affect when there is a direct confrontation between reason and affect 
(that is, when the akratēs has knowledge of reason’s prescriptions at the 
moment of action). He mentions this aspect in his remarks on impulsiveness 
and weakness.8 I addressed this distinction in Chapter Four, in my discussion 
of Aristotle’s account of the symptoms of akrasia and how they relate to the 
underlying, stable and long-lasting condition of the akratēs, in particular the 
acquired level of rational desire. Here, I want to point out in addition that, 
according to Aristotle, weakness is worse than impulsiveness.
 Recall that it is a distinctive feature of impulsiveness that the akratēs 
gives in to affect without prior deliberation, whereas in the case of weakness 
the akratēs can also fail to stick to reason’s prescription even when he 
deliberates. Aristotle says that ‘the sort inclined to depart from reason are 
better than those who are in possession of the prescription but do not stick 
to it; for the latter are overcome by a lesser state of affection [pathos], and 
they do not act without prior deliberation [logos] as the other sort do’ (NE 
VII.8.1151a1-3). Aristotle thus holds that weakness makes an akratēs more 
ill-disposed than impulsiveness.
 One may wonder why it is not the other way around – that is, why 
Aristotle does not consider impulsiveness worse than weakness. After all, in 
the case of weakness the akratēs seems to make better use of his reasoning 
capacities, for even though he does not follow reason’s prescription he does 
manage to complete the process of deliberation at the relevant moment.
 To see what Aristotle has in mind, let me recall the main aspects of 
what I established earlier about his views on impulsiveness and weakness. 
On his account, whether or not an akratēs can give in to affect in direct 
confrontation with reason has everything to do with how strongly rational 
desire has been cultivated and the strength of competing appetites at the 
moment of action. If rational desire is permanently very weak, as is the 
case for an akratēs whose character can be described in terms of weakness, 
it only takes a very weak appetite to defeat reason. Aristotle holds that in 
such a case an akratēs typically gives in to very weak appetites, even when 
he deliberates and is aware of reason’s prescription at the moment of action. 
8  Aristotle does not mention whether the distinction between impulsiveness and 
weakness also applies to the qualified forms of  akrasia that he distinguishes.
119
If his appetite is somewhat stronger, however, it is plausible that he is also 
not be able to resist the pull of affect. On the other hand, if an akratēs has 
acquired the level of rational desire associated with impulsiveness, he only 
goes against reason in the face of a somewhat stronger competing appetite.9 
Presumably, if this person experiences only very weak appetite, he does 
manage to deliberate and act in accordance with reason’s prescriptions. This 
means that in the case of impulsiveness, akrasia can only manifest itself in an 
indirect confrontation between reason and affect (or a non-strict form of 
acting akratically), whereas in the case of weakness akrasia can manifest itself 
both in an indirect and a direct confrontation between reason and affect (or 
a strict form of acting akratically).
 On Aristotle’s account, then, impulsiveness and weakness violate the 
criterion of rationality in similar ways, but weakness does so more strongly. 
First of all, in the case of weakness reason’s prescription can be defied by 
appetite in a direct clash and in the face of only very weak appetite. And, 
secondly, in the case of weakness the akratēs’ rational desire is cultivated less 
strongly than in the case of impulsiveness. Both with respect to the symptoms 
that the character trait of akrasia can produce and with regard to the level 
of rational desire that marks the akratēs’ underlying, stable and long-lasting 
condition, weakness is thus worse than impulsiveness.
 5.3.2 Healthy, corrupt or absent reason
A second factor that Aristotle takes into account in demarcating and 
evaluating character traits is whether someone’s reason is healthy, corrupt, 
or not developed fully enough for him to be susceptible to moral evaluation 
at all. Besides akrasia, the character traits that are relevant here are vice and 
beastliness.
 
9  This is likely also why Aristotle says that impulsiveness is less hard to cure than 
weakness (10.1152a28-29). Improving one’s character is not easy, but Aristotle seems to hold 
that the further one’s character is removed from virtue, the harder it is to make progress. I 
say more on character development in Chapter Six.
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Consider Aristotle’s remarks in NE VII on akrasia in comparison to vice. 
Aristotle holds that vice makes a person more ill-disposed than akrasia does, 
for the vicious person acts badly more easily than the akratēs (7.1150a26-
31). On Aristotle’s notion of vice, the vicious person’s reason and affect are 
aligned. In the case of the akratēs, they are not. Nevertheless, akrasia is less 
bad than vice because the vicious person’s reason is corrupted, whereas 
the akratēs’ reason is healthy. The vicious person abides by what he himself 
(subjectively) thinks he should do, which is informed by what he desires 
right now. His reason’s prescriptions do not reflect what it is objectively best 
to do (8.1151a5-16). The vicious person shows no regret, for he does not 
disapprove of his own action and he has no desire to act in line with what it is 
objectively best to do (Aristotle adds that this also makes the vicious person 
less easy to cure than the akratēs; 1150b29-32). According to Aristotle, 
despite the fact that the akratēs acts badly, this type of person knows what it 
is objectively good to do (1151a5-16). That is, his reason’s prescriptions are 
correct. Moreover, the akratēs regrets his action and is thus at least to some 
extent motivated to change his behavior (1150b30-31). The vicious person 
violates the criterion of rationality more than the akratēs does because his 
reason is corrupted. The fact that the akratēs’ reason is healthy (that is, he 
knows what it would be good to do) is, as it turns out, the only positive 
aspect of akrasia. It is because the akratēs’ reason is healthy that akrasia does 
not belong entirely at the bottom of Aristotle’s hierarchy of character traits.
 Next to reason’s being healthy or corrupt, it is important for the 
moral evaluation of character that reason is not absent. Aristotle distinguishes 
the character trait of ‘beastliness’ (thēriotēs).10 Beastliness involves an appetite 
for things that are unnatural for human beings to desire, ranging from nail 
biting to eating human fetuses and other forms of cannibalism (5.1148b20-
31). More importantly in this context, Aristotle holds that a person with this 
character trait both acts badly and lacks reason.
 
10  Aristotle sometimes uses the term ‘beastliness’ to refer to a character trait of  its 
own and other times more generally to include both beastliness and morbidity (nosēmatōdēs). 
He holds that beastliness in the strict sense is due to a natural lack of  quality, morbidity to 
disease, or habit (4.1148a35 and 5.1149a9-13).
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Aristotle mentions beastliness as one of the character traits that need to be 
avoided (1.1145a17). Its positive opposite is superhuman excellence (theia 
aretē). Of superhuman excellence Aristotle says that it is to be honored even 
more than virtue (1145a29). In general, the hierarchy of positive character 
traits is mirrored in the hierarchy of negative ones. Therefore, one would 
expect Aristotle to hold that beastliness is even worse than vice. He does 
not draw this conclusion, however. He maintains that beastliness is certainly 
more frightening than vice (after all, it can dispose someone to want to 
consume human flesh), but at the same time he holds that in terms of moral 
evaluation beastliness is less bad than vice. He states that in the case of the 
beastly person, ‘the better part has not been corrupted, as it has been in the 
human case [that is, vice], but is simply not present’ (6.1150a2-3). As noted 
above, what is corrupted in the case of vice is reason. The vicious person’s 
reason prescribes incorrectly. So if the beastly person lacks reason altogether, 
this implies that he has no (or an insufficient) rational capacity to deliberate 
and form prescriptions of reason. Pavlos Kontos concludes as well that on 
Aristotle’s account ‘beastliness does not involve the grasp of false practical 
principles but rather a total lack of access to practical principles’ (2014, 225). 
Presumably, the actions of the beastly person are, like those of animals, directly 
based on affect. Both the beastly person and the vicious person are not doing 
well, then, but Aristotle holds that beastliness is morally speaking less bad 
than vice because reason is absent, and therefore there are no prescriptions 
that could be obeyed in the first place.
 It therefore appears that on Aristotle’s view beastliness does not so 
much violate the criterion of rationality as fall outside its scope. However, 
he also explicitly calls beastliness a character trait (hexis) (NE VII.1.1145a25 
and 5.1148b20), which suggests that it makes a person ill-disposed. It is 
not entirely clear whether Aristotle holds that beastliness is susceptible 
to moral evaluation. Perhaps, since the beastly person is a human being, 
reason is present just enough for beastliness to be considered a character 
trait. Or perhaps Aristotle simply calls beastliness a character trait because 
it disposes a person to think, feel, and act in a certain way just as firmly 
as full-blown character traits do. Another option would be that Aristotle 
considers beastliness a natural character trait. In his discussion of virtue, 
Aristotle distinguishes between ethical character traits (hexeis ēthikai) and 
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natural ones (phusikai hexeis or phusikai dunamai). Aristotle says that natural 
character may dispose a person to act like a virtuous person11, but that 
without intelligence (nous) this is not virtue as such (VI.13.1144b3-10). It 
is plausible that something similar goes for beastliness: beastliness disposes 
a person to act badly, but with reason being absent it seems to be a natural 
character trait rather than an ethical character trait such as virtue, vice, and 
akrasia.
 Aristotle does not directly compare beastliness to akrasia, but it is 
clear that, according to him, just like the vicious person, the akratēs possesses 
reason fully enough to be susceptible to moral evaluation. The vicious person 
violates the criterion of rationality more than the akratēs does, however. 
Both types of people are disposed to act badly, but the vicious person’s take 
on how he should behave is bad as well, whereas in the case of the akratēs 
reason’s prescriptions are correct.
 5.3.3 The nature of the kinds of objects desired
Thirdly, Aristotle distinguishes and evaluates akrasia by means of the nature 
of the kinds of objects desired. This factor reveals why Aristotle restricts 
akrasia to the sphere (or domain) of food, drink and sex.12 He does not deny 
that people can lack control over all sorts of things. He just holds that the 
nature of the kinds of objects that a person is disposed to lack control over 
matters for moral evaluation. This becomes apparent in Aristotle’s discussion 
of akrasia as such, akrasia with regard to things such as money and honor, 
and beastly akrasia.
11  In an article on Aristotle’s view on natural character, Mariska Leunissen explains 
that he holds that who we are and how we behave is influenced not only by how well we are 
educated and habituated but also by the material nature of  our body (such as organs and 
blood) and changeable factors in our environment (2012, 509).
12  Note that akrasia is qua sphere like the particular virtue of  moderation and the 
particular vice of  self-indulgence. Vice, as well as virtue, is a genus term (NE VI.13.1145a1, 
VII.3.1146b19-20 and 4.1148b12-13). Vice makes a person ill-disposed in general. Akrasia 
as such makes a person ill-disposed towards certain things.
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Perhaps Aristotle restricts akrasia to the sphere of food, drink, and sex simply 
because this was the primary meaning of the term in his time. As Hendrik 
Lorenz and Jörn Müller point out, Xenophon and Isocrates both mean 
pretty much the same thing by ‘akrasia’ as Aristotle does (2009, 72-73 and 
2009, 111). However, if we assume that the audience at the time found this 
use of the term natural or even obvious, then Aristotle must have had an 
additional reason to draw attention to the specific sphere of akrasia.
 Aristotle’s main ground for restricting akrasia to the sphere of 
food, drink, and sex instead seems to be the fact that, according to him, 
the nature of the desired objects is relevant to the moral evaluation of a 
character trait. Aristotle distinguishes between three kinds of objects to 
which a person might give in: ‘…some appetites and pleasures have objects 
that are generically fine and good (since some pleasant things are by nature 
desirable) while the objects of others are the contrary, with those of others 
in between’ (NE VII.4.1148a22-24).13 All of the objects that Aristotle refers 
to in this quotation are objects of appetite. Since the general object of 
appetite is pleasure, he is talking about objects that are desired as pleasurable 
(see III.1.1111a32-33 and 12.1119b5; cf. Pearson 2012, Chapter Four). 
Aristotle thus holds that of the possible objects of appetite, some are natural 
for human beings to desire (these objects are fine and good14), some are 
contrary to this and thus unnatural for human beings to desire, and some 
are somewhere in between.
 By the objects of appetite that are natural for human beings to 
desire, Aristotle means things such as money, profit, winning and honor (NE 
VII.4.1148a26 and 1148b2-4). When talking about akrasia in relation to 
these objects, he adds a qualification such as ‘akrasia with regard to honor’ 
(1148b7-14). He holds that these qualified forms of akrasia make a person 
13  Following Hendrik Lorenz (2009), I base myself  on the distinction that Aristotle 
makes in the second part of  NE VII.4 (from 1148a22 onwards). Aristotle presents two 
versions of  the same argument and Lorenz argues convincingly that the second version was 
meant to replace the first one, not to supervene it (2009, 90-99).
14  Note that this does not mean that the objects are desired as fine and good, but only 
that they are themselves fine and good. Again, appetite is a desire for objects insofar as they 
are pleasurable.
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less ill-disposed than akrasia as such (akrasia haplōs; 1148b5-7). By the objects 
of pleasure that are unnatural for human beings to desire Aristotle means 
things such as eating human meat (cannibalism), eating fetuses, chewing 
nails, and eating charcoal (5.1148b21-31). These are the objects involved in 
beastly akrasia (and beastliness). The objects of akrasia as such, then, are those 
objects of appetite that Aristotle calls the ‘in between ones’. It follows that, 
according to Aristotle, it is neither natural nor unnatural for humans to have 
an appetite for food, drink, and sex.
 But why would food, drink and sex not be natural to desire? 
After all, the virtuous person pursues them as well (albeit in moderation) 
(III.12.1119b16-17). Moreover, Aristotle argues that the akratēs acts 
voluntarily because appetite (which must then be appetite in the sphere of 
food, drink or sex) is a natural thing for a human being to have (1.1111b2-4 
and EE II.8.1224b27-31). Furthermore, it would be strange if the pursuit 
of these objects were not considered natural for human beings, for food 
and drink are indispensable to individual survival, and sex is indispensable 
to the survival of the species (cf. NE VII.4.1147b26-29). The pursuit of 
food, drink and sex, then, is in a way natural for human beings after all. 
Aristotle calls such objects of appetite ‘in between ones’ because they are 
not exclusively desirable for human beings (cf. Sarah Broadie 1991, 268-269). 
It is also natural for non-rational animals to have an appetite for these things 
(NE III.10.1118a24-26 and 1118b1-4). Appetite is a kind of desire that 
we in general share with non-rational animals (2.1111b14), but we do not 
share every particular kind of appetite with them. The distinctive element of 
human nature, the possession of reason, bears on having appetite. First of 
all, it means that appetite should also obey reason’s prescriptions. Secondly, 
it expands the range of objects that can be experienced as pleasurable. To 
have an appetite for things such as money and honor requires the possession 
of reason. These objects contribute to leading a life that is fit for a rational 
being. As Hendrik Lorenz points out with regard to money (wealth), ‘…
wealth and wealth acquisition are in their own right fine and worthwhile 
things. After all, they are rational and practically intelligent ways of ensuring 
that a given household is supplied on an ongoing basis with the various 
goods that its members need for civilized human living’ (2009, 85-86). In 
the case of akrasia with regard to things such as money and honor, these 
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objects are desired and pursued in excess (that is, not in line with what 
reason prescribes). However, acting contrary to reason due to an excessive 
appetite for ‘in between objects’ is a greater violation of the criterion of 
rationality, because these objects are desirable not specifically for rational 
beings. This leads Aristotle to conclude that akrasia with regard to food, 
drink, and sex makes a person more ill-disposed than akrasia with regard to 
things such as money and honor (NE VII.4.1148b5-7). This difference in 
moral evaluation is also why Aristotle restricts akrasia as such to the sphere 
of food, drink, and sex.
 On top of this, Aristotle excludes from the sphere of akrasia as such 
objects that are unnatural for human beings to desire, given that they are 
rational beings (these objects are not necessarily desirable for non-rational 
animals either, though). As mentioned above, he has in mind having an 
appetite for things such as eating human meat, eating fetuses, chewing nails, 
and eating charcoal. Aristotle bundles these objects together because they 
do not contribute to leading a good and rational life, nor are they necessary 
for survival. What troubles a person in this context is not so much excessive 
appetite as having an appetite for such objects in the first place. Aristotle calls 
lack of control with regard to objects that are unnatural for human beings to 
desire ‘beastly akrasia’ (akrasia thēriōdēs) (5.1149a19).
 Aristotle does not clarify what ‘beastly’ refers to in relation to akrasia. 
It could just point to the fact that a person has an appetite for certain kinds 
of objects that are not by nature desirable for human beings. Or it could 
also, as in the case of beastliness, denote an absence of reason (cf. Thorp 
2003, 679). Aristotle merely says of beastly akrasia that it is a form of akrasia 
by resemblance only (NE VII.5.1149a3) and that it involves an appetite that 
is unnatural for human beings, and which they may sometimes overcome 
(1149a12-16). Aristotle does not specify whether the beastly akratēs knows 
that it would be best not to pursue the objects for which he has an appetite, 
or whether there is instead some other ground to believe that the beastly 
akratēs could in principle overcome his appetite. Perhaps the beastly akratēs 
has access to well-developed social conventions that could help him to 
resist unnatural appetites.15 In any case, it is not clear where Aristotle places 
15  This would fit Aristotle’s remark that a person with beastliness – who Aristotle 
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beastly akrasia in the hierarchy of character traits. As with beastliness, reason 
in the case of beastly akrasia might not be sufficiently developed for it to 
fall within the scope of the moral hierarchy at all. However, if beastly akrasia 
is susceptible to moral evaluation, Aristotle provides no clue as to where it 
stands in relation to the other character traits.16
 What has become evident, though, is that Aristotle restricts akrasia 
to the sphere of food, drink and sex. He does so mainly because, although 
it is not unnatural for human beings to desire these objects, they are not 
exclusively desirable for rational beings either. This is one of the ways in 
which akrasia violates the criterion of rationality and makes a person very 
ill-disposed.
 5.3.4 Seeking pleasure or avoiding pain
Aristotle evaluates the akratēs not only in light of the nature of the kind of 
objects this type of person desires but also in view of whether the akratēs 
desires these objects in relation to pleasure or pain. He says that enkrateia 
and akrasia, on the one hand, are concerned with objects in the sphere of 
food, drink and sex because of the pleasure these objects promise to bring. 
Endurance (or resistance; karteria) and softness (malakia)17, on the other 
hand, are concerned with objects in the same sphere but because of a desire 
to avoid pain (NE VII.7.1150a10-15).18
 
does not seem to expect to be capable of  overcoming appetite – can be found mostly in 
non-Greek (that is, underdeveloped) societies (1.1145a31 and 5.1149a11).
16  I would have liked to say more about this, but Aristotle does not provide enough 
clues on beastly akrasia to develop a plausible argument about where this state would fit in 
his hierarchy of  character traits.
17  Aristotle also mentions weakness for comfort (truphē) which is a form of  softness 
(NE VII.7.1150b3) and a kind of  softness that more closely resembles vice, more specifically 
self-indulgence (1150b17-18).
18  Aristotle does not mention whether this distinction between pleasure and pain is 
also relevant to the qualified forms of  akrasia.
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Aristotle holds that enkrateia is more praiseworthy than endurance, and, 
mirroring this, that akrasia is worse than softness. He explicitly addresses 
only the moral status of enkrateia and endurance, and he says that the 
former is more praiseworthy than the latter because ‘resisting is a matter 
of withstanding, whereas self-control is a matter of overcoming, and 
withstanding is different from overcoming as not being defeated is different 
from winning’ (1150a34-b2).
 The interpretation of this passage (and consequently also of what 
endurance and softness precisely entail), according to Aristotle, depends on 
whether endurance and softness are, like enkrateia and akrasia, concerned 
with objects of food, drink and sex or whether they are connected to related 
objects that have to do with, for example, hunger, thirst and lust. I present 
two different interpretations of Aristotle’s view on the moral status of akrasia 
in comparison to softness, which depend on the different options for the 
kind of objects that softness may be concerned with.
 A first possible interpretation of this passage is provided by Carol 
Gould (1994). She suggests that the pain in the case of endurance is caused 
by the frustration of not fulfilling an appetite for food, drink or sex. She thus 
holds that the objects of endurance and softness are precisely the same as 
those of enkrateia and akrasia. On her reading, the difference between the 
enkratēs and the resistant is that the former completely conquers the pull 
of appetite before the act, whereas the latter experiences this pull for the 
entire duration of the act (1994, 177-179). The enkratēs on this view is more 
praiseworthy than the resistant because he suppresses appetite as soon as it 
appears. He thereby obeys reason more perfectly than the resistant person 
does. Gould does not address how this reading bears on akrasia and softness. 
It implies that the akratēs gives in to affect as soon as it arises, whereas 
the soft person does not manage to withstand lingering pain. On Gould’s 
interpretation, then, akrasia makes a person more ill-disposed than softness 
does because reason is more radically defeated by appetite.
 A second possible interpretation is that, according to Aristotle, 
softness is not about avoiding the frustration of an unfulfilled appetite for 
food, drink or sex, but rather comes down to having a desire to get rid of 
inherently painful experiences such as hunger, thirst and perhaps lust. In 
a passage on moderation and self-indulgence – the virtue and vice with 
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the same sphere as akrasia as such – he mentions that hunger and thirst, 
as well as heat and cold, are examples of objects of pain that belong to the 
same sphere as the objects of food, drink and sex (NE VII.4.1148a5-10). 
In a close-reading article of NE VII.7, Chris Bobonich considers, among 
other things, the relevance of pleasure and pain in demarcating enkreteia 
and akrasia from endurance and softness. He observes that if endurance and 
softness are directly concerned with the pains of hunger, thirst and so on, 
it makes sense that Aristotle considers enkrateia and akrasia as respectively 
better and worse than these character traits, on the grounds that ‘there does 
[…] seem to be a certain kind of passivity in being motivationally responsive 
to pain’ (2009, 153).19
 It is worth developing Bobonich’s suggestion about passivity further, 
for a distinction between activity and passivity matches nicely the difference 
between the ‘pleasure-cases’ and the ‘pain-cases’. It can make sense of the 
analogy that Aristotle draws in the above passage between overcoming/
withstanding and winning/not being defeated. Not being defeated is like 
defending yourself by staying put. This is passive in comparison to winning 
a battle by attacking the enemy. On this reading, the enkratēs abides by the 
criterion of rationality more strongly than the resistant person does, because 
in his case appetite is defeated more thoroughly. The enkratēs actively attacks 
and gets rid of the appetite for food, drink or sex when it arises, whereas 
the resistant endures hunger and thirst for as long as it lasts. Conversely, the 
akratēs is actively attracted by the objects of food, drink and sex in trait-
relevant situations, whereas softness comes down to avoiding hunger and 
thirst. Furthermore, the terminology of activity and passivity also fits the 
analogous examples that Aristotle mentions to illustrate what softness is. He 
talks about a person who drags his cloak on the ground to avoid the ‘pain’ 
of lifting it and about ‘the devotee of amusement’, where ‘amusement’ is 
‘slackening, since it is a kind of resting’ (NE VII.7.1150b3-5 and 1150b17-
19). These examples show people who behave passively and avoid the pains 
19  Bobonich also remarks that Aristotle could have in mind in this context the idea 
that ‘it may be very hard to perceive something as painful without also seeing it as bad, even 
if  its badness is outweighed’ (2009, 153; cf. NE VII.13.1153b1-5). I find no link to this idea 
in Aristotle’s discussion of  akrasia, though.
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of physical or mental exercise. On this interpretation, the akratēs violates the 
criterion of rationality more than the soft person does because he is actively 
attracted by the pleasure promised by the desired objects.
 The different interpretations of Aristotle’s passage on enkrateia 
and endurance, and its implications for the distinction between akrasia and 
softness, do not conflict and could, I think, exist very well alongside one 
another. It is clear in any case that according to Aristotle akrasia makes a 
person more ill-disposed than softness does. Giving in to appetite because 
of the pleasure the desired objects promise to bring violates the criterion of 
rationality more than giving in to appetite for the sake of avoiding pain, for 
in the former case reason is defeated more radically by affect, or in an active 
rather than a passive way.
 5.3.5 The kind of desire involved: appetite or thumos
A final factor that Aristotle brings up in relation to the moral evaluation 
of akrasia is the kind of desire that is involved. Recall that Aristotle 
distinguishes between three different kinds of desires: appetite (epithumia), 
thumos, and rational desire (boulēsis). As noted above, I prefer to leave thumos 
untranslated because common English translations such as ‘anger’, ‘temper’, 
and ‘spiritedness’ do not quite capture the scope of the Greek term. The 
kind of desire that is central in akrasia as such is appetite, but Aristotle also 
distinguishes akrasia with regard to thumos as a separate character trait.20 
20  Note that akrasia with regard to rational desire would be impossible on Aristotle’s 
view. Rational desire is by definition in line with reason. Aristotle does mention the example 
of  Neoptolemus, who is persuaded by Odysseus to lie to Philoctetes but who, when the 
moment comes, tells the truth, not because he changed his mind but due to a ‘fine’ desire 
(NE VII.9.1151b19-21). Aristotle can only mean a rational desire by this. He maintains 
that the example about Neoptolemus does not display a good form of  akrasia, however. 
Presumably, Neoptolemus’ character is so well-developed that even in the absence of  a 
correct prescription (which, considering Odysseus’ incredible talent for persuasion, we 
might want to excuse him for), the non-rational part of  his soul makes him disposed in such 
a way as to ensure correct behavior. Neoptolemus’ case also does not seem to be an example 
of  the contemporary notion of  ‘inverse akrasia’, for at least in the way Aristotle presents it, 
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He states that this form is less bad than ‘the form relating to appetites 
(epithumia)’ (NE VII.6.1149a24-25; cf. 1149b2-b4, and 1149b24-25). He 
thus maintains that akrasia with regard to thumos is less bad than akrasia as 
such, and therefore also less bad than all other negative character traits in 
which appetite plays a pivotal role.
 It has been suggested that by ‘akrasia with regard to thumos’ Aristotle 
does not introduce a new notion but is in fact referring to the same character 
trait that he addresses as ‘akrasia with regard to things such as money and 
honor’. David Charles writes, for example, that ‘[i]t is tempting to think that 
the other cases of akrasia which Aristotle mentions (akrasia through desire for 
honour, victory, money, love of one’s parents: 1148a29ff) follow the pattern 
of akrasia through anger [thumos]’ (2011, 197, n.19). The objects that Aristotle 
mentions in connection to both notions indeed overlap. Furthermore, he 
says that akrasia with regard to thumos is linked to the kinds of objects that are 
naturally desirable for human beings (NE VII.6.1149b7-8), which include, 
as discussed above, things such as money and honor. Nevertheless, I am 
hesitant to conclude that Aristotle uses the two notions to refer to the same 
character trait, for appetite and thumos seem to be concerned with the same 
objects in essentially different ways. In the passage on akrasia with regard to 
thumos, Aristotle takes a different perspective than in his discussion of akrasia 
with regard to things such as money and honor. In this context, he is not 
addressing the nature of the desired objects themselves but rather the way 
in which a person is directed towards those objects. Appetite is a desire for 
objects as pleasurable; thumos pertains to objects in a different way.
 In what way does thumos pertain to objects, then? Unfortunately, 
Aristotle does not provide a definition of thumos, and he does not explicitly 
explain what the general objective of this kind of desire is. Thumos is at 
any rate not a desire for things insofar as they are pleasurable or insofar as 
they are good, for those objectives are related to appetite and rational desire, 
respectively. Aristotle does state that, like appetite, thumos is a kind of desire 
that we in general share with non-rational animals (III.2.1111b12-13). 
He mentions, for example, that it is thumos that drives ‘wild animals that 
Neoptolemus does not appear to regret his action of  telling the truth. For more on inverse 
akrasia, see Chapter Three.
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rush at the people who have wounded them’ (8.1116b26). It is thus a non-
rational desire. Further, Aristotle often mentions thumos in connection with 
things such as anger, revenge, and retaliation (see for example 1117a7 and 
VII.6.1149a32). However, thumos has a wider scope than this, for Aristotle 
also mentions it in connection with love and friendship, for example (Politics 
VII.7.1327b40-1328a5).
 Klaus Corcilius’ discussion of thumos and, as we may call it, ‘thumotic 
akrasia’ is highly illuminating, and in the remainder of this section I shall by 
and large follow his interpretation of Aristotle’s views about these matters. 
Corcilius suggests that thumos has to do with how one relates to other 
people, other life forms, and lifeless goods, which include both competitive 
and positive relations (2008a, 148). He furthermore observes that the 
relevant examples that Aristotle provides all involve a relation that is either 
being disturbed or restored (2008a, 151). In line with these observations, I 
believe it is warranted to describe Aristotle’s concept of thumos in terms of a 
desire that is in general aimed at restoring and maintaining relations in the 
form that a person perceives as natural and appropriate.21
 Corcilius proposes that on Aristotle’s view thumotic akrasia is less 
bad than appetitive akrasia because thumos in general is closer to reason 
than appetite is. If thumos is indeed concerned with relations, this means, 
according to Corcilius, that it requires more complex perceptual abilities 
than those that are strictly necessary for appetitive desire, for the relational 
objects towards which thumos is directed are not objects of direct perception 
but can only be established through some kind of interpretation of the 
type of situation (2008a, 143). For example, a touch on the arm may be a 
pleasurable tactile experience by itself, but it can be experienced as friendly 
or hostile depending on how a person perceives his relation to the person 
doing the touching. Since Aristotle maintains that thumos is a non-rational 
desire, such a complex perception need not be based on rational abilities or 
arguments. However, Corcilius emphasizes that thumos nevertheless requires 
21  Charles concludes from Aristotle’s discussion of  thumotic akrasia that thumos 
is instead aimed at justice and value (2011, 197-198). Aristotle indeed refers to justice 
in this context and claims that thumotic akrasia is less unjust than appetitive akrasia (NE 
VII.6.1149b13-26). The reference to justice is compatible, however, with the more general 
picture of  thumos as a desire concerned with setting relations right.
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a complexity that is not open to lower life forms, whereas appetite in a basic 
form still is (2008a, 141). If this is indeed Aristotle’s view, thumos is in general 
a step closer to reason than appetite is because it requires more complex 
perceptual abilities and interpretation.
 Importantly, Corcilius maintains that this way of understanding 
Aristotle’s view is confirmed in his discussion of thumotic akrasia. Let me 
stress that in the relevant passage Aristotle talks about thumos in the context 
of lack of control. So the question of interest is how the passage shows that 
thumos is closer to reason than appetite is, even in cases in which a person’s 
behavior is not in line with reason due to thumos. The most crucial part of 
the passage runs as follows:
…one’s thumos in such cases [akratic cases] seems to hear what reason says, but 
to mishear it, like hasty servants who run out of the room before they have heard 
everything being said to them and then fail to carry out the instruction, and as 
dogs bark just at a sound, before discovering if it’s a friend who’s there; just so 
a hot and quick nature means that thumos hears – but does not hear the order, 
before rushing to vengeance. For reason [logos], or sensory appearances [phantasia], 
indicate “unprovoked aggression” or “insult”22, and thumos, as if having reasoned 
it out that this sort of thing is cause for going to war, moves into angry mode at 
once; whereas appetite only needs reason [logos] or perception [aesthesis] to say 
“pleasant” for it to rush off to enjoy it. So thumos follows reason in a way, but 
appetite does not. (NE VII.6.1149a25-b2)23
This passage reveals that the main problem with thumotic akrasia is that 
the person’s deliberation is overhasty. Corcilius concludes that in thumotic 
cases, the akratēs acts on incomplete knowledge rather than a total absence 
of knowledge (as in impulsiveness) or against knowledge (as in weakness) 
(2008a, 144, n.21; cf. Charles 2011, 198).24 He points out that both the 
22  These are examples of  competitive relations only. I am not sure whether Aristotle 
considers thumotic akrasia with regard to positive relations impossible, or whether he simply 
does not mention any example of  this.
23  I have adapted Rowe’s translation of  this passage and have replaced ‘temper’ with 
thumos.
24  Both Natali (2009b) and Pearson (2012, 137) emphasize the ‘as if  having reasoned 
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example of the barking dog and the example of the hasty servant illustrate 
that in the case of thumotic akrasia a person assumes knowledge that he 
cannot yet have (2008a, 144). The dog interprets the knocking on the door 
as coming from a foe, although he cannot yet know whether the person 
knocking is friend or foe. The hasty servant interprets the situation as one 
in which his master has already told him what to do, but no definite order 
has been given yet. When thumos leads a person astray, complex forms of 
perception and interpretation are thus involved, whereas Aristotle indicates 
that with appetite the direct perception of something pleasant suffices 
(‘appetite only needs reason or perception to say “pleasant” for it to rush off 
to enjoy it’, NE VII.6.1149a35-b1). Corcilius points out that the thumotic 
akratēs’ response to the situation is not entirely without rational justification, 
however (2008a, 146). If one is insulted, for example, it is perfectly appropriate 
to become angry. The problem is rather that a person too hastily perceives 
something as an insult even though he cannot yet know whether an insult 
has indeed been given. With thumotic akrasia, a person too hastily assumes 
that something is the case and acts on this assumption instead of waiting 
to see what is truly going on and what an appropriate response would be.
 Hence, appetitive akrasia and other negative character traits that 
revolve around appetite violate the criterion of rationality more strongly 
than thumotic akrasia does. This is because thumos is in general closer to 
reason than appetite is, since it requires more complex perceptual abilities 
and interpretation, and because the thumotic akratēs does not act against or 
without knowledge of reason’s prescription but rather acts on the basis of 
incomplete knowledge. He assumes knowledge that he could not yet have 
and acts on it. The thumotic akratēs is not as bad as the akratēs who gives in 
to appetite, however, for his response would have been warranted if he had 
correctly established the knowledge he now presupposes.
it out’-part of  this passage. They hold that according to Aristotle in cases of  thumotic akrasia 
something analogous to a reasoning process takes place, whereas in cases of  appetitive 
akrasia it does not. I think it is unlikely that the difference between the two lies here. Aristotle 
appears to sketch parts of  a so-called ‘appetite-based syllogism’ in his discussion of  akratic 
action in NE VII.3 (1147a33-b2). This is in any case what alternative interpretations of  NE 
VII.3 claim.
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5.4 Final remarks
In NE VII.4-10, Aristotle draws up a hierarchy of character traits by 
comparing how ill-disposed akrasia as such makes a person in comparison 
to various other character traits. This reveals which factors he deems relevant 
to establishing the moral status of akrasia. On Aristotle’s account, morally 
relevant and demarcating factors coincide. This leads Aristotle to restrict 
the sphere of akrasia to food, drink and sex, for example. The complete list 
of factors that I have distinguished in Aristotle’s work is as follows: 1) how 
strongly (or rather weakly) the akratēs’ rational desire has been cultivated, and 
consequently whether there can be a direct or only an indirect confrontation 
between reason and appetite, 2) whether reason is healthy, corrupt or absent, 
3) how (un)natural it is for a human being to desire the objects of affect, 4) 
whether the objects are pursued because of seeking pleasure or avoiding 
pain, and 5) whether the lack of control is due to appetite or to thumos, or, 
in other words, whether it involves acting against knowledge that one has or 
could in principle have, or whether it instead involves acting on incomplete 
knowledge.
 Aristotle’s view on the moral status of akrasia as a character trait is 
also relevant to developing a contemporary character account of akrasia. 
This is not to claim that we should follow his account in every respect. He 
puts nail biting in the same class as cannibalism, for example, even though 
the first is relatively innocent compared to the latter. Moreover, Aristotle 
limits the domain of akrasia as such to the sphere of food, drink, and sex, 
even though other forms of lack of control can be equally interesting. As I 
argued in Chapter Three, however, Aristotle is correct when he observes that 
the kinds of objects over which a person is disposed to lack control matters 
for moral evaluation. And, in a similar vein, each of the criteria for morally 
evaluating the akratēs that Aristotle distinguishes can be redescribed in a way 
that fits in with contemporary discussions on akrasia.
 In more contemporary terminology, the morally relevant factors 
that Aristotle distinguishes may be fruitfully redescribed as follows: 1) how 
strong a judgment-contrary motivation it takes for the akratēs to give in, 
and in what form(s) a person’s akratic character typically manifests itself, 
2) whether or not a person forms judgments in a sound way, and whether 
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he is sufficiently capable of rational deliberation at all, 3) which kind of 
objects the akratēs is disposed to lack control over, 4) whether someone is 
actively attracted to the akratic alternative or whether he instead gives in to 
competing motivation in order to avoid discomfort or a painful experience, 
and 5) whether the akratēs acts in a way that he would never judge as best 
with regard to this kind of situation or whether he acts on an overhasty 
conclusion but in a way that he would judge best if the situation were as he, 
at the moment of action, prematurely assumes.25
 In the previous two chapters, I presented Aristotle’s character account 
of akrasia. The fact that he regards akrasia primarily as a character trait means 
that, according to him, it is both stable and long-lasting and makes someone 
ill-disposed in several respects. These two features provide an outline for 
his entire discussion of akrasia: after introducing the topic and the issues 
that it raises in NE VII.1-2, he addresses the symptoms through which the 
character trait reveals itself in NE VII.3 and then goes on, in the remainder 
of the discussion, to consider its moral status.
 In the final two chapters, I follow the division between the two 
features that Aristotle ascribes to character traits. I address further challenges 
to the conception of akrasia as a stable and long-lasting character trait in 
Chapter Six, and I discuss akrasia in relation to moral responsibility in 
Chapter Seven.
25  As I argued in Chapter Three, repetition can be added to this list of  morally 
relevant factors for evaluating akrasia. Since it was common in Aristotle’s time to think of  
akrasia as a character trait, or in any case as a stable condition, he probably took this for 
granted.
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6. AKRASIA AND THE PROBLEM 
 OF CHARACTER DEVELOPMENT1
6.1 Introduction
In the literature on character education, some authors – such as Howard 
Curzer, Kristján Kristjánsson and Wouter Sanderse – identify akrasia as one 
of the stages in their (neo-) Aristotelian models of character development. 
Their prime concern is to describe how a person’s character can develop 
from the lowest moral level via other stages – most notably akrasia and 
enkrateia/self-control2 – to full virtue.3 They do not deny that a person’s 
development can stagnate at a stage that falls short of the moral ideal. Curzer, 
for example, writes that ‘although some people at each stage of moral 
development eventually progress to the next stage, and some deviate from 
the moral development path, most people at each stage simply fail to move 
up’ (2002, 155; cf. Kristjánsson, 2007, 20).4 Nevertheless, their work suggests 
the image of akrasia as a stage in the development of character because the 
focus lies on means of improvement. Moreover, they discuss akrasia with a 
hopeful tone: ‘…they [people who are at the level of akrasia] have made a 
1  This chapter is an adapted version of  Paulien Snellen (2018).
2  Curzer and Kristjánsson include other intermediate stages as well: the stage of  the 
generous-minded and the stages of  softness and resistance, respectively. I stick with the four 
stages that are mentioned in all three models, including Sanderse’s.
3  The general idea is that to become virtuous a person must move through the 
stages in a sequential order. However, the character educationists allow for the possibility 
of  a person’s jumping from one level to another right away, or a person’s skipping a stage 
entirely (see for example Kristjánsson 2007, 22).
4  Curzer (2018) is concerned with formulating a fine-grained list of  character flaws 
rather than construing a general model of  moral development.
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giant leap on the path to moral virtue’ (Sanderse 2015, 389; cf. Curzer, 2002, 
161, n.38 and Kristjánsson, 2007, 21).
 In this dissertation, I primarily regard akrasia not as a stage in the 
development of character but as a character trait that is stable and long-
lasting (or stable for short). Of course, akrasia might be stable for some 
people and a stage in a developmental process for others. The claims made in 
the literature on character education and the character approach to akrasia 
for which I have been arguing are not incompatible. The main focus and the 
central question are opposed, however. The literature on character education 
does not shed light on how akrasia can be a stable state because it focuses 
on the question of how one can surpass this stage. If we take the possibility 
that akrasia can be a stable character trait seriously, then, in comparison 
to the character educationist’s prime concern, the inverse question arises, 
namely: how can we understand, on conceptual grounds, how akrasia does 
not develop into self-control or, alternatively, degrade into vice?
 One might expect that a person with an akratic character – an akratēs 
– will (eventually) change, for this type of person is typically displeased with 
the way he acts. He has a judgment about what it is best to do in a particular 
situation5, but – in trait-relevant situations – he fails to act in line with this 
better judgment due to a competing motivation. There are two ways in 
which the akratēs can try to resolve the conflict: he can alter his standards for 
action, or he can alter his behavior. Character educationists would obviously 
recommend the latter because it would bring a person one step closer to the 
moral ideal of virtue. They consider the problem of character development 
a moral issue, which makes sense given the virtue ethical context of their 
5  Recall that to connect to the contemporary literature on akrasia, I relax Aristotle’s 
demand that a person on the level of  akrasia has objectively true knowledge of  what the 
right thing to do is. What matters most on my account is that someone is himself  strongly 
convinced of  his better judgment. Akrasia still differs from the stage of  the generous-
minded person in Curzer’s developmental model (2002, 156) because people’s convictions 
at the level of  akrasia are firm, not vague. Jan Garrett rightly points out that people with 
unstable convictions can also struggle to abide by their better judgment (1993, 188). With 
regard to such people I would say that the path to self-control and virtue requires them not 
only to align their behavior with their better judgment but also to develop firmer and clearer 
standards for action.
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project. However, even if one is not interested in development towards 
virtue or in moral development at all, the question nevertheless arises of why 
the akratēs does not alter his standards for action or his behavior. I explore 
several possible ways to understand why the akratēs does not necessarily 
change either of these.
 I take as a starting point the distinctive features of the concept of 
akrasia. As before, I focus on developing a conceptual analysis of akrasia as a 
stable character trait, since such an analysis is lacking in the literature. Some 
of the conclusions that I draw may be empirically testable, but as I pointed 
out previously it is not my aim to map the relevant empirical literature. This 
conceptual analysis may, however, provide leads for interdisciplinary and 
empirical researchers when they study the empirical reality of akrasia as a 
stable character trait.
 I start with a discussion of three features of akrasia that give rise to 
the belief that it is a stage in a developmental process (6.2). I then try to make 
sense of the stagnation of the akratēs (6.3). I first argue that, although habits 
are bound to play a big role in this, they do not provide an entirely satisfactory 
answer. Secondly, I rely on the analogy that Aristotle draws between akrasia 
and epilepsy, which I discussed in Chapter Four. Inspired by this analogy, 
I argue that people can endure internal conflict and regret because these 
may not be permanently present. I then turn to Amélie Rorty, who explains 
that akratic habits are particularly tough to break when akrasia has social 
and political sources. Finally, I consider what these theoretical considerations 
might imply for the practice of character development and therapy (6.4).
6.2  Reasons to expect the akratēs to change, 
 for better or worse
There are reasons to believe that akrasia is likely to develop towards self-
control or decline towards vice. This has to do with the fact that a person 
who is on the level of akrasia by his very nature a) is characterized as having 
an internal conflict, b) regrets the way in which he typically acts, and c) is 
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likely to have knowledge of the kinds of contexts in which he is prone to 
violate his better judgment.
 Before I continue, let me first make a remark on the category of vice. 
Jan Garrett argues that Aristotle often contrasts virtue not with vice but rather 
with the concept of ‘the Many’ (hoi polloi).6 The class of the many is broader 
than that of vice. It includes vice, but also other conditions that are radically 
flawed but not wholly bad, such as being uncommitted altogether rather 
than being committed to the wrong goals (1993, p. 171).7 For this reason, 
Curzer, Kristjánsson and Sanderse name the first developmental stage ‘the 
many’, and not ‘vice’ as one might expect. The distinctive features that the 
character educationists attribute to this category are a lack of commitment 
to virtue, having unstable convictions and not being able to identify virtuous 
actions correctly. I rely mostly on the first two features, which are formal, 
and less on the third, which is related to content. However, I continue to use 
the term ‘vice’ to denote the category just below akrasia. Let me stress that 
I have an Aristotelian notion of vice in mind here.8 I do not refer to people 
6  Garrett points out that for Aristotle, ‘the Many is a majority defined by moral-
psychological characteristics’ (1993, 175); it does not have anything to do with numbers.
7  Vice forms a subclass of  the many that is characterized by an inability to be moved 
by a fear of  punishment to change one’s behavior (see Garrett 1993, 179 and Curzer 1998).
8  There appears to be an inconsistency in Aristotle’s account of  vice. In the largest 
part of  his work, most explicitly in Nicomachean Ethics (NE) Book VII, he contrasts vice 
with akrasia by stating that, unlike the latter, the former is not accompanied by conflict and 
regret. In NE IX.4, however, he says that the souls of  bad people are ‘in a state of  faction’ 
and that the vicious are ‘full of  regret’ (1166b20 and 1166b25). Despite the fact that some 
authors have offered detailed interpretations of  this inconsistency (see for example Thomas 
Brickhouse 2003 and David Roochnik 2007), I am not sure what to make of  it. As Julia 
Annas pointed out at the Jubilee Centre’s 2016 conference ‘Cultivating Virtues’, much more 
work needs to be done on the Aristotelian notion of  vice, and indeed on vice in general. 
Perhaps Aristotle is admitting in NE IX.4 that, like the akratēs, the vicious can experience 
internal conflict because sudden arousal can conflict with a more long-standing desire. Or he 
might be stressing that the goals of  the vicious are unstable because they pursue what they 
desire the most and their desires change all the time. Alternatively, he could have in mind 
the observation that a vicious person can be tormented by insatiable desires. In any case, 
Aristotle does not seem to allow for a notion of  vice in which the vicious person himself  
recognizes that what he strives for is bad. His main concern in NE IX.4 – which forms part 
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who know that what they are doing is evil and do not care (although such 
a form of wholehearted badness would definitely count as vice, should 
it exist). When I talk of vice, I am instead thinking of people who act 
under the influence of a tendency to base their better judgments and (more 
general) standards for action directly on their desires or on whatever suits 
them best at the time.
 The first reason to think that akrasia is a stage in a developmental 
process is that its main characteristic is having the experience of an internal 
conflict – a conflict between a judgment about how it is best to act and a 
motivation to act otherwise. Internal conflict seems to point to instability 
rather than stability. Self-control is also characterized by internal conflict. 
The crucial difference is that in the case of self-control the better judgment 
leads to action, whereas in the case of akrasia the competing motivation 
wins out. In contrast to the self-controlled person, the akratēs therefore 
dislikes the consequences that the internal conflict has for the way in which 
he is inclined to act. For this reason, it is hard to imagine how the internal 
conflict of the akratēs can be permanent.9 It is natural to seek to resolve 
any incongruity, but especially one that troubles a person repeatedly and of 
which he has a clear idea what the outcome should be. Ideally, the akratēs 
solves his internal conflict in favor of the option he deems best. However, 
he might not manage to change his behavior. In that case, he might take the 
other option to rid himself of his internal conflict: giving up on the standards 
for action that he struggles to live up to. Hence, it seems that the akratēs is 
likely not to put up with his characteristic internal conflict permanently, 
since there are two ways he can resolve the tension.
 Secondly, akratic actions are typically accompanied by regret, and 
this brings high hopes for improvement. On Curzer’s Aristotelian model 
of  a larger discussion on friendship – is to point out that vicious people are no friends to 
themselves and are miserable.
9  A similar question can be asked with respect to self-control (see Carol Gould 
1994). However, I would say that it is less astounding that the internal conflict at the level of  
self-control can be permanent, since the self-controlled person can be pleased with the fact 
that he manages in the end to combat judgment-contrary motivation successfully.
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of character development, it is the painful feeling of regret10 – a rough 
translation of the Greek aidōs – that drives a person to move upwards from 
akrasia to self-control: ‘Regret’s role must be to motivate the performance 
of virtuous acts which eventually become habitual’ (1998). This is not 
necessarily Curzer’s view, for his main aim is to accurately describe Aristotle’s 
account. However, Kristjánsson and Sanderse also adopt this idea as part of 
their neo-Aristotelian models of character development (2007, 35-36 and 
2015, 389-391). In comparison to self-control, what is lacking at the level 
of akrasia is a habit of acting in the right way. In order to acquire a new 
behavioral habit, a person needs to perform the right actions. Curzer states 
that regret functions as a ‘catalyst’ in this process. Regret is a reaction of 
disapproval to bad behavior. It also has the prospective function of warning 
against performing actions that are wrong (2002, 159-160). The painful 
sting of regret might in itself be reason enough to avoid acting in a similar 
way in the future, but it also helps a person to recognize when he has acted 
wrongly in the past or when he is on the brink of doing so. The feeling of 
regret can thus steer someone in the right direction.
 If the akratēs fails to improve his behavior, however, there is also 
reason to believe that the painful feeling of regret may lead him to slip 
from akrasia to vice. Luc Bovens’ (1999) philosophical discussion of akrasia 
and therapy exemplifies this. He actually recommends the strategy of 
changing one’s judgment to remedy akrasia. He is inspired by an amusing 
‘advertisement’ for a ‘cure’ for akrasia by Roy Sorensen (1997; see also Tamar 
Gendler 1998). In a humorous tone, Sorensen proposes that people pay him 
a certain amount of money, which he will then return to them if they act 
against their better judgment. The suggestion is that the action ceases to 
qualify as akratic because the refund provides a person with a good reason 
for acting as he does. Bovens considers this kind of strategy seriously. The 
key, according to him, is to ‘raise the utility of what would otherwise count 
10  Contrary to Burnyeat (1980), Curzer (1998 and 2002) argues that the path to virtue 
is painful, according to Aristotle. Perhaps it is not Aristotle’s view, but we should not rule out 
the option that positive feelings can stimulate development as well, such as the pleasure of  
receiving a compliment or being proud of  having gotten it right. Kristjánsson remarks that 
‘Aristotle probably saw a place for both pleasure and pain in the habituation process’ (2007, 
36). I focus on regret here because of  the direct link with akrasia.
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as akratic acts’ (1999, 234).11 The strategy does not simply come down to 
accepting one’s motivation for what it is. According to Bovens, it involves the 
manipulation of one’s environment or personal identity, for example (1999, 
234). Interestingly, Bovens recommends this strategy because he finds the 
alternative – attempting to change one’s behavior – hard and not much fun: 
‘…to me it feels like reason whipping the living daylights out of passion’ 
(1999, 232). He says that a person who tries to avert the threat of akrasia by 
attempting to change his behavior embraces weight, whereas a person who 
does so by attempting to adapt his better judgment embraces lightness (1999, 
235). By this I understand Bovens to mean that he prefers the latter strategy 
of coping with akrasia because it seems to be free of pain. And regret, I would 
like to stress, is one of the forms this pain might take. Hence, in order to 
avoid experiencing regret, someone who suffers from akrasia can come to 
adjust his standards for action and justify the way in which he is inclined to 
act.
 There is a third reason to think of akrasia as a stage in a developmental 
process. It is plausible that the akratēs knows that he has an akratic character. As 
Aristotle says, unlike vice, akrasia does not go undetected by its possessor 
(Nicomachean Ethics (NE) VII.8.1150b37). The feeling of regret also testifies 
to the akratēs’ self-knowledge. The fact that someone feels badly about the 
way he has acted reveals that he knows he acted wrongly (even if only after 
the fact). Importantly, the akratēs typically acts against his better judgment 
more than once. Some of the better judgments that he violates might be 
unique to a particular situation, but others will represent a more general 
standard for action. An akratēs can, of course, fail to recognize the pattern 
in his behavior even if he observes (some of) his akratic actions separately. 
However, I am most interested in akratic people who do connect the dots. 
It is possible for an akratēs to note which standards for action he is likely to 
violate and which objects and opportunities commonly trigger his akratic 
actions. This self-knowledge might help an akratēs to take the necessary 
precautions to develop a self-controlled character.
11  Bovens writes that a person who applies this strategy, for example, could ‘come to 
construct an identity that places a disvalue on prudence and a value on spontaneity’ (1999, 
234) or could ‘let passion surreptitiously form a pact with reason’ (1999, 235).
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But, again, in the absence of progress, having the self-knowledge that one 
is prone to akrasia brings with it the risk that a person takes a step down 
on the developmental ladder. It is painful to endure the thought that you 
disapprove of your character. Curzer remarks that people who are akratic 
‘sometimes pretend to be members of the many because they prefer to be 
perceived as people who are not trying to be moral rather than people who 
are failing to be moral’ (2002, 158).12 I would like to add that this pretense 
can turn into something real over time. A person can become convinced 
that he really does approve of his actions. Furthermore, the self-knowledge 
that he has a tendency to act in a certain way can lead the akratēs to come 
to see his behavior as evidence of what he really judges best. When a person 
repeatedly violates the same standard for action, he is likely to wonder at 
some point whether he sincerely endorses that standard. Now, revisiting a 
better judgment can sometimes help a person to discover that he appreciates 
something else more highly. Akrasia can occasionally lead to new and better 
insights, and thereby to a rational revision of one’s judgment.13 However, 
when someone changes his convictions precisely because he tends to act in a 
certain manner, this strongly indicates that the result is not a rational change 
of mind but a transition to vice. Hence the self-knowledge of the akratēs can 
lead to a change of judgment because a person can come to see his behavior 
as an indication of his true conviction.
 All of the above-mentioned features of akrasia can be expected to 
induce the akratēs to alter his behavior. If his behavior does not improve, 
however, the very same features can also lead him to change his standard for 
action instead. There is therefore ample reason to expect that akrasia will 
either develop into self-control or degrade into vice.
12  Curzer also observes that ‘[t]he many often pretend to be incontinent because 
incontinence is more respectable than choosing to act wrongly’ (2002, 158). This goes to 
show that people tend to try to cover up their faults.
13  For discussions of  this idea, see Xavier Vanmechelen (2000, 302-308), Martin Seel 
(2001, 618), Annemarie Kalis (2011, 161-164), and Sabine Döring (2010, 296-299).
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6.3 Understanding the stagnation of the akratēs
Despite the reasons to believe that akrasia is a stage in a developmental 
process, experience seems to indicate that it is actually often persistent. 
Moreover, I showed in the previous chapters that Aristotle – on whose work 
the character educationists named above build – primarily regards akrasia as 
a stable and long-lasting character trait. How can we understand how akrasia 
can remain a stable state?
 The answer seems clear: an akratēs does not easily change his character 
because his akratic habits are too well entrenched. On the one hand, there is 
the habit of acting in a certain way. This keeps in place judgment-contrary 
motivation and behavior. On the other hand, there is the habit of forming 
certain kinds of better judgment.14 This prevents the akratēs from heading 
further in the direction of vice. From the perspective of the akratēs, it is the 
first type of habit that needs to be changed. He is already convinced that 
he should act differently than he actually does. Instead, the problem seems 
motivational. However, as Aristotle observed, habits are like a second nature 
and are hard to change (NE VII.3.1147a23 and 10.1152a30-33).
 At first glance, an explanation of stability in terms of habits might 
seem like a tautology. ‘Habit’, however, can refer to more than the plain 
observation that behavior is stable because it has often repeated itself. The 
term helps to capture what keeps repetitive behavior in place. It might help 
to think of habits as pathways in a forest, for example. If a certain route is 
taken often, a path becomes marked out. Once a path has been created, it is 
the easiest way through the forest. Likewise, when a person has acquired a 
habit of acting in a certain way, he has performed a certain type of behavior 
so often that it is difficult to avoid taking the motivational path that has been 
created.
 Creating new motivational pathways takes much time and repetition. 
Some character educationists are mainly concerned with the character 
development of children, whose constitution is not yet entirely settled 
14  Perhaps some people would be reluctant to call this a habit, since it concerns an 
epistemic state. I merely want to point out that a person’s tendency to form a certain kind of  
better judgment, just like the inclination to act otherwise, may be stable.
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(Kristjánsson, 2007, 22 and Sanderse, 2015). In the case of the young, the 
mechanisms described in the previous section might be relatively successful 
in helping them to surpass an akratic or akratic-like stage.15 However, the 
constitution of adults who are prone to violate their better judgment is 
likely to be more deeply settled. Having an akratic character trait is tragic. 
By the age at which a person develops a conviction on the basis of which 
he disapproves of his inclination to act a certain way, the behavioral habit is 
likely to have already firmly taken shape.
 Whilst the explanation of the akratēs’ character stagnation in terms 
of habits rings true, it is nevertheless not entirely satisfactory. The question 
remains how the habits that are expressive of the character trait can stay 
well entrenched given the above-mentioned reasons to believe that akrasia 
is likely to change. After all, habits can be broken. It is easiest to keep to the 
beaten track, but it is not impossible to stray from the trail. Recall that factors 
other than character can influence action, such as a person’s attentional 
condition.
 Moreover, as I argued in the introduction to this dissertation, it is 
plausible for conceptual reasons that akrasia has a specific sphere. If akrasia 
displayed unity along the lines of full virtue, the akratēs would achieve nothing 
that he set out to do, and it is doubtful whether he would be sufficiently 
rational to be considered a person. An akratēs might compensate for his 
akrasia in one sphere (say, food) with the control he possesses in another 
sphere (say, keeping promises) (cf. Chrisoula Andreou, 2010).
 Furthermore, self-control is also not entirely lacking within the 
‘akratic domain’. Someone who suffers from akrasia with regard to alcoholic 
drinks, for example, can manage to decline having another drink on more 
than one occasion, for otherwise he would be dead drunk most of the time 
(assuming here that he is not an alcoholic, for that would be a different matter). 
Hence, in order to develop a self-controlled character, the akratēs need not 
start from scratch. Habits surely play an important role in accounting for the 
stability of akrasia, but they do not tell the whole story. Again, how can we 
15  On the other hand, Aristotle says that young people are like akratic people in the 
sense that they ‘have a tendency to be led by the emotions’ (NE I.3.1095a4). If  Aristotle is 
right, young people are vulnerable to akrasia because they could simply get stuck at this stage. 
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make sense of the fact that internal conflict, regret and self-knowledge can 
fail to urge the akratēs onwards?
 Let me start with the question of how akrasia can be permanent 
given the internal conflict that the akratēs typically experiences. There may of 
course be people – such as artists and Nietzscheans – who would embrace 
their conflicted nature. This does not apply to the akratēs, though. The 
akratēs holds that he should act otherwise than he is disposed to act. He can 
acknowledge that this condition is typical of him, but it goes too far to say 
that the akratēs actually endorses this aspect of his character.
 Secondly, a person’s character could be stable in the sense that it is 
consistently inconsistent. The akratēs’ character might display continuity 
precisely through permanent internal conflict. The psychologist William 
Swann (1996) has developed a theory – based on empirical research – that 
can help to explain how this might work.16 He argues that people with low 
self-esteem find it difficult to achieve higher self-esteem despite a strong 
desire for positive evaluation because maintaining low self-esteem coheres 
with their self-image. According to Swann, a person’s drive for self-coherence 
can prevail over a desire to improve. A similar explanation may account for 
why akrasia can remain stable. Suffering from a conflict at one point in time 
and again at another point in time can constitute a coherent self-image. It 
may be a drive to preserve this self-image that keeps the internal conflict of 
the akratēs alive. Further empirical research is needed to establish whether 
this is the case, but there is a conceptual reason to doubt that such a Swann-
inspired explanation applies to akrasia. The experience of internal conflict 
may indeed confirm the negative self-view of the akratēs, but the akratēs 
cannot escape the fact that at the same time it also brings to the surface his 
wish to change his akratic nature. The internal conflict inherently questions 
the akratēs’ character. It is therefore not self-evident that a drive for self-
coherence can account for the stability of akrasia as a character trait.
 Aristotle’s analogy between akrasia and epilepsy, discussed at length 
in Chapter Four, provides a clue to a different answer as to why internal 
conflict can fail to prompt the akratēs to change. Recall that according to 
Aristotle, akrasia is like epilepsy in that it is ‘a non-continuous way of being as 
16  I thank Kristján Kristjánsson for having mentioned Swann’s work to me.
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one shouldn’t be’ (NE VII.8.1150b35). An epileptic is ill all the time, but the 
symptoms of the illness show only now and then. If akrasia is like epilepsy in 
this respect, it follows that on Aristotle’s account akrasia is a stable condition 
of which the characteristic symptoms are only temporarily and occasionally 
present. This means that the internal conflict that is so characteristic of akrasia 
is itself not permanently present and only arises in trait-relevant situations. 
The akratēs, then, does not necessarily experience internal conflict all the 
time.17
 The analogy that Aristotle draws between akrasia and epilepsy can 
help us to see how internal conflict can fail to establish any change in the 
akratēs. True, a person could make use of the time between trait-relevant 
situations to take precautions that prevent repetition of akratic behavior. 
However, the crux is that at such moments the symptomatic features of 
akrasia are not there; that is, there is at that time no internal conflict asking 
to be resolved. One might, after acting akratically, intend to do better next 
time but not feel an urge to take immediate precautions. After all, right 
now nothing much seems to be the matter. Hence, the akratēs might fail 
to improve because, when it is most convenient for him to try to prevent 
future akratic actions, he is not constantly reminded via internal conflict of 
his tendency to violate his own better judgments. Similarly, this might be 
what prevents the akratēs from declining. There is no pressure to reconsider 
one’s standard for action when judgment-contrary motivation is absent. In 
this context, the akratēs has no trouble hanging on to (or perhaps restoring) 
his conviction about how it is best to act. Hence, one way to understand the 
stability of akrasia is to note that the uncomfortable internal conflict that is 
essential to this state is not constantly present.
 A similar explanation might help us to see why regret is not necessarily 
enough to get the akratēs to alter his ways. A person is likely to experience 
regret over his akratic action. This can sting a lot at the time of action or 
17  As I discussed in Chapter Four, there is much dispute about whether Aristotle 
allows for the akratēs to experience internal conflict at the moment of  action. If  not, I 
would say that the akratēs can still become aware of  the conflict between better judgment 
and contrary motivation right before or immediately after the action. See also the discussion 
in Chapter Three of  the distinction between strict and non-strict manifestations of  akrasia 
as a character trait.
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immediately after, but the painful feeling might fade away quickly. Of course, 
regret can sometimes be tenacious. People whose akrasia leads to adultery 
or to causing a fatal accident, for example, might have to live with regret 
about their akratic behavior every day, for the rest of their lives. However, if 
a person’s akrasia instead involves something like eating a piece of chocolate, 
the painful feeling of regret might not linger for very long. It is not that the 
akratēs no longer disapproves of his action. It is just that he might not be 
reminded of it by means of a constant feeling of regret. The regret might 
return every time the akratēs thinks about his akratic behavior, although 
it could become less intense over time. The point is that it need not be a 
lingering feeling of regret that brings back the memory. When regret indeed 
fades away following the akratic action, this also helps to understand how the 
akratēs can resist changing his standard for action to avoid pain. There are 
moments of relief between separate akratic actions, and this gives the akratēs 
time to reinforce his convictions and confirm that his standard for action has 
not changed. Furthermore, the akratēs might find the idea of the alternative 
to pangs of regret even more painful. He could realize that it is irrational to 
change his better judgment simply because of what he is most motivated to 
pursue. A second way to understand the stability of akrasia, then, is that each 
time a person acts akratically regret does not necessarily stick around long 
enough to establish change.
 Thus far, I have argued that internal conflict and regret often fail 
to have a transforming effect on akrasia because they may be relatively 
short-lived. Does the same line of thought apply to the self-knowledge of the 
akratēs? As I argued above, it is plausible that the akratēs is acquainted with 
the particulars of his akratic character. There is a possible link between this 
self-knowledge and regret. Curzer in any case holds that regret (or shame) 
can help to explicate self-knowledge and make it salient (2002, 160). So 
perhaps the akratēs fails to benefit from his self-knowledge when there is 
no feeling of regret in between trait-relevant situations to remind him of 
this knowledge. However, I am not sure whether this is the case. The feature 
of self-knowledge differs from the features of internal conflict and regret 
because it is not (a direct associate of) a symptom of the stable condition 
of akrasia but rather an awareness of having this condition. This awareness 
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need not diminish when the characteristic symptoms of akrasia are no 
longer present.
 Amélie Rorty offers a different explanation of how akrasia can remain 
a stable and long-lasting character trait. She points to social and political 
sources in order to argue that akratic habits are particularly hard to break.18 
The core of her view is that ‘[s]ocial institutions and economic systems 
encourage and foster the very actions that they also condemn’ (1997, 652). 
She gives the example of Daemona, a stockbroker who trades in short-term 
securities. Daemona values helping the infirm and elderly as a volunteer, but 
against her convictions she at the same time tricks her fellow volunteers into 
making risky investments for her own personal gain. Although Daemona 
believes that what she is doing is wrong, she fails to live up to her social 
ideals and gives in to the attractions of a luxurious lifestyle, the latter being 
encouraged, among other things, by ‘mass media, television dramas, songs, and 
advertisements’ (1997, 653). Rorty’s argument entails that social institutions 
and other elements of public life tend to sustain the different sides of the 
kind of internal conflict that is characteristic of akrasia.19 For behavior to 
qualify as akratic, it is important that a person has internalized the values that 
he violates. But if this criterion is met, the picture that Rorty sketches can 
make sense of many of the common examples of akrasia. Think of examples 
concerning alcoholic drinks, for instance. Health institutions recommend 
limiting one’s alcohol intake. This reinforces a standard of not drinking 
too much and strengthens specific judgments, for example the judgment 
that one should only have one drink at the party tonight. At the same time, 
there may be pressure from peers to drink because drinking is considered a 
social activity, not to mention the many commercial images that promote 
alcohol consumption. This supports the judgment-contrary motivation side 
of the akratic conflict. With these factors in play, it is hard for the akratēs to 
adapt his behavioral patterns, for the attractiveness of the tempting option 
18  Her undertaking is Aristotelian in nature, for as she observes ‘Aristotle locates his 
ethics within the frame of  his politics’ (1997, 646).
19  Rorty does not mean to take away a person’s own responsibility for his akratic 
actions. She emphasizes that, despite their social and political origin, akratic actions can still 
be considered voluntary (1997, 645).
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is repeatedly confirmed in public life. Societal structures also prevent the 
akratēs from changing his standards for action, for they regularly remind him 
of his convictions. One way to understand how the akratēs’ self-knowledge 
can fail to help him to change, then, is Rorty’s idea that at least some of the 
contexts in which the akratēs is vulnerable to akrasia are themselves strongly 
embedded in societal structures.
6.4 Some thoughts on therapy
What does all this imply for people with an akratic character who want to 
make an effort to improve? This is the kind of question that the character 
educationists I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter are interested 
in. My suggestions on therapy are meant to supplement their ideas about 
character development, and are specifically concerned with overcoming the 
character trait of akrasia.
 When it comes to people with an akratic character, Rorty concludes 
that ‘[t]he long-range solution for their endemic akrasia rests with political 
and economic reform’ (1997, 657).20 Change in social and political 
circumstances could be helpful to people with an akratic character. If the 
conditions under which a person is prone to violate his judgment no longer 
obtain, then he will no longer be triggered to act akratically. Furthermore, 
if the changed circumstances stimulate the akratēs to act repeatedly in ways 
that differ from his previous patterns of behavior, this might also help him to 
form new and improved motivational pathways.21 Social and political reform 
20  Rorty holds that knowledge of  the social and political sources of  akrasia can 
also help a person to counteract their effect (1997, 657). I think she has in mind something 
similar to what I said about the self-knowledge of  the akratēs: it can provide a person with 
the knowledge of  which contexts he had better avoid. Rorty warns, however, that knowledge 
of  the sources of  akrasia can also lead a person to ‘self-deceptively disown their akratic 
actions’ (1997, 657).
21  The akratēs might not manage to internalize the new practice sufficiently, however. 
This would make him vulnerable if  social and political conditions were to change once again. 
The person has truly improved only when his new behavioral patterns are paired with the 
right internal motivation.
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thus seems like a good solution (provided it is the right kind of reform). 
Unless it is a collective process, however, this solution seems unlikely, for a 
person cannot change social and political structures on his own, let alone 
customize them to his own specific needs.22
 Another option could be to attempt to get a painful feeling like regret 
to linger, especially after the internal conflict of akrasia has disappeared. A 
person might try to create a painful feeling that reminds him to take steps 
toward progress, even though this comes with the risk that the pain will 
become too much for him and that he will find a solution in a change of 
judgment instead. Although Luc Bovens would not choose this strategy for 
himself, he points out that one could try to bind oneself – as Odysseus literally 
did to protect himself from the sirens’ song – to resist enticement. If you want 
to quit smoking, for example, you are advised to ‘tell all your friends that you 
are quitting smoking: there is plenty of disutility in the shame of lighting 
up that first cigarette’ (1999, 231). In this way, you may make use of your 
environment to exercise self-control, not by relying on larger societal and 
political structures for change but by, for example, counting on supportive 
friends to remind you of your resolution. Creating painful experiences is an 
unpleasant way to achieve positive change, but it should not be surprising 
that this is what it takes for the akratēs to improve. Kicking a habit that is 
both deeply entrenched in one’s character and supported by elements of 
public life that are strongly embedded in societal structures is no easy task. 
This is made more difficult when the person who must undertake the task is 
not exactly brimming with self-control.
6.5 Conclusion
The way in which some character educationists present akrasia suggests the 
image of a stage in a developmental process. There is indeed reason to believe 
22  Rachel McKinnon and Mathieu Doucet claim that the best chance of  improvement 
for an akratēs lies with ‘random features that permeate our lives’ and ‘apparently irrelevant 
features external to decisions’ (2015, 66). This does not help an akratēs, however, who wants 
to take matters into his own hands.
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that internal conflict, regret and self-knowledge will urge the akratēs towards 
self-control or, alternatively, towards vice. Nevertheless, it seems that akrasia 
can be a stable and long-lasting character trait. Akratic habits may account 
for this to some extent, but how can these habits themselves remain fixed? 
Internal conflict and regret are distinguishing features of akrasia, but these 
features may not be constantly present. In the absence of the uncomfortable 
and painful experience that they cause, an akratēs can easily get away with an 
intention to do better next time without immediately taking precautions to 
prevent future akratic action. When regret is absent, this might also explain 
why the akratēs’ knowledge of the particulars of his condition is not salient 
to him at times when he could take precautions. However, self-knowledge 
need not diminish as internal conflict and regret fade away. Rorty argues that 
akrasia can have social and political sources. This may explain why knowledge 
of one’s akratic character can fail to induce change, for if Rorty is right, 
improving one’s character requires changing not only personal structures 
but also societal ones.
 The arguments presented above suggest that it is hard to change 
one’s akratic character, but whether akrasia is indeed a state that often stays 
fixed is an empirical matter. It seems to always be possible for an akratēs 
to eventually move on or deteriorate. What I have shown, however, is that 
akrasia’s remaining a stable and long-lasting state is indeed quite conceivable, 
and that it can thus pose a serious obstacle to further developing one’s 
character.




In the previous chapter, I took a closer look at how akrasia can be a stable 
and long-lasting character trait. In this final chapter, I consider in relation 
to akrasia the other feature that Aristotle attributes to a character trait, 
namely that it is a moral notion. I discussed Aristotle’s view on the moral 
status of akrasia as a character trait in Chapter Five. Here, I consider a more 
fundamental question: why believe that the akratēs is susceptible to moral 
evaluation at all? More particularly, what grounds do we have to assume that 
the akratēs is morally responsible in relation to akrasia and that akrasia as a 
character trait is not instead a form of compulsion or automatic routine for 
which people are not commonly thought to be morally responsible?
 My aim here is not to develop a full theory of the moral responsibility 
of the akratēs but to present prospects for developing such a theory. The 
reason for this restriction is that I am first and foremost interested in the moral 
aspect of akrasia as a character trait and not in moral responsibility as such. I 
refrain from comparing different kinds of moral responsibility theories and 
from specifying details such as what exactly the akratēs is morally responsible 
for (for example, his akratic character, his akratic actions, or both). Rather, I 
wish to inquire into which feature(s) of the akratēs’ condition are likely to 
play a role in considerations about moral responsibility.
 The topic of moral responsibility and akrasia – whether or not it 
is further identified as a type of action or as a character trait – has received 
ample attention in the philosophical literature. The two concepts are tightly 
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connected. On the one hand, akrasia can be thought of as a touchstone of a 
sound theory of moral responsibility. A theory of moral responsibility that 
does not accommodate akrasia is arguably too narrow. On the other hand, 
moral responsibility is typically in some way part of the definition of akrasia. 
On an action approach, for example, this is often captured by stating that 
akratic actions are free.1 Akrasia is thus commonly defined as falling within the 
scope of moral responsibility. However, this does not yet make it intelligible 
why moral responsibility would pertain to akrasia. To safeguard the concept 
of akrasia from skeptics, the concern is therefore to find a criterion by which 
to distinguish akrasia from other types of actions or conditions – such as 
compulsion or addiction2 – in relation to which people are not commonly 
thought to be morally responsible.3
 I take as a point of departure a version of this concern that comes 
specifically with regarding akrasia as a character trait. This takes the form 
of the so-called ‘automaticity challenge’. The challenge arises because a 
person who acts from a character trait allegedly responds to trait-relevant 
situations in certain ways immediately. The question is, then, in what way 
character traits differ from mindless habits. If character traits turn out to be 
mere automatic routines that resemble the motions of arational animals or 
machines, it seems illegitimate to base attributions of moral responsibility on 
them. In order to resolve this issue and set character traits apart from other 
conditions, it is not uncommon to define them as, for example, intelligent 
conditions (John Doris 2002, 17) or conditions that are reasons-responsive 
(Kristján Kristjánsson 2010, 27). In view of such a ‘rational’ feature, character 
traits are eligible as grounds for moral responsibility. It is not immediately 
clear that an akratic condition can live up to this part of the definition of 
1  On an action approach, attention to moral responsibility usually does not stem 
from an interest in akrasia as a moral problem, though.
2  It is often assumed by philosophers that addiction is a form of  compulsion. 
Annemarie Kalis points out that psychologists, on the other hand, commonly think of  
addiction and compulsion as separate conditions (2011, 123-128). For a more detailed 
discussion of  addiction and compulsion, see Neil Levy (2010).
3  See for example the articles on recklessness, weakness, and compulsion by Gary 
Watson (1977), Jeanette Kennett (2001), and Michael Smith (2003).
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a character trait, however, as it is a paradigm example of irrationality. The 
automaticity challenge hence at the same time puts into question whether an 
akratic condition can qualify as a character trait and whether it is something 
in relation to which people can justifiably be held morally responsible.
 I therefore especially set out to explore whether it is plausible that 
an akratic condition can be sufficiently intelligent or reasons-responsive 
to serve as a ground for moral responsibility. First, I address Julia Annas’ 
attractive solution to the ‘automaticity challenge’ for virtue (7.2). She draws 
an analogy between virtue and a certain type of practical skill to show that 
virtue is not a mindless habit but is very much an intelligent condition. I 
argue that this ‘skill analogy’ is unfortunately not applicable to akrasia, but 
that it nonetheless reveals two preconditions for a theory of akrasia as an 
intelligent or reasons-responsive condition. Such a theory must be able to 
deal with both the typical disharmonic nature of akrasia and the kind of 
historical development that is likely to be involved in acquiring an akratic 
character. Secondly, I argue that the leading theory of moral responsibility 
in the contemporary literature – John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza’s 
account of moral responsibility – provides promising leads for meeting these 
two preconditions (7.3).
7.2 Annas’ skill analogy and akrasia
In her book Intelligent Virtue (2011), Julia Annas addresses the ‘automaticity 
challenge’ for virtue. The challenge is constituted by the fact that virtue is 
said to be the product of habituation, and the virtuous person supposedly 
acts in a virtuous way immediately. Annas argues that virtue is nonetheless 
an intelligent condition4 by showing that it is analogous to a certain type 
4  Annas actually uses the term ‘disposition’. She stresses, however, that ‘although it 
is natural for us to think of  a virtue as a disposition, we should be careful not to confuse this 
with the scientific notion of  a disposition, which just is a static lasting tendency’ (2011, 8). 
In order to avoid the connotation of  the scientific notion, I prefer the terms ‘condition’ or 
‘stable condition’ over the term ‘disposition’.
 Chapter Seven - Prospects for akrasia as a character trait and moral responsibility
158
of skill.5 The crux of her theory is that virtue comes about and functions in 
a similar way as practical skills that are all too familiar, such as playing the 
piano, building, or practicing a sport.
 Annas holds that, like a practical skill, virtue involves first of all the 
‘need to learn’. It is not something a person is simply born with but must 
instead be acquired through practice (although of course some people have 
more natural talent for certain practical skills or virtues than others). At first, 
learning a skill requires conscious thought. The novice piano player has to 
think explicitly about basics such as where to put his fingers, how to play a 
scale, and so on. He improves by doing it over and over again (2011, 13-14). 
Similarly, it takes repeated effort for a person to acquire virtue. He must learn 
to feel, think and act in appropriate ways, and this ‘requires time, experience, 
and habituation’ (2011, 14).
 Like expertise in a practical skill, virtue on Annas’ view also involves 
‘understanding what you do, self-directedness, and a drive to improve’ (2011, 
27). She calls this combination of elements the ‘drive to aspire’. Through 
constant and ongoing repetition, the expert pianist has acquired the skill 
of piano playing. He need not consciously think about how to play the 
piano anymore, but the result is not mere routine in the sense of mechanical 
repetition. The expert pianist can teach the skill to others and his play is 
flexible and innovative. Annas stresses that for the expert pianist ‘the result [of 
constant repetition] is not mindless routine but rather playing infused with 
and expressing the pianist’s thoughts about the piece’ (2011, 13-14). The 
virtuous person has mastered virtue in a similar way. He no longer needs to 
consciously think about how to respond to a situation. He does not simply 
copy a teacher or a role model but appropriately adapts his response to the 
situation. Moreover, he has come to understand why certain responses are 
appropriate, and he is able to articulate this, for example, in teaching others 
or when asked to. The virtuous person has acquired a condition ‘not just to 
act reliably in certain ways but to act reliably for certain reasons’ (2011, 27). 
Virtue is an intelligent condition because the virtuous person has learned 
5  The skill analogy originally stems from Aristotle. See Daniel Russell (2015) for 
a discussion of  Aristotle’s comparison between virtue and practical skills such as playing a 
musical instrument or building a house.
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through repetition to act immediately on reasons that he finds suitable.
 Annas argues that the skill analogy can be extended to vice as well 
(2015). She has an Aristotelian notion of vice in mind here. This entails that a 
vicious person acts as he thinks he should but is mistaken about which goals 
it is good to pursue. She acknowledges that whereas people become virtuous 
by striving to be virtuous (or, in any case, to be generous, just, and so on; Annas 
2011, 74), it is inconceivable that people would strive to become vicious 
(2015, 98). Nonetheless, she points out that it is possible to acquire a vicious 
character in the same way that virtue is learned: by gradually becoming 
better at what one is aiming for. For example, a vicious person may have 
learned ‘to make money in ways not guided or restrained by honesty’ (2015, 
103) and to be good at it. The skill analogy is thus applicable not only to 
the morally perfect character trait of virtue but also to the morally negative 
character trait of vice.
 Can the skill analogy also be used in relation to the morally negative 
character trait of akrasia? Note that the skill analogy works for virtue and 
vice insofar as these are character traits that have developed through learning 
how to act for reasons that a person finds suitable. It is unlikely that an akratic 
condition has this kind of past, though. Granted, it is possible that the sort 
of development captured by the skill analogy is part of the history of an 
akratēs. For example, what a person views as worthy of pursuit in the early 
stages of his career may differ from what he values later on. He may first 
enthusiastically and actively learn to act for certain reasons and only later 
come to prefer acting for other reasons. It is, however, improbable that this 
is how akrasia usually comes about. Virtue and vice on the one hand and 
akrasia on the other hand are importantly different. Virtue and vice – at least 
on an Aristotelian model – are both characterized by harmony between 
reason and (motivation for) action. Akrasia, on the other hand, typically 
involves disharmony between the reasons that a person judges it best to 
act on and the reasons or motivations that actually tend to influence his 
behavior. It is therefore much more likely that the history of an akratēs will 
be characterized precisely by a failure to learn to act for the reasons that he 
finds suitable. If this is correct, a conscious effort to achieve what one aspires 
to is not commonly part of developing an akratic condition. The akratēs 
can, of course, have aspirations, but this would be an aspiration to change his 
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behavior, not to reinforce it. Because of its typical disharmonic nature, then, 
it is implausible that akrasia has the kind of history that matches with the skill 
analogy.
 As it stands, the skill analogy cannot help to show that a condition 
like akrasia is sufficiently intelligent or reasons-responsive to serve as a basis 
for the attribution of moral responsibility.6 Nevertheless, the discussion of the 
skill analogy teaches us that a notion of akrasia as an intelligent or reasons-
responsive condition, and thus also an account of the moral responsibility of 
the akratēs, must meet two preconditions: a) it must be able to deal with the 
typical disharmonic nature of akrasia and b) it must be able to deal with the 
kind of history that likely comes with acquiring such a condition.
7.3  Fischer and Ravizza’s account and akrasia 
 as a reasons-responsive condition
With these two preconditions in hand, I now turn to John Martin Fischer 
and Mark Ravizza’s leading account of moral responsibility, as presented in 
their book Responsibility and Control (1998). I first present the main aspects of 
Fischer and Ravizza’s account of moral responsibility. I then show that their 
account offers promising leads for meeting the two preconditions described 
above.
 Fischer and Ravizza do not themselves provide an account of akrasia. 
However, their theory of moral responsibility can help us to understand the 
grounds on which akrasia can be seen as an intelligent or reasons-responsive 
condition. This is important, for as I pointed out in the introduction to this 
chapter, such a ‘rational feature’ can provide a promising basis for a sound 
theory of the moral responsibility of the akratēs.
 Fischer and Ravizza’s account is notable because it bases moral 
responsibility not on a principle of alternate possibilities but on ‘guidance 
control’. This means that, according to their view, a person need not have 
6  Annas’ skill analogy does not seem to cover the development of  all virtuous and 
vicious character traits either. See, for example, Nancy Snow (2016) for a discussion of  two 
other ways in which virtue – or at least states that are very near to virtue – might develop.
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control in the sense of being able to do otherwise at the actual moment in 
order to be morally responsible for an action (or omission, consequence, and 
so on). With the help of what they call ‘Frankfurt-type examples’7, Fischer 
and Ravizza illustrate that guidance control is the relevant sort of control 
for moral responsibility. Consider Sally, who is taking driving lessons and 
is directing her car to the right as instructed. Had she not turned her car to 
the right, her driving instructor would have steered the car in that direction 
anyway. In the actual situation, however, there is no such intervention. The 
point is that even though Sally lacks the power to do differently, she guides 
the car to the right herself. Fischer and Ravizza conclude that Sally is morally 
responsible for steering the car to the right precisely because she herself 
guides her performance.
 Fischer and Ravizza’s concept of guidance control rests on two pillars. 
The idea is that a person has guidance control (that is, is morally responsible) 
when the mechanism8 that leads to, for example, an action is a) moderately 
reasons-responsive and b) the agent’s own. These two pillars, so I argue, fit 
nicely with the two above-mentioned preconditions that a notion of akrasia 
as an intelligent or reasons-responsive condition, and thus also an account of 
the moral responsibility of the akratēs, must meet.
 7.3.1 Moderate reasons-responsiveness and 
  the disharmonic nature of akrasia
Reasons-responsiveness is the first of two key aspects of Fischer and 
Ravizza’s account of moral responsibility. Their view on this notion offers a 
way to meet the first precondition, which concerns the disharmonic nature 
7  Fischer and Ravizza name this type of  example after Harry Frankfurt, who 
introduced them into the contemporary literature on moral responsibility.
8  It is difficult to avoid talking of  mechanisms in relation to Fischer and Ravizza’s view, 
as they conceive of  their account as a ‘mechanism-based’ approach to moral responsibility. 
At the same time they are not all too attached to the term ‘mechanism’. They write that we 
could also talk of  ‘the process that leads to the action’ or ‘the way the action comes about’ 
(1998, 38). Examples of  mechanisms are practical reason, habits and traits.
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of akrasia. Let me point out that this part of their account not only fits a 
character approach to akrasia but is of equal interest to an action approach. 
Whether akratic actions are considered as single and isolated cases or as part 
of a pattern, the disharmony between better judgment and action forms a 
vital part (note, though, that on a character approach this disharmony can be 
seen as a mere symptom of an underlying condition). The main thing that 
I want to point out in this section is that the two components of Fischer 
and Ravizza’s notion of moderate reasons-responsiveness – regular reasons-
receptivity and weak reasons-reactivity – map well onto the two sides that 
constitute the characteristic disharmonic nature of akrasia.
 Fischer and Ravizza consider three different forms of reasons-
responsiveness: strong, weak, and moderate. They settle on the last option and, 
interestingly, one of the reasons for this is that moderate reasons-responsiveness 
does not exclude akrasia. Fischer and Ravizza start by discussing strong reasons-
responsiveness and write that it entails ‘a tight fit between the reasons there 
are and the reasons the agent has, the agent’s reasons and his choice, and his 
choice and action’ (1998, 42). As I discussed in Chapter Two, presupposing 
such a strong connection between reason, choice/motivation, and action 
rules out akrasia. Fischer and Ravizza see this too. They use akrasia as one 
of the touchstones of a sound theory of moral responsibility – in this case, 
in particular, of the element of reasons-responsiveness. The notion of strong 
reasons-responsiveness excludes akrasia, and Fischer and Ravizza reject this 
strong notion as a suitable component of a theory of moral responsibility in 
part because of this (1998, 42 and 68).
 Secondly, Fischer and Ravizza turn to a weak notion of reasons-
responsiveness. They maintain that this notion simply requires ‘that there 
exist some possible scenario (or possible world) in which there is a sufficient 
reason to do otherwise, the agent recognizes this reason, and the agent 
does otherwise’ (1998, 44). They hold that this description of reasons-
responsiveness is already fruitful, and I will return to it. Moreover, they point 
out that it properly ascribes moral responsibility in relation to akrasia. The 
problem with the weak notion, however, is that it ‘becomes so loose that it 
also ascribes responsibility to agents who act on mechanisms that respond 
only in unusual or incoherent ways’ (1998, 68). For example, on a notion of 
weak reasons-responsiveness we can hold someone responsible who judges 
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that a thousand dollars for a ticket to a basketball game is too expensive but 
two thousand dollars is not. Clearly, a person who responds coherently would 
conclude that two thousand dollars is in this case also too expensive. Hence, 
we may wonder whether the person in the example is sufficiently capable of 
responding in a coherent way, such that we can ascribe moral responsibility 
to him. In response to this problem, Fischer and Ravizza conclude not that 
what is formulated in the description of weak reasons-responsiveness is false, 
but that a notion of reasons-responsiveness that is adequate for a theory of 
moral responsibility requires something in addition.
 This prompts Fischer and Ravizza to develop a moderate notion 
of reasons-responsiveness that consists of two components: ‘regular reasons-
receptivity’ and ‘weak reasons-reactivity’ (1998, 82). Basically, the latter 
component corresponds to their earlier description of weak reasons-
responsiveness, and the first component can be considered additional. It is in 
virtue of this distinction, as I show in a moment, that Fischer and Ravizza’s 
account can deal well with the disharmonic nature of akrasia. They do not 
explicitly observe this themselves. As noted above, they refer to akrasia as a 
touchstone of their account. They do not ask what the account can in turn 
teach us about the grounds of moral responsibility in relation to akrasia. The 
division between regular reasons-receptivity and weak reasons-reactivity can 
shed light, however, on how moral responsibility can go together with the 
disharmonic nature of akrasia.
 By reasons-receptivity, Fischer and Ravizza mean ‘the capacity to 
recognize the reasons that exist’ (1998, 69). They hold that moral responsibility 
demands regular reasons-receptivity, where ‘regular’ is to be understood along 
the lines of orderliness or regularity (1998, 71, n.12). They state that regular 
reasons-receptivity ‘requires a pattern of actual and hypothetical recognition 
of reasons that is understandable and minimally grounded in reality’ (1998, 
76). If someone finds a thousand dollars for a ticket to a basketball game 
too expensive, one would expect him to also find two thousand dollars too 
much. In other words, the reasons for action that a person acknowledges 
must be intelligible.
 By reasons-reactivity, Fischer and Ravizza mean ‘the capacity to 
translate reasons into choices (and then subsequent behavior)’ (1998, 69). They 
argue, though, that moral responsibility requires only weak reasons-reactivity. 
 Chapter Seven - Prospects for akrasia as a character trait and moral responsibility
164
According to them, a mechanism need not actually react to reason in order 
for a person to be morally responsible for it, as long as the mechanism has the 
general capacity to do so. We already briefly encountered this idea in Fischer 
and Ravizza’s description of weak reasons-responsiveness. In the context 
of the moderate notion, they further describe their view on weak reasons-
reactivity as follows:
Our contention […] is that a mechanism’s reacting differently to a sufficient 
reason to do otherwise in some other possible world shows that the same kind of 
mechanism can react differently to the actual reason to do otherwise. This general 
capacity of the agent’s actual-sequence mechanism – and not the agent’s power to 
do otherwise – is what helps to ground moral responsibility. (1998, 73)
In other words, if there is at least one possible scenario in which a person 
would react to a reason that he sees as a sufficient reason to do otherwise, 
this shows the mechanism to be weakly reasons-reactive.9 According to 
Fischer and Ravizza, for example, the fact that a person in an alternative 
scenario would react to the reason not to buy a chocolate bar because it 
is too expensive indicates that the operating mechanism has the general 
capacity to react in the actual situation to this person’s reason not to buy the 
chocolate bar because he judges it best to eat snacks that contain less sugar.
 What is striking is that the division between regular reasons-
receptivity and weak reasons-reactivity relates to the different sides of akrasia. 
Regular reasons-receptivity relates to the judgment side of akrasia. Someone 
who fails to abide by his judgment may in principle also err in identifying 
the best reasons for action, but this is not what the akratēs is commonly 
criticized for. The process of judgment formation typically functions just 
fine in the case of this type of person. To the extent that the akratēs indeed 
forms sound judgments, the mechanism that leads to his typical behavior can 
be considered regularly reasons-receptive.
 
9  Note that this does not require that a person actually be able to do otherwise in the 
given situation. The possible scenario need not be genuinely open to a person at the actual 
moment. It rather functions as an epistemic condition for learning whether the operating 
mechanism has the general capacity to react to any incentive to do otherwise (cf. 1998, 45).
165
Weak reasons-reactivity relates to the motivation/action-side of akrasia. 
Fischer and Ravizza in fact provide an example to illustrate how akrasia 
(or to be more precise, the mechanism that leads to akratic behavior) can 
be weakly reasons-reactive. They introduce us to Jennifer10, who attends a 
basketball game despite of judging it best to stay at home and work on a 
paper with an oncoming publication deadline. Fischer and Ravizza state 
that ‘[e]ven though Jennifer is disposed11 to be weak-willed under some 
circumstances [as in the example], there are other circumstances in which she 
would respond appropriately to sufficient reasons’ (1998, 45). According to 
Fischer and Ravizza, there is at least one possible scenario in which Jennifer 
would refrain from going to the basketball game and instead work on her 
manuscript. They suggest that if ‘Jennifer is told that she will have to pay one 
thousand dollars for a ticket to the game […], she presumably would not go 
to the game’ (1998, 45). Fischer and Ravizza hold that the fact that there is 
a possible scenario in which Jennifer reacts to a reason that she considers a 
sufficient reason to do otherwise indicates that the operating mechanism has 
the general capacity to react to the actual reason to do otherwise. Hence, they 
maintain that the mechanism leading to Jennifer’s akratic behavior is weakly 
reasons-reactive.
 It is helpful that Fischer and Ravizza explicitly mention akrasia in 
the context of weak reasons-reactivity, but the Jennifer example also raises 
important questions. First of all, just how representative is the example? Does 
it show that in all instances of akrasia the operating mechanism is weakly 
reasons-reactive? The structure of Jennifer’s case is quite conventional, and 
it is formulated broadly enough to possibly include both strict and non-
10  Fischer and Ravizza actually talk about Jennifer in relation to weak reasons-
responsiveness. As I mentioned above, however, in the context of  moderate reasons-
responsiveness the description of  weak reasons-responsiveness is pretty much replaced by 
the component of  weak reasons-reactivity, so the example of  Jennifer is relevant in relation 
to weak reason-reactivity as well.
11  I suspect that by ‘disposed’ Fischer and Ravizza mean that akrasia is a dispositional 
or modal property of  Jennifer (cf. 1998, 53). They do not further explain whether they prefer 
to regard akrasia as a single and isolated type of  action, a character trait, or both.
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strict versions of akratic behavior.12 However, this does not guarantee that, 
as in Jennifer’s case, for every instance of akrasia there is at least one other 
relevant possible scenario. Another option, and I believe this is rather what 
Fischer and Ravizza have in mind, is to consider this element essential to 
akrasia.13 On their account, the criterion of whether or not there is at least 
one possible scenario in which a person would react to a sufficient reason 
to do otherwise is one of the criteria that help demarcate akrasia from other 
types of actions or conditions for which people cannot justifiably be held 
morally responsible.
 This brings me to a second issue that the Jennifer example brings 
to the fore: under what conditions is a possible scenario a relevant possible 
scenario? I am not sure, for example, why Fischer and Ravizza consider 
relevant the other possible scenario they describe in relation to Jennifer. For 
the factor that would bring Jennifer in the possible scenario to refrain from 
attending the basketball game has nothing to do with her judgment that 
it is best not to go because she needs to work at home on an important 
manuscript. In the possible scenario, she would stay at home because the 
tickets are too expensive. Unfortunately, Fischer and Ravizza remain quite 
vague about what counts as a relevant possible scenario and why.
 Fischer and Ravizza do provide some further information about 
what a possible scenario must have in common with the actual situation in 
order to be relevant for establishing weak reasons-reactivity. First of all, it is 
clear that on their account the possible scenario does not share all the details 
with the actual situation. Secondly, the world in which the possible scenario 
takes place must have the same natural laws as the actual world (1998, 44). 
Thirdly, Fischer and Ravizza state that in the possible scenario ‘the same kind 
of mechanism’ must operate as in the actual situation (1998, 51-52). This 
seems to be all that is required of the possible scenario as far as Fischer and 
12  That is, it could cover both cases in which Jennifer clearly has in mind her better 
judgment that it is best to stay at home and work on the manuscript and cases in which she 
does not.
13  Recall that moral responsibility is often in some way part of  the definition of  
akrasia. Fischer and Ravizza’s account helps to make it intelligible in virtue of  what feature 
moral responsibility could possibly pertain to akrasia.
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Ravizza are concerned, though, for they maintain that even the incentive to 
do otherwise and the particular details of the mechanism may differ from the 
actual situation (1998, 52).
 Fischer and Ravizza do not clarify why it is sufficient that the 
possible scenario has the same kind of mechanism in common with the 
actual situation. Why must the incentive to do otherwise not be the same 
as well, for example?14 Furthermore, they admit that they ‘do not have any 
general way of specifying when two kinds of mechanisms are the same’ 
(1998, 40).
 For a full theory of the moral responsibility of the akratēs, we 
would need to develop this issue about possible scenarios in more detail, 
but I shall let it rest for now. What is most important for my purposes is that 
the two components of Fischer and Ravizza’s notion of moderate reasons-
responsiveness – regular reasons-receptivity and weak reasons-reactivity – 
map well onto the two sides that constitute the characteristic disharmonic 
nature of akrasia. Fischer and Ravizza’s notion of moderate reasons-
responsiveness is therefore a promising component of an account of the 
moral responsibility of the akratēs. It offers interesting leads for dealing with 
the first precondition – that is, the precondition concerning the disharmonic 
nature of akrasia that, so I argued, a notion of akrasia as an intelligent or 
reasons-responsive condition must meet.
 7.3.2 Moral responsibility, history, and akrasia
Recall that I formulated a second precondition that a notion of akrasia as 
an intelligent or reasons-responsive condition, and thus also an account of 
the moral responsibility of the akratēs, must meet: doing justice to the kind 
of history that is likely involved in acquiring an akratic condition. The need 
14  Also, we may wish to exclude as relevant possible scenarios that are extreme. We 
could, for example, incorporate Gary Watson’s idea that akrasia is relative to some sort of  
standard of  normal self-control, whereas a condition like compulsion, for which a person 
cannot justifiably be held morally responsible, falls outside the scope of  what is considered 
normal human conduct (1977). Jörn Müller (2014) discusses a similar idea.
 Chapter Seven - Prospects for akrasia as a character trait and moral responsibility
168
for this second precondition is reflected in Fischer and Ravizza’s account. 
They hold that for moral responsibility it is not enough that the relevant 
mechanism be moderately reasons-responsive. They emphasize that it must 
also be the agent’s own. Fischer and Ravizza state in this context that moral 
responsibility is an ‘essentially historical notion’ (1998, 170). They claim that 
moral responsibility cannot be read off a person’s ‘snapshot properties’ (1998, 
187) but instead depends on the obtaining of certain facts in the past. For 
example, someone lacks moral responsibility for an action (or consequence, 
omission, and so on) if it is the product of hypnosis or an unwilling surgery 
by an evil neurologist.
 This part of Fischer and Ravizza’s account is therefore better suited 
to a character approach to akrasia than an action approach, despite the fact 
that in Responsibility and Control Fischer and Ravizza pay more attention 
to single actions than to trait actions. As I discussed in Chapter Three, in 
an action approach, with its focus on strict akratic actions, considerations 
of time are irrelevant. Authors who take an action approach to akrasia are 
mainly interested in whether or not a person has his better judgment clearly 
in mind at the moment of action, and they thereby zoom in precisely on the 
snapshot properties of the action. A character approach, however, naturally 
comes with an interest in how akratic actions came to be instantiated. As 
a character trait, akrasia has a certain historical development and manifests 
itself across time. This resonates with Fischer and Ravizza’s view on what 
makes a mechanism the agent’s own.
 Fischer and Ravizza hold that for a mechanism to be the agent’s own 
there must be some sort of process of taking responsibility for the mechanism 
(1998, 200 and 207). In general, taking responsibility involves a person’s 
‘recognizing his agency and accepting that he is an apt target for the reactive 
attitudes on the basis of exercising that agency’ (1998, 214).15 In particular, 
‘an agent takes responsibility for acting from a particular kind of mechanism’ 
(1998, 215; emphasis removed). Behavior may spring from different sources, 
15  Fischer and Ravizza borrow the term ‘reactive attitudes’ from Peter Strawson. This 
term captures the idea that ‘when we regard someone as a responsible agent, we react to 
the person with a unique set of  feelings and attitudes – for example, gratitude, indignation, 
resentment, love, respect, and forgiveness’ (1998, 5).
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such as practical reason or nonreflective mechanisms. A mechanism is the 
agent’s own if he takes responsibility for that which issues from it.16 
 Note that the statement that someone is morally responsible if he 
sees himself as morally responsible involves a form of circular reasoning. 
But I believe this is remedied to a certain extent, first of all, by the fact 
that the subjective element of taking responsibility can only establish moral 
responsibility in combination with the more objective element of moderate 
reasons-responsiveness. Fischer and Ravizza observe that the element of 
taking responsibility is an important addition, though, because experiencing 
oneself as being in control is required for actually being in control. Otherwise, 
so they observe, a person would be ‘like a sailor who does not believe his 
rudder is working; he allows the boat to be buffeted by strong winds’ (1998, 
221). Secondly, Fischer and Ravizza stress that it is not usually an attractive 
option to evade taking responsibility: ‘Agents who genuinely fail to take 
responsibility – and thus view themselves as lacking control – are legitimately 
sequestered from society, and are deprived of the opportunity to participate 
in the moral community’ (1998, 229; see also 217-219). As Fischer and 
Ravizza conceive of it, the element of taking responsibility therefore does 
not appear to be redundant.
 The question is, then, whether the history of the akratēs involves 
a process of taking responsibility for the mechanism that leads to his 
typical judgment-violating behavior. Fischer and Ravizza do not address 
this, but I believe the answer is affirmative. Let me start by observing that 
mindless habituation does seem to play an important role in developing an 
akratic condition. In particular, as far as the akratēs’ behavioral tendencies 
and motivational preferences are concerned, he probably did not have 
much conscious influence on the way these turned out, especially if they 
developed when he was only a child. The tragedy is, as I pointed out in the 
previous chapter, that by the age at which the akratēs comes to disapprove 
of his behavior, (some of) his behavioral and motivational patterns are likely 
to have already firmly taken shape. However, mindless habituation cannot 
16  The agent need not take responsibility explicitly. Fischer and Ravizza point out 
that a person can have some sort of  ‘standing policy’ with respect to a mechanism (1998, 
216).
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constitute the whole story of how an akratic condition develops.
 Akrasia requires at least some amount of reflection. Not every akratēs 
might reflect very deeply on his behavior, and certainly not all the time. To 
qualify as an akratēs, however, it is not enough to have certain behavioral and 
motivational tendencies. It is not even sufficient that these tendencies conflict 
with a person’s better judgment. An akratēs is at least at some point also aware 
of this conflict. The reflective element constitutes his akratic condition. It is 
due to his knowledge of the judgment-violation that he disapproves of his 
behavior. The akratēs thus reflects on his behavior at least insofar as he notices 
the discrepancy with his better judgment.
 I propose that it is in virtue of this reflective element that the akratēs 
can be said to take responsibility for the akratic behavior that issues from 
his character. The key is that the akratēs has a particular view of himself. 
The behavioral tendencies that are typical of his character manifest across 
time, and, as should be clear by now, the akratēs typically disapproves of his 
behavior. It is also not uncommon for this to be accompanied by feelings 
of regret or shame. In Fischer and Ravizza’s terms, we could say that the 
akratēs has a negative reactive attitude towards himself. This implies that he 
would consider others justified in also having this or related reactive attitudes 
towards his character and the behavior that tends to flow from it. If he were 
not to find this justified, this would raise doubts about the sincerity of his 
attitude of disapproval, and thus about whether he truly is an akratēs and not 
instead a vicious person.17 The akratēs therefore takes responsibility for the 
relevant mechanism (that is, he makes it his own) by means of noticing his 
typical judgment-violating behavior and disapproving of it.
 With their account of what makes a mechanism the agent’s own, 
Fischer and Ravizza offer a lead for meeting the second precondition for a 
theory of akrasia as an intelligent or reasons-responsive condition. It brings 
to the fore the crucial role of the reflective element in the development 
of an akratic condition. Unlike the virtuous and the vicious person, it is 
implausible that the akratēs’ condition has come about by learning to act for 
reasons he finds suitable. Rather, the akratēs’ condition only fully takes shape 
17  Again, I have an Aristotelian notion of  vice in mind here, in which the vicious 
person is mistaken about what appropriate reasons for action are.
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when he notices and comes to disapprove of his motivational and behavioral 
tendencies. Through this kind of process or historical development, he can 
be said to take responsibility for his akratic behavior. It follows from Fischer 
and Ravizza’s account that the relevant mechanism is the akratēs’ own. 
Their account thus provides a way to incorporate the kind of history that is 
likely involved in acquiring an akratic condition into a theory of the moral 
responsibility of the akratēs.
7.4 Conclusion
Do we now have the means to face the automaticity challenge to akrasia as a 
character trait? Recall that if akrasia turns out to be (just) a mindless habit or 
mechanical routine, the worry is that we cannot ascribe moral responsibility 
to the akratēs, and it is doubtful whether akrasia can qualify as a character 
trait.
 Julia Annas tries to tackle the automaticity challenge to virtue and 
vice with the help of the skill analogy. I have shown that this does not work 
for akrasia, however. The discussion of Annas’ work did bring to the fore two 
preconditions that a notion of akrasia as an intelligent or reasons-responsive 
condition, and thus also an account of the moral responsibility of the akratēs, 
must meet: it must be able to deal with the disharmonic nature that is typical 
of an akratic condition and with the kind of historical development that is 
likely to come with it.
 Fischer and Ravizza’s account of moral responsibility offers leads for 
meeting these two preconditions. For one, their notion of moderate reasons-
responsiveness consists of two components – regular reasons-receptivity 
and weak reasons-reactivity – that can accommodate the two sides of the 
disharmonic nature of akrasia. For a full theory of the moral responsibility of 
the akratēs, however, the reference to possible scenarios in the component 
of weak reasons-reactivity needs further specification. Secondly, Fischer and 
Ravizza’s view on what makes a mechanism the agent’s own matches well 
with the plausible historical development of the akratēs. It highlights that by 
reflecting on and disapproving of his behavior, the akratēs takes responsibility 
for it. Fischer and Ravizza’s account thus provides a promising basis for a 
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theory of akrasia as a reasons-responsive condition in relation to which the 
akratēs can justifiably be held morally responsible.
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The main aim of this dissertation was to reintroduce a character approach to 
akrasia. Is it beneficial to regard akrasia primarily as a character trait? What 
can a fruitful character account of akrasia look like? What are its advantages 
and challenges?
 I concluded in Chapter Three that there are several advantages 
to approaching akrasia primarily as a character trait over the common 
contemporary approach of regarding it as a type of single and isolated action. 
A character approach takes an inherent interest in the repetitive nature and 
the moral status of akrasia, and it can take on board all forms of action that 
are naturally described as failures to abide by one’s better judgment, strict and 
non-strict cases alike. Furthermore, unlike an action approach, a character 
approach need not concern itself with the logical puzzle of how strict akratic 
action is possible. Instead, it can focus on the underlying condition of the 
character trait as such and on non-strict akratic action. It can thereby safely 
stay away from the discussion on the logical puzzle, which currently seems 
to have reached an impasse. In the remainder of the dissertation, I have tried 
to show – building on Aristotle’s work – what a character account of akrasia 
might look like and how further challenges can be met.
 A first main theme concerned akrasia as a stable and long-lasting 
character trait. It is natural for a character approach to regard akrasia as a 
condition that can manifest itself in repeated akratic action. However, this also 
raises a challenge for a character approach. I addressed the question of how 
we might understand the akratēs’ failure to improve his behavior despite the 
fact that, by his own standards, he should exercise more self-control. Inspired 
by Aristotle’s work, I suggested that the disharmony between reason and 
8. CONCLUSION
174
affect (or the conflict between better judgment and competing motivation) 
that is characteristic of akratic action is likely not constantly present. This 
implies that there are moments in between akratic actions in which an 
akratēs is not urged to change his behavior, or not reminded of the need 
to do so. Furthermore, social and political structures can also contribute to 
keeping a person’s akratic habits in place. As a consequence, it appears that it 
is hard for an akratēs to change his character.
 A second main theme of the dissertation was the moral status of 
akrasia as a character trait. I related a character trait to a person’s morally 
relevant patterns of feeling, thinking and acting, such as his core commitments, 
aspirations and ideals. This raises questions, first of all, about the factors that 
can play a role when we blame someone for being disposed to violate his 
better judgment. Aristotle, for example, in his evaluation of akrasia takes into 
consideration morally relevant factors such as the kinds of objects over which 
the akratēs lacks control and how strong a judgment-competing motivation it 
takes for the akratēs to give in. Secondly, I discussed the grounds on which the 
akratēs is susceptible to moral evaluation. I argued that John Martin Fischer 
and Mark Ravizza’s account of moral responsibility provides promising leads 
in this respect. Their account of moral responsibility can do justice to the 
disharmonic nature of akrasia and the likely historical development of the 
akratēs. It is plausible that the akratēs can be held morally responsible in part 
because he reflects on and disapproves of his akratic behavior.
 I have thus shown that it is fruitful to regard akrasia primarily as 
a character trait. This character approach is of relevance to anyone who is 
in some way concerned with akrasia, character, or character development. 
However, I have not exhausted all that there is to say about akrasia as a 
character trait. 
 For one, there may be much to gain by looking into empirical 
research in relation to akrasia as a character trait. I have deliberately not 
engaged much with the empirical literature because I wanted to focus on 
philosophical analysis of the character trait. With a better conceptual grasp 
of akrasia as a character trait in hand, however, it is also easier to know what 
to look for in the empirical literature. To which spheres does akrasia most 
commonly pertain? Does the underlying condition of the akratēs typically 
involve a lasting cognitive deficit, a motivational deficit, or both? How can 
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an akratēs best try to improve his character? What is the influence of social 
and political structures on people with an akratic character? (With all of 
these questions, it would be helpful to have more relevant empirical studies 
that follow the same individuals over a long period of time.)
 Secondly, it would be valuable to study akrasia as a character trait 
in relation to different branches of virtue ethics or other frameworks of 
character. What consequences do different varieties of virtue ethics – such 
as Platonic, Stoic, Confucian, Thomistic, Nietzschean, and neo-Aristotelian 
– have for a character approach to akrasia? And, conversely, what light does 
a focus on akrasia as a character trait shed on different theories concerning 
character? When character is the topic of discussion, virtue is usually central 
(sometimes along with vice). It might bring with it new perspectives on 
virtue ethics, however, if we take seriously the idea that a more intermediate 
condition such as akrasia qualifies as a character trait as well.
 Thirdly, it would be intriguing to pay attention to the will in the 
discussion on akrasia as a character trait. Although akrasia is often translated 
into English as weakness of will, the will hardly plays a role in the relevant 
contemporary literature. In ancient Greek literature, including Aristotle’s 
work, a fully developed concept of the will is likewise absent. As Jeanne-
Pierre Vernant and Pierre Vidal-Naquet write: ‘…we might say that one does 
indeed find choice and responsibility based on intention in a Greek such as 
Aristotle but what is lacking, precisely, is will’ (1981, 46). In its most extreme 
form, the will is understood as a faculty that can make decisions in an entirely 
autonomous way, completely detached from beliefs and desires. On such a 
conception of the will, akratic action is – as with motivational externalism 
– no more mysterious than other types of actions, and therefore not of any 
particular interest. As Jörn Müller (2009) discusses, however, there are plenty 
of medieval philosophers with a nuanced concept of the will and an interest 
in akrasia as a character trait (or as some form of stable human condition). 
It would be fascinating to look into these accounts more closely from the 
perspective of a character approach to akrasia. For one thing, it could be 
productive to compare more traditional concepts of the will to related terms 
in the contemporary literature on akratic action, such as Richard Holton’s 
notion of willpower. I am thinking in particular, however, of the context 
of sin and evil that medieval discussions of the will and akrasia bring with 
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them. The context of the will opens up the possibility that an akratēs could 
act not just on a desire for the lesser good but on truly evil or base motives, 
which might bear on matters of moral evaluation and prospects for moral 
development.
 Hence, plenty of interesting research opportunities concerning 
a character approach to akrasia remain. I made a start with what I hope 
will prove to be a new way of approaching akrasia in the contemporary 
literature. I have shown that pursuing this line of research and regarding 




The main aim of this dissertation is to reintroduce a character approach 
to akrasia into the philosophical debate. In Chapter One, I explain that the 
contemporary literature on akrasia is almost exclusively preoccupied with 
the logical puzzle of how a single and isolated akratic action is possible. This 
dissertation is deliberately not meant as a contribution to solving this logical 
puzzle. Although it is an interesting philosophical problem, it fails to address 
a very significant issue: people can, and typically do, act against their better 
judgment repeatedly. Akrasia especially poses a problem in everyday life when 
it is recurrent. In this dissertation, I therefore focus on akrasia as a character 
trait. What might a fruitful character account of akrasia look like? What are 
the advantages and the challenges of such an account? Building on the work 
of Aristotle, I show that it is fruitful to approach akrasia as a character trait.
 In Chapter Two, I address the main positions in contemporary 
discussions about the logical puzzle of how strict akratic action is possible. 
The logical puzzle is constituted by the fact that there intuitively seems to 
be a strong link between evaluation and action (via motivation), yet the 
experience of strict akratic action – in which better judgment and action 
clearly come apart – seems real enough as well. There are three types of 
strategies for solving the logical puzzle, which I illustrate focusing on the 
accounts of Richard Hare, Donald Davidson and Alfred Mele: (1) denying 
the possibility of strict akratic action, (2) distinguishing between (processes 
leading to) a judgment that warrants action and (processes leading to) a 
judgment that a person violates in acting akratically, and (3) denying that 
there is a necessary connection between better judgment, motivation, and 
action. Each of these strategies faces a difficulty, however, that is inherent 
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to the strategy itself. The first strategy does not truly take the experience 
of strict akratic action seriously. With regard to the second strategy, the 
question arises of whether it is really impossible to act against the kind of 
judgment that supposedly warrants action. And the third strategy, although it 
can make room for the possibility of strict akratic action, renders the precise 
relation between better judgment, motivation, and action unintelligible. All 
three strategies therefore face an inherent problem that seems impossible to 
overcome entirely.
 In Chapter Three, I present several advantages of approaching akrasia 
primarily as a character trait over the common contemporary approach of 
regarding it as a type of single and isolated action. I argue that a character 
approach can do justice to akrasia as it is of most concern in everyday life 
because it takes an inherent interest in the repetitive nature and the moral 
status of akrasia. Moreover, because it is necessarily stretched out over time, a 
notion of akrasia as a character trait can take on board all forms of action that 
are naturally described as failures to abide by one’s better judgment. These 
include not only strict cases but also non-strict cases such as procrastination, 
temporary judgment shifts, and akrasia through self-deception or 
rationalization. Furthermore, this fact also allows the character approach to 
remain agnostic about the logical puzzle. It has the option of focusing on the 
stable condition of akrasia as such and on non-strict akratic actions. Further, 
I argue that philosophical situationism – the position that denies that broad 
character traits are widespread – does not pose a threat to my project about 
akrasia as a character trait. With the help of arguments by Tom Bates and 
Pauline Kleingeld, I show that akrasia as a character trait is compatible with 
the kind of empirical evidence referred to by the situationists.
 To explore the details of what a fruitful character account of akrasia 
might look like, I turn to Aristotle’s rich account of akrasia as a character 
trait. According to him, a character trait is 1) stable and long-lasting and 2) a 
moral notion. These two features provide an outline for his entire discussion 
of akrasia as a character trait: after introducing the topic and the issues that it 
raises in Nicomachean Ethics (NE) Book VII.1-2, he addresses the symptoms 
through which the stable character trait of akrasia reveals itself in the famous 
passage on akratic action in NE VII.3 and the moral status of akrasia in NE 
VII.4-10.
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In Chapter Four, I discuss Aristotle’s view on akrasia as a stable and long-
lasting character trait. On Aristotle’s view, the bad aspect of this character trait 
– the characteristic disharmony between reason and affect – is only present 
in its temporary and occasional symptoms – that is, akratic actions. I present 
an interpretation of Aristotle’s account in which he distinguishes two kinds 
of symptoms of akrasia, a non-strict and a strict form (these two forms can 
be associated with his notions of impulsiveness and weakness, respectively). 
These symptoms are the manifestations of the underlying, stable and long-
lasting condition of akrasia. This stable condition may involve a lasting 
cognitive deficit, but I argue that the akratēs on Aristotle’s account in any 
case suffers from a permanently overly weak rational desire.
 In Chapter Five, I address Aristotle’s ideas on akrasia as a moral notion. 
On his account, character traits make a person well- or ill-disposed in light 
of how strongly they follow or violate a more general criterion of rationality 
for evaluating character traits. In NE VII.4-10, Aristotle draws up a moral 
hierarchy of character traits. He compares akrasia to various other character 
traits, such as virtue and vice, but also enkrateia (self-control) and softness. 
This brings to light, first of all, where Aristotle situates akrasia in the moral 
hierarchy of character traits. Vice is the worst, followed by akrasia. Secondly, 
it reveals which features he deems relevant for morally evaluating the akratēs. 
On Aristotle’s view, morally relevant and demarcating factors coincide. As a 
consequence, for instance, he restricts the sphere of akrasia to food, drink and 
sex. The complete list of morally relevant factors that Aristotle distinguishes 
in NE VII.4-10 is as follows: 1) how strongly (or rather weakly) the akratēs’ 
rational desire has been cultivated, and consequently whether there can be 
a direct or only an indirect confrontation between reason and appetite, 2) 
whether reason is healthy, corrupt or absent, 3) how (un)natural it is for 
a human being to desire the objects of affect, 4) whether the objects are 
pursued because of seeking pleasure or avoiding pain, and 5) whether the 
lack of control is due to appetite or to thumos – or, in other words, whether 
it involves acting against knowledge that one has or could in principle have 
or whether it instead involves acting on incomplete knowledge.
 In the final two chapters, I follow the division between the topics of 
the stability and the moral status of akrasia as a character trait and explore 
further challenges. In Chapter Six, I address how we can understand, on 
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conceptual grounds, how akrasia can remain a stable state. How is it possible 
for akrasia not to develop into self-control or, alternatively to degrade into 
vice? I engage with the work of contemporary character educationists. 
Their work suggests the image of akrasia as a stage in the development of 
character. There is indeed reason to believe that internal conflict, regret and 
self-knowledge will urge the akratēs towards self-control or, alternatively, 
towards vice. Nevertheless, it seems plausible for conceptual reasons that 
akrasia can be a stable and long-lasting character trait. Akratic habits may 
account for this to some extent, but how can these habits themselves remain 
fixed? Internal conflict and regret are distinguishing features of akrasia, 
but these features may not be constantly present. In the absence of the 
uncomfortable and painful experience that they cause, an akratēs can easily 
get away with an intention to do better next time without immediately 
taking precautions to prevent future akratic action. Furthermore, Amélie 
Rorty argues that akrasia can have social and political sources. This might 
explain why knowledge of one’s akratic character can fail to induce change, 
for if Rorty is right, improving one’s character requires changing not only 
personal but also societal structures.
 Finally, in Chapter Seven, I consider the basis on which akrasia can 
be thought of as a moral notion. The main worry is that repetitive akratic 
behavior turns out to be (just) a mindless habit. This would imply a) that we 
cannot ascribe moral responsibility to the akratēs, and b) that it is doubtful 
whether akrasia can qualify as a character trait given that it is common to 
define a character trait as an intelligent or reasons-responsive condition. I 
do not develop a full theory of the moral responsibility of the akratēs, but 
I discuss the aspects of the akratēs’ condition that are likely to play a role in 
considerations about moral responsibility. I first discuss Julia Annas’ view on 
what makes virtue an intelligent condition, and I then go on to explain why 
it does not apply to akrasia. It does, however, reveal that a notion of akrasia 
as an intelligent or reasons-responsive condition, and thus also an account 
of the moral responsibility of the akratēs, must meet two preconditions: a) it 
must be able to deal with the typical disharmonic nature of akrasia, and b) it 
must be able to deal with the kind of history that likely comes with acquiring 
such a condition. I argue that John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza’s 
account of moral responsibility offers promising leads for meeting these two 
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preconditions. First of all, their notion of moderate reasons-responsiveness 
consists of two components – regular reasons-receptivity and weak reasons-
reactivity – that can accommodate the two sides of the disharmonic nature 
of akrasia. Secondly, Fischer and Ravizza’s view on what makes a mechanism 
the agent’s own matches well with the likely historical development of the 
akratēs. This reveals that it is plausible that the akratēs can be held morally 
responsible in part because he reflects on and disapproves of his akratic 
behavior.
 In this dissertation, I do not exhaust all that there is to say about 
akrasia as a character trait. Plenty of interesting research opportunities 
remain, some of which I mention in the conclusion. I have shown, however, 
that regarding akrasia primarily as a character trait is very much worthwhile, 
in particular because a character approach captures the repetitive nature and 




Stel, je bent van oordeel dat je het beste zuinig met water kunt omgaan, 
maar toch blijf je telkens weer langer onder de douche staan dan je 
zelf goed vindt. Dan handel je akratisch, dat wil zeggen, tegen je eigen 
oordeel in. In de filosofie genereert akrasia twee problemen. Hedendaagse 
filosofen benaderen akrasia vooral als logische puzzel. Hoe kan iemand 
op het moment van handelen het ene vinden en toch het andere doen? 
In de klassieke oudheid en middeleeuwen zagen filosofen akrasia echter 
vooral als moreel probleem. Ze beschouwden akrasia bijvoorbeeld als een 
karaktertrek die iemand verhindert om een goed leven te leiden. Ik claim 
dat het ook in hedendaagse filosofische discussies vruchtbaar is om akrasia 
als karaktertrek op te vatten. Dit proefschrift heeft dan ook als doel om een 
karakterbenadering van akrasia te herintroduceren in het filosofische debat.
 In het inleidende Hoofdstuk Eén leg ik uit dat de hedendaagse 
literatuur over akrasia zich vrijwel alleen maar richt op de logische puzzel 
hoe een singuliere en geïsoleerde akratische handeling mogelijk is. Deze 
logische puzzel ontstaat doordat er intuïtief gezien een sterke connectie tussen 
evaluatie/oordeel en handeling (via motivatie) lijkt te zijn. Tegelijkertijd is 
de ervaring van strikt akratisch handelen – waarbij oordeel en handeling 
overduidelijk uiteenlopen – ook overtuigend. Dit proefschrift is bewust 
niet bedoeld als een bijdrage om deze logische puzzel op te lossen. Hoewel 
het een interessant filosofisch probleem is, laat het ook een belangrijk 
aspect buiten beschouwing: het is namelijk mogelijk en zelfs typisch voor 
mensen om herhaaldelijk tegen hun eigen oordeel in te handelen. In het 
alledaagse leven vormt akrasia vooral een probleem als het telkens weer 
terugkeert. In dit proefschrift concentreer ik me daarom op akrasia als een 
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karaktertrek. Hoe ziet een vruchtbare karakterbenadering van akrasia eruit? 
Wat zijn de voordelen van en uitdagingen voor een dergelijke benadering? 
Voortbordurend op het werk van Aristoteles laat ik zien dat het loont om 
akrasia als een karaktertrek te beschouwen.
 In Hoofstuk Twee bespreek ik de belangrijkste posities in de 
hedendaagse discussies over de logische puzzel hoe strikt akratische 
handelingen mogelijk zijn. Er zijn drie strategieën om met deze logische 
puzzel om te gaan. Ik illustreer deze aan de hand van de toonaangevende 
theorieën van Richard Hare, Donald Davidson en Alfred Mele. De drie 
strategieën zijn: 1) ontkennen dat strikt akratische handelingen mogelijk 
zijn, 2) onderscheid maken tussen oordelen die gegarandeerd tot handelen 
leiden en oordelen die dat niet doen, zoals bij akratische handelingen, en 3) 
ontkennen dat er een noodzakelijke connectie is tussen oordeel, motivatie 
en handeling. Elk van deze strategieën heeft echter een probleem dat 
inherent is aan de strategie zelf. De eerste strategie neemt de ervaring van 
strikt akratisch handelen uiteindelijk niet echt serieus. De tweede strategie 
roept de vraag op waarom akrasia dan niet mogelijk is bij de oordelen die 
handelen zouden garanderen. De derde strategie maakt weliswaar ruimte 
voor de mogelijkheid van strikt akratisch handelen, maar tegen de prijs dat 
de relatie tussen oordeel, motivatie en handeling niet langer inzichtelijk is. 
Alle drie de strategieën lopen dus aan tegen een probleem dat niet op te 
lossen lijkt.
 In Hoofdstuk Drie presenteer ik de voordelen die het oplevert 
om akrasia als karaktertrek te beschouwen. Ik beargumenteer dat een 
karakterbenadering beter aansluit bij alledaagse ervaringen van akrasia, 
omdat het recht doet aan de repetitieve aard en de morele status van akrasia. 
Bovendien kan een notie van akrasia als karaktertrek alle vormen van ‘tegen 
beter weten in handelen’ omvatten. Daaronder vallen niet alleen strikt 
akratische handelingen, maar ook niet-strikte vormen zoals uitstelgedrag, 
tijdelijke oordeelsverandering en akrasia door middel van zelfbedrog of 
rationalisatie. Ook maakt een karakterbenadering het mogelijk om een 
agnostische houding aan te nemen ten opzichte van de logische puzzel. Met 
deze benadering is het namelijk mogelijk om als alternatief te focussen op 
de stabiele staat van de karaktertrek akrasia als zodanig en ook op niet-strikte 
vormen van akratisch handelen. Ten slotte betoog ik in dit hoofdstuk dat het 
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filosofisch situationisme – de positie die ontkent dat robuuste karaktertrekken 
wijdverbreid zijn – geen bedreiging vormt voor mijn project. Met behulp 
van argumenten van Tom Bates en Pauline Kleingeld laat ik zien dat de 
empirische data waar de situationisten zich op beroepen compatibel zijn 
met akrasia als karaktertrek.
 In de volgende twee hoofdstukken bespreek ik Aristoteles’ 
systematische en gedetailleerde benadering van akrasia als karaktertrek. 
Volgens Aristoteles hebben karaktertrekken, inclusief akrasia, twee 
eigenschappen: ze zijn stabiel, dat wil zeggen, ze strekken zich uit over de 
tijd, en ze zijn moreel van aard. In de beroemde passage Ethica Nicomachea 
(EN) VII.3 bespreekt hij de symptomen waarin de stabiele karaktertrek 
akrasia zich kan manifesteren. In de rest van de discussie van akrasia in EN 
VII.4-10 gaat Aristoteles in op de morele status van akrasia.
 In Hoofdstuk Vier bespreek ik Aristoteles’ visie op akrasia als 
een stabiele en langdurige karaktertrek. Volgens Aristoteles is de voor 
akrasia karakteristieke disharmonie tussen rede en affect (in hedendaagse 
terminologie: oordeel en motivatie) alleen aanwezig bij de tijdelijke en 
incidentele symptomen van de karaktertrek, dat wil zeggen, bij akratische 
handelingen. Zoals ik Aristoteles interpreteer, kunnen dit zowel strikte als 
niet-strikte akratische handelingen zijn, twee vormen die kunnen worden 
geassocieerd met respectievelijk Aristoteles’ noties van impulsiviteit en 
zwakte. Akratische handelingen zijn daarmee de symptomen of manifestaties 
van een onderliggende, stabiele en langdurige staat van akrasia. Deze stabiele 
staat wordt wellicht gekenmerkt door een blijvend cognitief gebrek, maar ik 
beargumenteer dat volgens Aristoteles er bij de akratēs in ieder geval sprake 
is van een motivationeel gebrek in de vorm van een rationeel verlangen dat 
permanent te zwak is.
 In Hoofdstuk Vijf bespreek ik Aristoteles’ idee dat akrasia een morele 
notie is. Volgens hem zorgen karaktertrekken ervoor dat een persoon een 
goede of slechte attitude heeft. Aristoteles hanteert hierbij een algemeen 
criterium van rationaliteit om karaktertrekken te evalueren. De ene 
karaktertrek volgt of schendt dit criterium meer dan de andere. In EN 
VII.4-10 schetst Aristoteles een morele hiërarchie van karaktertrekken. 
Hij vergelijkt akrasia met andere karaktertrekken zoals deugd en ondeugd, 
maar ook met enkrateia (zelfcontrole) en slapheid (waarbij iemand typisch 
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tegen beter weten in handelt vanwege een verlangen om pijn te vermijden). 
Dit laat allereerst zien waar hij akrasia plaatst in de morele hiërarchie van 
karaktertrekken. Ondeugd is het slechtst, direct daarna volgt akrasia. Ten 
tweede laat Aristoteles’ discussie in EN VII.4-10 zien welke factoren hij 
relevant vindt voor de morele evaluatie van de akratēs. Bij Aristoteles vallen 
de factoren die karaktertrekken van elkaar onderscheiden samen met de 
moreel relevante factoren. Een van de gevolgen hiervan is bijvoorbeeld dat 
hij het domein van akrasia beperkt tot het gebied van voedsel, drank en seks. 
De volledige lijst van moreel relevante factoren die Aristoteles onderscheidt 
is als volgt: 1) hoe sterk (of, zwak) het rationeel verlangen in het geval van 
de akratēs is gecultiveerd en, daarmee samenhangend, of het conflict tussen 
rede en begeerte enkel een indirecte vorm kan aannemen of ook een 
directe vorm, 2) of de rede gezond, gecorrumpeerd of afwezig is, 3) hoe 
(on)natuurlijk het is voor een mens om naar bepaalde objecten te verlangen, 
4) of de objecten worden nagestreefd omwille van plezier of om pijn te 
vermijden, en 5) of het verlangen dat een rol speelt bij akrasia de vorm 
aanneemt van begeerte (epithumia, gericht op plezier) of van thumos (gericht 
op menselijke verhoudingen, ook wel in het Nederlands vertaald als ‘drift’). 
Bij begeerte wordt ingegaan tegen praktische kennis over hoe het het beste 
is om te handelen, waarover iemand op het moment van handelen beschikt 
of kan beschikken. Bij drift handelt iemand op grond van praktische kennis 
die incompleet is.
 In de laatste twee hoofdstukken ga ik achtereenvolgens in op de 
stabiliteit en de morele status van akrasia als karaktertrek. In Hoofdstuk 
Zes behandel ik de vraag hoe we op basis van conceptuele overwegingen 
kunnen begrijpen dat akrasia een stabiele staat kan blijven. Hoe is het 
mogelijk dat akrasia zich niet verder ontwikkelt tot zelfcontrole, of anders 
degradeert tot ondeugd? Ik ga in op het werk van hedendaagse auteurs die 
zich bezighouden met karaktervorming. Hun werk schetst het beeld van 
akrasia als stadium van karakterontwikkeling. Er is inderdaad reden om aan 
te nemen dat interne conflicten, spijt en zelfkennis ertoe leiden dat de akratēs 
meer zelfcontrole ontwikkelt of minder deugdzaam wordt. Desalniettemin 
is het plausibel dat akrasia een stabiele en langdurige karaktertrek kan zijn. 
Akratische gewoontes lijken hierbij een grote rol te spelen. De vraag is echter 
waarom het niet lukt om deze gewoontes te veranderen. Een mogelijke 
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verklaring is dat hoewel interne conflicten en spijt akrasia kenmerken, deze 
niet per se continu aanwezig zijn. Als het oncomfortabele en pijnlijke gevoel 
dat ze veroorzaken er niet is, komt een akratēs er makkelijk mee weg om 
alleen de intentie te vormen om het de volgende keer beter te doen, zonder 
gelijk ook voorzorgsmaatregelen te nemen om toekomstig akratisch gedrag 
te voorkomen. Daarnaast beargumeert Amélie Rorty dat akrasia een sociale 
en politieke oorsprong kan hebben. Dit kan verklaren waarom de zelfkennis 
dat je een akratisch karakter hebt niet per se tot verandering leidt. Als Rorty 
gelijk heeft, zijn er zowel persoonlijke als maatschappelijke veranderingen 
nodig om vooruitgang te boeken als je een akratisch karakter hebt.
 Ten slotte ga ik in Hoofdstuk Zeven na op welke gronden akrasia 
als morele notie kan worden beschouwd. De grootste zorg is dat repetitief 
akratisch handelen louter een vorm van gedachteloze gewoontevorming 
zou zijn. Dit zou inhouden 1) dat we geen morele verantwoordelijkheid 
aan de akratēs kunnen toeschrijven, en 2) dat de status van akrasia als 
karaktertrek kan worden betwijfeld, aangezien het gebruikelijk is om een 
karaktertrek te definiëren als een intelligente houding die ontvankelijk 
is voor redenen. Ik ontwikkel geen volledige theorie over de morele 
verantwoordelijkheid van de akratēs, maar laat wel zien welke aspecten 
van de akratēs’ conditie meegenomen moeten worden bij overwegingen 
omtrent morele verantwoordelijkheid. Ik bespreek eerst wat volgens Julia 
Annas deugd tot een intelligente houding maakt en leg uit dat dit niet van 
toepassing is op akrasia. Haar ideeën brengen echter wel twee voorwaarden 
aan het licht waar een theorie over akrasia als een intelligente houding aan 
moet voldoen: 1) ze moet kunnen omgaan met de conflicterende aard van 
akrasia, en 2) ze moet recht doen aan hoe een akratische houding tot stand 
komt. Ik beargumenteer dat John Martin Fischer en Mark Ravizza’s theorie 
over morele verantwoordelijkheid veelbelovende handvatten biedt om aan 
deze twee voorwaarden te kunnen voldoen. Allereerst bestaat hun notie van 
‘moderate reasons-responsiveness’ uit twee componenten (‘regular reasons-
receptivity’ en ‘weak reasons-reactivity’) die tegemoet komen aan de twee 
kanten van het soort disharmonie of conflict dat akrasia kenmerkt. Ten tweede 
past Fischer en Ravizza’s idee over hoe iemand zich een mechanisme eigen 
maakt bij de wijze waarop een akratēs zich naar alle waarschijnlijkheid heeft 
ontwikkeld. Het blijkt aannemelijk dat de akratēs moreel verantwoordelijk 
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gehouden kan worden, onder meer vanwege het feit dat dit type persoon op 
zijn eigen akratische handelingen reflecteert en ze afkeurt.
 Dit proefschrift vormt een uitgangspunt om in verdere hedendaagse 
discussies akrasia als karaktertrek te benaderen. Het beoogt niet een 
uitputtende behandeling te zijn van alles wat er over akrasia als karaktertrek 
te zeggen valt. Wel toont het aan dat het heel waardevol is om akrasia als 
karaktertrek te beschouwen, omdat we op die manier recht kunnen doen 
aan de repetitieve aard en morele status van akrasia.
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